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ABSTRACT OF THESIS (Regulation 7.9)
The thesis begins with my arguing that, despite some trends in 20th c.
philosophy, there is a perfectly genuine, meaningful (and indeed, extremely
difficult) set of problems concerning free will. No amount of clarity or
precision regarding our employment of language (I argue) can make problems
about free will dissolve into nothing, and in fact, any attempted
formalisation of one or other problem about free will is really an attempt at
expressing a preverbal worry in language without losing it. In the early part
of the thesis I cite what I think are penetrating formalisations of
determinism and incompatibilism, provided by Ginet and Van Inwagen.
In Chapter 3, I elucidate and criticise 'language strata' compatibilism,
a position most notably held by Donald Davidson, this being the suggestion
that the irreducibility of the mental categories secures our freedom. In
Chapter 6, I discuss and criticise the empirical compatibilism of Keith
Lehrer, and other compabibilist projects which are tried and found wanting
include conditionalism (Chapter 8), and the Mind argument (Chapter 10), though
I recognise that the latter is really an argument for the incompatibility of
free will and indeterminism.
The empirical attempt' at establishing the absence of free will is also
criticised (Chapter 7), as is Frankfurt's attempt at marginalising free will/
determinism as anything affecting "freedom" (Chapter 9), as well as the
eliminative materialist's effort at transforming all our talk about the mental
(Chapter 5).
Having argued for incompatibilism, the concluding chapters of the thesis
include my arguing that determinism looks unlikely and that, whilst very
serious difficulties remain, any positive theory of free action will turn on
the possibility of causation without determination and this, in turn probably,
on the possibility of 'agent-causation'.
My final chapter is a brief criticism of Frankfurt's argument that moral
responsibility does not require free will.
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1. THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM
In a footnote to his essay "One Determinism"!, Ted Honderich
expresses some curiosity regarding both the number and the eminence
of contributors who have pleaded ignorance of the content of the
thesis of determinism. J.L. Austin, for instance, was 'inclined to
think that determinism...is a name for nothing clear' and that it
'has been argued for only incoherently' 2 and t in an equally
celebrated work, P.F. Strawson aligns himself with 'the party of
those who do not know what the thesis of determinism is', although,
as he says, he has 'some inkling - some notion what sort of thing is
being talked about^'. Honderich then goes on to make the deeply
revealing point, I think, that both of the aforementioned
distinguished essays arrive at substantial conclusions about what
was thought to be unclear. I would myself feel perplexed about this
quirk in the claims and conclusions of the likes of Austin and
Strawson, were it not for what I think it does in fact reveal. It
is not that I believe that the thesis of determinism cannot be
stated formally, or that it cannot be stated without incoherence, or
even (as will all be made clear) that the worries traditionally
supposed to be grounded in the prospect of its truth, are bogus. In
cs,
fact, I will be arguing that each of those claims ate mistaken.
However, what is, I think, lying at the bottom of the prima facie
incompatibility between this claim and conclusion of Austin and
Strawson, the claim of ignorance about what determinism is, and the
substantial conclusion in the face of this ignorance about
determinism, is actually something fundamental about philosophical
problems in general. Indeed, this feature of philosophical problems
is so pervasive, and so essential to what it is that make
philosophical enquiry at all valuable, that I am surprised at the
likes of Strawson failing to recognise it. The point is this:
despite what I think is the not only mistaken but intellectually
repressive idealist approach within much recent philosophy, which
dismisses a great many philosophical problems as mere manifestations
of our particular historical situation or of the accidental forms of
our language, the sources of philosophy are preverbal and often
precultural and, as Nagel points out in his introduction to
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The View from Nowhere, one of its most difficult tasks is to express
unformed but intuitively felt problems in language without losing
them. It is therefore not only entirely unwarranted of the likes of
Strawson and Austin to conclude from the fact that they do not have
a clear-cut, straightforward statement of the thesis of determinism
at their fingertips, that such a formalisation is impossible without
incoherence and that there is no free will/determinism problem^but
indeed, this is entirely of a piece with most philosophy. It can
therefore be no surprise, and in fact again I regard it as of the
utmost significance, that Strawson has 'some inkling' of what kind
of thing determinism is. To use Nagel's language, Strawson "feels"
the free will/determinism problem, I'm sure, every bit as much as
those who don't take his 'much ado about nothing' attitude
(otherwise it's doubtful whether he would have ever bothered writing
"Freedom and Resentment"). And, as I've been trying to point out,
we often do start out only with a 'felt' inkling of a philosophical
problem, and then we must struggle with existing concepts to
formalise it in a way which we can recognise as a satisfactory
articulation of this preverbal, or at least inchoate worry. To take
another example, consider realism/idealism. This seems to me to
quite obviously have its source in a highly primitive, 'gut' kind of
worry, which we must hope that we can get our concepts to meet. No
degree of Wittgensteinian purity can make it go away, since it is an
issue which outruns any level or dexterity of linguistic therapy.
We can, for instance, spend any amount of time we wish or achieve
any level of precision we could, on (say) criteria of application of
material-object words, under what conditions we are justified in
making the jump from sense-experience to perceptual claim etc., and
yet the questions which comprise realism/idealism would not have
gone away^i.e. are any of the qualities we ascribe to objects
essentially subject-dependent (this position being famously
espoused, of course, about the 'secondary' qualities)? If so, which
ones? Could they all be? Can we make sense of the notion that the
entire world could be completely different from how it appears to us
and if so, is there any reason for believing that this is the case?
Could the ultimate constituents of the universe be beyond the grasp
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of any possible human conception? Can we make sense of this idea?
(Nagel, of course, believes that, not only is the idea coherent, but
that the universe probably does outrun any possible human conception
of it.) Quite regardless of the contingencies of language or
culture at any time or place, these questions remain, and so there
is a realism/idealism problem which we must then do our best to
articulate. Similarly with ethical or aesthetic objectivity:
however difficult it may seem to articulate the problem, it would
take a very great deal indeed to persuade us that there is not, at
the very least, a different kind of subject-dependence and
subject-independence in ethics and aesthetics than there is in, say,
physics, (despite Bambrough's efforts in Moral Scepticism and Moral
Knowledge). And so on. As Nagel also points out, certain forms of
perplexity (amongst which he includes freedom) seem to embody more
insight than any of the supposed solutions, and, in his essay
'Responsibility for Self'^, Taylor makes the point most succinctly!
In philosophy typically we start off with a question, which we
all know to be badly formed at the outset. We hope that in
struggling with it, we shall find that its terms are
transformed, so that in the end we will answer a question which
we couldn't properly conceive at the beginning. We are striving
for conceptual innovation which will allow us to illuminate some
matter...which would otherwise remain dark and confused.
Indeed only just prior to the start of the above extract, Taylor
suggests that anyone who has struggled with a philosophical problem
is aware of this kind of feature, and it is surely reasonable to
assume that this includes Strawson. All the more reason, I think,
to regard it as ill-conceived on the part of Strawson (as I will
argue in more detail later) to think (as he seems to) that by
hinting, through his own proclamation of ignorance, that there is no
genuine content to the thesis of determinism and by offering what I
take to be some banalities and trivialities, the free will problem
will be seen to be bogus.
As the remarks of Taylor cited above suggest, formalisation of a
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philosophical problem frequently doesn't come easily. And indeed,
before we can even arrive at what we know to be an unsatisfactory
articulation, we may well have to first articulate and recount what
gives rise to the feeling that there is a problem at all. I have
already sketched an example of this, in the case of
realism/idealism, citing the fundamental features about ourselves
and the world which gives rise to the problem. Similarly with free
will/determinism. We can only arrive at even a poor and murky
articulation of the problem through articulating and recounting
factors which give us the primitive feeling that there is anything
to be worried about at all. It strikes me, indeed, as wholly
unsurprising that in 'Freedom and Resentment' Strawson makes no
serious effort to consider these relevant factors, and it is little
more than trite to suggest that had he done so, he would never have
thought that the issues which he claims to address could have been
dealt with in the dismissive fashion he displays.
In common, again, with a great many philosophical problems, free
will/determinism has something of a chequered history. In the same
way in which it may come more easily to say what it is (for
instance) that empiricism denies rather than what it asserts, we
could fairly painlessly grant the likes of Strawson that the terms
"free will" and "determinism" do not each, within philosophical
history, mark off single unambiguous theories going up for grabs.
To see this, however, as a reason for denying the authenticity of
the free will/determinism problem would also commit one to denying
the credibility, I expect, of most classical problems of philosophy,
e.g. empiricism/rationalism, realism/idealism, monism/dualism, and
perhaps most famously of all^ the analytic/synthetic distinction. I
expect that neither Strawson nor Austin would want to do this. Here
again, free will/determinism strikes me as merely typically
philosophical; the various attempts throughout philosophical
history at stating both theories have been attempts, for better or
worse, at stating some fundamental intuition, itself felt in the
most deep and primitive way, and resulting from observations,
intuitions, reflections and worries about ourselves, the world, and
the interaction between ourselves and the world. It can hardly be
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any surprise that the free will problem has the (typically
philosophical) history which it does have and indeed, the situation
is perhaps exacerbated in the case of free will/determinism by the
historical presence of the theses of compatibilism and
incompatibilism; the former thesis is that human freedom can be
reconciled with determinism, the latter that determinism precludes
human freedom. Again unsurprisingly, it is frequently the case that
not much is specified regarding determinism, and nor is anything
specified regarding free will. And in fact, the terms "free will"
and "determinism" have been frequently defined so that one
explicitly excludes the other, this taking incompatibilism for
granted. However, I say again that, at the bottom of all the
ceremony and flailing about, are primitive intuitions, and before I
cite or consider any specific formalisations of the determinist
theory, it is more than worthwhile, I think, to recount what it is
that gives rise to those intuitions in the case of free
will/determinism. At any rate, to do so can do no harm, and I would
hope that it would also make it clear why I regard any of the
formalisations of determinism, indeterminism, libertarianism,
compatibilism or incompatibilism which I will cite, as challenging
and interesting. However, before actually recounting the
significant factors, I think it very worthwhile to note comments
made by Peter Van Inwagen, in his excellent Essay on Free Will,
comments which are at least germane to this point. I began by
noting Honderich's slight exasperation at claims made by such as
Strawson and Austin which (if sound) would seem to marginalise
determinism as any sort of issue, and Van Inwagen displays a similar
kind of exasperation about a feature of incompatibilism's fate in
philosophical history. It is, notes Van Inwagen, surprisingly hard
to find any arguments for incompatibilism, i.e. surprising in light
of the fact that arguments are so easy to give:
Perhaps the explanation is simply that the arguments are so
obvious that no one has thought them worth stating. If that is
so, let ue3 not be afraid of being obvious.
Van Inwagen then goes on immediately to state what he takes to be an
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obvious argument (in that it should occur) for incompatibilism (the
Consequence Argument), which he fleshes out admirably in the book,
and about which I will go on to say much more:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of
the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not
up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up
to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences
of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.
Van Inwagen's rather brazen remarks here are interesting, I think.
Like the efforts of Honderich, they are a sharp reminder to the
likes of Strawson and Austin that there may well be worries
regarding a thing called 'determinism' and a thing called 'free
will'. At the same time, however, they do not gainsay my earlier
remarks regarding the primitive, preconceptual well-spring of the
problem. Strawson and Austin may say (as I expect a great many
others would) that the above formalisation is ludicrously bland, and
on inspection can be seen to not actually state any problem, since
it contains concepts which are ultimately vaccuous, e.g. 'law of
nature'. Even Van Inwagen^ however, is perfectly well aware that a
great deal of cashing out and defence of this argument is required,
a great deal of the book being devoted to just this (including
remarks on the notion of a 'law of nature', a notion which I will
say something about later). Van Inwagen knows that this
formalisation of the Consequence Argument can only be a start. It
is the first primitive efforts and, although these embryonic steps
may be obvious the subsequent steps (as the book bears out) may be
somewhat more tricky. The point is, however, that despite the
dismissiveness of Strawson or Austin, it may well be the start, the
first efforts, the first tottering steps of something, and if it is
not, then we can really only find out by examination and argument
(Honderich is also, likewise, well aware that a defence of his
determinist premises is required, and so too is Ginet, as I will
document).
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At the forefront of the factors generating the free
will/determinism worry is undoubtedly the achievements of the
sciences, and most importantly of the aspiring sciences of man.
Strawson may or may not be right in believing that we cannot but
assume in most everyday life that on many occasions we are free
agents, able to do or abstain from doing this or that at will. This
assumption, or alleged assumption of ours could conceivably be a
merely local feature, peculiar to a particular historical
standpoint, or a particular culture - specific psychological trait.
However, there's little to be lost, I think, in allowing for the
moment that such an assumption is as given, as fixed as the likes of
Kant and Strawson claim. The first problem, however, for this
assumption as stated here, is not, in fact, one which is
specifically generated by the achievements of science, though it may
well be the case that the latter contribute further to its
appearance of intractability. This is the question of precisely
what an 'ability' or a 'capacity' is: it is said that we believe
ourselves able to do things which we don't do. But what exactly
does this mean? What do I mean when I say that I can do something
at a time when I am not doing it, and how do I know that it is
true? As Dennett puts it in a footnote to his essay "On Giving
Libertarians What They Say They Want "5
How can the unique four-dimensional world-worm that comprises
all that has happened and will happen admit of a notion of
possibilities that are not actualities? What does an
opportunity look like when the world is viewed sub specie
aeternitatis ?
I will be arguing later, for instance, that Keith Lehrer, in 'An
Empirical Disproof of Determinism?'6, and M.R. Ayers in 'The
Refutation of Determinism , are operating with a significantly
evasive notion of capacity, which they don't appear to recognise as
a problem. At any rate it appears to me to be a very real problem.
And, as I've indicated, the achievements of the sciences tend, if
anything, to exacerbate this problem; even if we are confident that
we can make sense of the notion of an opportunity, the notion that
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we can do something at a time when we are not doing it, there
remains the further question of whether we ever actually have
opportunities, i.e. whether we actually can genuinely ever do
something other than what we do. It may seem to be both a
presupposition and implication of the achievements of the sciences
that there are, in truth, no genuine alternatives; and that
everything, human conduct not excluded, really happens necessarily,
and of course, it is well known that Kant was aware of this, and
thought himself able to secure human freedom only through
postulating a mysterious and inaccessible component of the self,
i.e. the noumenal self. The problem is that mechanisms are regarded
as the paradigm case of the cause-effect relation, the archetypal
exemplars of notions of natural law and inevitability. Once wound
up properly and whilst in good working order the clock cannot but go
round - it is nonsense to entertain the prospect of its doing
otherwise. Furthermore, it would be an especially bizarre piece of
nonsense to ascribe the notion of choice to the clock, to say that
it is "deciding" to go round for another few hours or, for that
matter, to ascribe feelings to it, say of enjoying going round.
This sort of consideration both reinforces and is reinforced by the
legacy of Cartesianism, according to which mechanisms don't choose,
will, think, feel or do anything "mental" (except perhaps in the
flimsy metaphorical sense), with the consequence that, in so far as
humans do these "mental" things, they cannot be mechanisms. They
may, by all means be mechanisms, but they cannot be mechanisms and
nothing else besides. This is the force behing the locution "mere
mechanism", and the attendant worry, which arose as science seemed
to be bringing increasing phenomena under its mechanistic tutelage,
the anxiety being fed that it was only a matter of time until humans
were, just like the rest, completely conquered; at which point,
being no different really from the clock, we would have to abandon
grand ethereal notions that we are free to choose what to do and
what not to do. As Dennett puts it:
How can a material thing (a mechanism) be correctly said to
reason, to have reasons, to act on reasons?^
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At any rate the relatively skeletal set of considerations I have
just advanced seem to me, despite Strawson, to be more than enough
to generate scepticism regarding human freedom, and the ascriptions
of responbility which seem to depend on it, this in turn seeming to
be a condition of a whole set of reactive attitudes, such as praise,
blame, love, gratitude, indignation, and, of course, resentment.
These considerations should give us an idea of what a rigorous
formalisation of the thesis of determinism would look like and
again, it has to be significant that Strawson doesn't look at one
actual formalisation. Three particular formalisations of the
determinism thesis have struck me as admirably concise and
challenging, with nothing obviously bogus about the consequences of
their truth for the way in which we view human actions, these being
Carl Ginet's "Might We Have No Choice?"^, Ted Honderich's "One
Determinism"^, and that put forward by Van Inwagen (the
aforementioned) in his Essay on Free Will. In fairness to Strawson
and Austin, I suppose the title of Honderich's essay contains a
tacit recognition that the history of writing on the free will
problem displays its share of conceptual confusion and possibly even
downright subterfuge (though again, I'm not convinced that this is
appreciably more so than with any other traditional philosophical
problem), hardly forgetting the fact that the bare facts of timing
leave it unreasonable to hold the Strawson of "Freedom and
Resentment" or the Austin of "Ifs and Cans", responsible for failure
to be acquainted with the cited works of Honderich, Ginet and Van
Inwagen. However, the fact that such formalisations are possible at
all reveals, I think, that it is unwarranted of Austin or Strawson
to claim that determinism is some sort of non-thesis or non-problem,
which a proper appreciation of our practices and conditions of
language use would reveal to be empty. I will soon devote some
attention and consideration to Ginet's enterprise, in particular.
The root problem to be formalised is surely that of the threat to
personal authorship: the prospect of an all-encompassing
explanation of our actions in terms of cause and effect, a la the
physical sciences, forces upon us the primitive, but deeply felt
intuition that we are, in fact, merely the focus of causal summation
for external influence, there being no room left for me as the
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author of decisions and actions. If a person is one physical
object among many in the natural order of cause and effect and can
(in principle at least) be exhaustively described in such terms,
then how can the notion of a person as decision maker get a
foothold? That is, if a person is absolutely nothing more than a
cog in the cause-effect wheel, then surely what the person will do
can be wholly accounted for in terms of natural causal law, thus
rendering the person ultimately impotent with regard to what he will
do. It will be no surprise that this has by no means been accepted
by everyone^ i.e. not everyone has accepted that the prospect of a
comprehensive physical (causal) explanation of all human activity
has the desperate consequences for our notions of freedom and
responsibility that it is generally taken to have. Among those
dissenters, as I will elucidate, are Davidson, Dennett and
Honderich. However, as I will also be elucidating in what is to
come, I agree (as I will document shortly) with the claim endorsed
by Malcolm^0, Van Inwagen and Ginet, that comprehensive physical
explanation of all human activity would cut across all ontologies
and would leave no room whatever for notions of freedom and
responsiblity; this, despite, not only Kant, but the desperate
manoeuverings of 'language strata' theorists such as Davidson,
'human nature' apologists such as Strawson, and those who try to
purge causality of its full-blooded centrality and significance,
such as Dennett and Harry G. Frankfurt (as I will cite later). And,
of course, hardly to be forgotten is the notion of the self. If it
is taken to be a different type of object from, and ultimately
independent of, the natural world of cause and effect, it would seem
impossible to fit it in anywhere, if a comprehensive physical
explanation of all human activity can be provided. If we are in
fact creatures of a programme which we do not ourselves writey then
any notion of the self as the unique entity which is ultimately
efficacious with regard to action, seems to lose all credence. The
clock, for instance doesn't contain some component over and above
the material parts functioning according to natural laws of cause
and effect and the prospect which (I, at any rate, think) would be
presented by the truth of universal physical causation, is that
persons are, in the significant sense, absolutely no different.
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They may just be considerably more sophisticated in detail, that's
all (and, as I will cite later, Dennett is one who mistakenly, I
believe, holds the disparity in sophistication to be that which is
ultimately important). Indeed by the end of the first paragraph of
"One Determinism", Honderich has concluded that, if the determinism
he is suggesting is, in fact truey
It follows too that, we are not responsible for our actions,
and, what is most fundamental, that we do not possess selves of
a certain character.
The promptness alone of Honderich here, in floating this apparently
calamitous conclusion, makes the apparent ignorance and
dismissiveness of the likes of Austin and Strawson as regards
determinism all the more unlikely. I hope that I have demonstrated
here, that despite Austin and Strawson, the recounting of a few of
what I think are now little more than banalities, reveals a real
problem, and with all the monumental possible consequences it is
felt, on the most primitive level, to have. The primary reason that
I am impressed by the formalisation of the problem which I am about
to consider, i.e. Carl Ginet's 'Might We Have No Choice?' is that it
is a coherent and carefully thought articulation of those deeply and
unmistakeably felt worries, which are instantly recognisable as such
within the formulation. It is merely a postulated determinism i.e.
Ginet is not especially arguing for its truth, nor is he even
strongly suggesting that it is likely to be true. He is, however,
arguing for its logical tenability, as well as claiming that we do
not now know it to be false. And, as Ginet says, if the attempt is
successful, that should be of sufficient interest in itself, and if
it is not, then perhaps it will have been done in such a way as to
make it possible to see why it has failed, and possibly even to see
why any attempt at this task must fail. Austin and Strawson should
perhaps note that it is not stated in one sentence; perhaps they
made the error of expecting it to be, concluding that, since little
of any interesting or useful content can be said about free
will/determinism in one sentence, then there is no coherent thesis
of determinism. Even Honderich, as I've said, takes a full
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paragraph to state it, and also requires three separate premises,
which he argues for in turn. This, as I've said, seems like most
philosophical problems of any interest, and the likes of Austin and
Strawson would do well to always bear in mind Charles Taylor's
comments about philosophy in general, which I noted earlier.
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2. A FORMALIZATION
The initial stage of Ginet's enterprise involves formalising a
certain relation between kinds of events (or states of affairs or
circumstances), which he calls the relation of contingent
necessitation. If 'A' and 'B' are descriptions specifying kinds of
events (states of affairs, circumstances), then 'A' contingently
necessitates 'B' if and only if
(1) 'A' does not entail 'B'
(2) every instance of 'A' is accompanied by an instance of 'B' (in
a manner indicated in the descriptions 'A' and 'B'),
and
(3) no one ever has a choice as to whether or not an instance of
'A' shall be accompanied by an instance of 'B'.
Ginet cites cases where connections of contingent necessitation are
already reasonably believed to hold e.g. if a piece of copper
surrounded by ordinary atmospheric conditions becomes hotter, then
it must expand or (say) if a small material body such as a bowling
ball, is left near but not in contact with a very large material
body, such as the earth, without anything between them but air, then
the small body must move into contact with the large one. We can,
notes Ginet, check these examples against the three defining
conditions of contingent necessitation:
(1) We do in each case understand the antecedent and consequent in
such a way that the former does not entail the latter,
supposing that the terms "hotter" (in the first case), and the
notion of gravitational force (in the second case) are both
understood in their everyday, pre-theoretical sense.
(2) We do in each case believe, that every instance of the
antecedent description (so understood) has been and will be
accompanied by an instance of the consequent description.
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(3) We do believe that no one ever has any choice as to whether or
not an instance satisfying the antecedent description shall be
accompanied by an instance satisfying the consequent
description.
It is, I think, worth pausing and discussing some questions arising
here. Note that, whilst Ginet's explication of 'contingent
necessitation' is certainly rigorous, contingent necessitation
seems, on examination, to add up to little more than our fairly
basic,unreflective idea of straightforward causation. This is, I
think, significant. And what is significant is that whilst it
certainly could become important within another stage of the free
will/determinism discussion, it is not, I think, at the moment
necessary to attempt to settle time-honoured problems regarding the
whole concept of causality itself. At the moment, we can, I think,
remain entirely neutral as regards the questions about causality
which the likes of Kant and Hume famously attempted to answer; we
needn't worry, for the time being, whether causality is, for
instance, an a priori condition of any experience of the world, or
what sense we can make of the idea of something over and above the
mere observation of constant conjunction. Whilst it will undergo
important clarification throughout the course of this thesis, all we
need be clear about for the moment is that whatever ordinary
causality is, that is exactly what is being talked about here, in
the concept of contingent necessitation. This feature is reinforced
by the banality of Ginet's examples,i.e. the expansion of the heated
copper, and the effect of gravity upon the bowling ball - whatever
straightforward causation is exactly, that is what is going on here,
and it is this, nothing more and nothing less which, largely,
generates the free will problem. In the same way in which I can
look out of the window to see if my father is arriving, and
confidently settle this question without first having to settle the
question of what persons are, what constitutes identity of persons
over time, and whether realism or idealism about the physical world
is true, we do not first have to settle all problems about causality
to know that causation generates a problem about free will. Indeed,
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in "One Determinism", Honderich makes this point:
In what follows, incidentally, I shall speak in an ordinary way
of causes. That is, a cause will be taken to be a chosen
member of some set of conditions sufficient to produce an event
or a state. To say of a state that it had a cause is to imply
rather than assert, that the state was the effect of some
sufficient set of conditions. It will make no substantial
difference if one understands sufficiency in terms of constant
conjunction or in terms of some stronger notion, (emphasis mine)
In fact, before returning to Ginet's specific offering, I feel it of
some value to say some more on this and related issues. The primary
reason I feel it important to do some clearing up here is that some
have thought that until we have a complete understanding of the
concept of causality and the closely related concept of a '"law of
nature" (which we have already seen appear in Van Inwagen's
formulation of incompatibilism), then we can barely make any sense
of the thesis of determinism, let alone begin to enquire whether it
is true. Others have thought that we know enough about those kind
of concepts to know that their nature makes any attempt at
forumlating the thesis of determinism collapse into incoherence
(included in this class of concepts also, is the concept of
"sufficient conditions"). Indeed, particular post-modern
philosophical trends have tended to lend weight to scepticism about
the import of concepts such as causation, sufficient conditions, and
laws of nature. I feel it important to make some sort of response
to these gestures, though (as will be borne out), I cannot begin to
attempt an exhaustive analysis of the concepts in question. All I
can do is finish what I have begun in the last few paragraphs, which
is really to put the required concepts, and our understanding of
them (or its lack) into some sort of perspective, vis a vis
determinism. I said a moment ago that clarification would be
required regarding the centrality of ordinary causality to the free
will problem, and I will begin by saying that causation alone does
not generate the free will problem. What generates a problem about
free will is laws ("laws of nature", as we have seen Van Inwagen
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call them), and despite Davidson's claim that causality is
nomological in character, singular cases of causation are not qua
cases of causation, an index to some or other law of nature; this
view is supported by Searle in his book "Intentionality" and I will
give much greater substance to this issue later, when I come to
discuss the mind (compatibilist) argument. We will also see Ginet
talk later of laws which would be required by his determinist
hypothesis ("physiological-cum-environmental"). Indeed, Van
Inwagen's distinction between the thesis of determinism and the
Principle of Universal Causation will become very important later,
not least when agent-causation gets onto the agenda. Determinism
being defined by Van Inwagen as the thesis that there is at any
instant exactly one physically possible future, he notes that in
order to deduce determinism from the Principle of Universal
Causation, we should-nefee at least three premises:
neec\
(1) if an event (or fact, change, state of affairs, or what have
you) has a cause, then its cause is always itself an event (or
what have you), and never a substance or continuant, such as a
man (the truth of "agent-causation" would falsify this);
(2) if an event (or what have you) 'A' was the cause of an event
'B', then it follows, given that 'A' happened and given the
laws of nature, that 'A' "causally necessitated" 'B', that 'B'
could not have failed to happen.
(3) every chain of causes that has no earliest member is such that,
for every time 't', some event in that chain happens earlier
than 't'.
We can see from this immediately that as well as the concept of
causation, in order to "get to" determinism, Van Inwagen has had to
invoke the concept "law of nature". Without the latter concept,
according to Van Inwagen, it may well be the case that while every
event has a prior cause, the past nevertheless does not determine a
unique future. The first thing I think it essential to stress is
that we undoubtedly have the concepts of causation and law of
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nature (and "sufficient condition"). I have just cited how little
Honderich feels it necessary to say on these issues, and as far as
causation is concerned, Ginet feels it unnecessary to say much more
than to define "contingent necessitation" as he has done, and
provide analogies, such as that of the expanding heated copper.
When he gets to the flesh of his 'H' hypotheses, he feels that he
can get away with talking straight off, of ("physiological-cum-
environmental") laws, i.e. without really saying anything about the
entire concept of a natural law. I've already indicated that I can
really find little fault myself with these presuppositions of Ginet
and Honderich. Going back in particular to Ginet's analogy, it
seems to me that we confidently employ the required concepts to say
that the expansion of the copper was caused by its being heated, and
that this in turn can be explained by some or the other law ("of
nature", if one wishes). It seems indisputable that we have no
choice about what these laws are (it was not up to us whether the
copper expanded on its being heated), and the worry which Ginet,
Honderich or Van Inwagen seem to be floating for us, is that our own
behaviour may in principle be explicable in exactly the same fashion^
i.e. by being subsumed under laws which are not up to us. As I've
indicated, it does not seem to me that any gaps in our precise
understanding of causation and natural law (or any allegations about
subject-input), undermine the coherence or reality of this worry.
Van Inwagen, like Honderich, pretty much refuses to set foot in the
minefield of causation but he does, I think, have some more than
useful comments to make on the notion of a law of nature, comments
which I think help defend the concept against its disparagers, and
consequently, help defend the thesis of determinism against the
charge of incoherence. He admits, right at the outset, that he does
not know how to define "law of nature". However, he does suggest
some constraints on an adequate definition of the concept and some
necessary conditions for its application. For instance,
(i) the phrase 'is a law of nature' is a real predicate: it is
typically and properly used in ascribing a certain property
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to certain objects (unlike, say, 'exists', according to Kant,
or 'is good', according to R.M. Hare),
(ii) the objects that have this property are sentences or
propositions (non-linguistic entities expressed by sentences)
or whatever it is that are bearers of truth-value: anything
that is a law is also either true or false,
(iii) whether a proposition or sentence is a law is independent of
what scientists or others happen to believe or happen to have
discovered: a proposition, if it is a law, is unchangeably
and objectively so, whatever mathematicians or others happen
to believe or happen to have proved.
I think these remarks of Van Inwagen are of great importance, and I
hope their importance will become clear as I proceed. The crucial
point, which I feel cannot be over-stressed, is that, however much
some may point to arbitrary or subjective elements in our
formulation of natural laws, the fact remains that the alleged laws
are true or false, only as a consequence of features independent of
us and which we discover. Even if there are arbitrary or
subject-dependent elements within the vocabulary which we use to
approach an investigation, there are, within that vocabulary,
objective facts. As Kenny says in "Freedom, Spontaneity and
Indifference"^ (when discussing Davidson), even if there is some
sense in which laws are "linguistic", there is surely also an
equally important sense in which they are natural^e.g. it is surely
a natural impossibility that I cannot fly. Indeed, it seems to me
that proper understanding of what I have just said leads one to see
that there is something suspect about the whole linguistic/natural
distinction. And it seems to be that when we entertain our
half-formed, poorly conceptualised worry about determinism and free
will, we are actually worrying that it may be a natural
impossibility that I can act other than how I do act. As Van
Inwagen says, 'law of nature' seems to be an intelligible concept
and one we can't get along without if we wish to give a complete
description of the world. Indeed, I think it worth quoting an
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example Van Inwagen gives of this, and I think it is helpful that it
is quite independent of any problems about determinism:
I have recently read an article on the possibility of
intersidereal travel in which the authors divide the unpleasant
necessities of this sort into two categories: those imposed
upon the travellers by the ignorance of the designer of their
vehicle, and those imposed upon the travellers by the laws of
nature....certain disadvantages of intersidereal travel are not
going to be removed by technological advance as the
corresponding disadvantages of inter-continental travel were
removed. Inter-continental travel, now a matter of hours was
once a matter of months or years. But intersidereal travel, if
it should ever come to pass, will always be a matter of years
or centuries. No technological advance could ever change this
unfortunate fact for it is a consequence of the laws of nature.2
Whilst the concept of 'law of nature' may remain undefined, this
kind of example surely demonstrates that it is an undefined concept
we at least have. This, I hope, clears the ground, for much of what
is to come, and I can now get back specifically to Ginet.
Ginet's next formal manoeuvre, which will be seen to have major
ramifications as the discussion proceeds, is the notion of a
complete first-level description of a person's behaviour during a
certain period. This is a description that contains only the
specification of all the places occupied by all the externally
observable parts of a person's body throughout that period, relative
to each other and to the adjacent environment, as well as the
specification of all the sounds emitted by his body during that
period. And we should really prick up our ears at this point, and
take very careful note, that is, of what a complete first-level
description does not include. The significant point regarding a
complete first-level description is that it does not contain
ascriptions of intentionality to persons, i.e. intentional verbs are
strictly precluded. Within a complete first-level description, a
person will not be described in the vocabulary of action; he will
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not want, wish, believe, hope, desire, fear, intend, do, etc. By
way of example, Ginet notes that "He repeatedly buzzed the other
office" is not a first-level, but a higher-level description. Such
a description cannot be a first-level one, since it contains an
action-description; the person is described as doing something
(i.e. buzzing the other office), which a first-level description
cannot, by stipulation, accommodate. Ginet clarifies by going on to
note that the statement "His arm and hand repeatedly moved so as to
press his finger against the button on the side of the desk", does
not ascribe any action to the person, and can therefore be a part of
a first-level description. However, it still cannot be a complete
one, since it makes no mention of what the rest of his body did at
the same time. The significance of this notion^i.e. the complete
first-level description, both what it includes and what it does not
include, cannot be over-stressed, and should become clear as the
discussion proceeds, since several attempts of some note at squaring
free will with determinism have turned upon the (alleged) dualism of
physical and intentional, the latter's non-reducibility to the
former, and its explanatory indispensability. Indeed I will, in the
course of the discussion, be forced to confront and examine various
important claims in this regard/i.e. what the claim of the
irreducibility of the intentional actually is, whether it is a
justified claim, whether the intentional idiom is actually
indispensable for a complete account of the world, and what import
the answers to all of these questions have (if any) for human
freedom. This project will, in fact, entail the examination of a
specific attempt at demonstrating that there is no conclusive ground
for believing that the intentional idiom is indispensable, this
being the well-known Eliminative Materialism put forward by Paul
Churchland in his essay "Eliminative Materialism and the
Propositional Attitudes".3 It is worthwhile, I think, to keep a
note of these broad issues in mental brackets for the time being,
until I actually rigorously examine them. Now I will press ahead
with an elucidation of Ginet.
Having elucidated the notions of contingent necessiation and
complete first-level description, Ginet is now in a position to
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state his major hypothesis, which he calls 'H':
(H) Every temporal segment of every human being's behaviour
has a complete first-level description 'B', and a series of
antecedent sets of circumstances having the descriptions 'A]/,
'A2',...'An' such that
(1) 'A)' does not entail 'B',
(2) Ai contingently necessitates A2, A2 contingently necessitates
A3,..., An_i contingently necessitates An, An contingently
necessitates B,
and
(3) the human being in question clearly had no choice whether or
not the antecedent instance of A^ would occur.
This hypothesis entails that no human being ever has a choice as to
whether or not his behaviour shall satisfy the first-level
description it does. And it is impossible to over-stress the
significance of Ginet's next claim, namely that this hypothesis
entails that no one has any choice as to what descriptions of any
kind his behaviour satisfies. Whilst this claim is far from
gratuitous and has to be upheld in the face of some distinguished
opposition, I feel it worthwhile, before I go on, to consider some
opposition, to document another incompatibilist argument, which is
somewhat germane, this being Van Inwagen's First Formal Argument. A
look at this just now will, I think, help reinforce what could
usefully be called the trans-vocabulary consequences of H (to which
we have just seen Ginet refer). This will be seen, I think, to be
especially useful, when I come soon to consider the 'language
strata' theorists, who think that we can make sense of the idea of
free will in the face of determinism through shifting vocabulary,
i.e. from the physical (determinsim) to the intentional (free
will). According to this, Ginet's claim that the truth of H would
preclude any sort of choice as to what description our behaviour
satisfies is false, since the truth of determinism need not be
incompatible with our having choice about which action-description
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our behaviour satisfies. As I say, I will soon consider (and
attempt to refute) this position, but before doing so, let us look
at Van Inwagen's First Formal (incompatibilist) Argument. As with
Ginet's comments, Van Inwagen's argument here leaves it looking very
difficult to make any sort of sense of the idea of free will in the
face of exhaustive physical explanation, so before considering an
effort at doing so in the shape of the 'language strata' approach, I
will document it.
Some of the vocabulary of the argument will have to be simply
assumed. Van Inwagen makes rather arduous attempts at cashing it
all out, but I would prefer for the time being, at any rate, to
simply assume that (as with concepts such as causation and 'law of
nature') we are always dealing with concepts which we already have,
and which admit of some sort of satisfactory account, even if we are
not, in fact, presently in possession of such (though I will, in
fact, be saying much more about causality, for one thing, later).
'To' denotes some arbitrary chosen instant of time earlier than J's
birth, 'Po' denotes a proposition that expresses the state of the
world at To, 'P' a proposition that expresses the state of the world
at J, and 'L' the conjunction into a single proposition of all the
laws of nature. The argument consists of seven propositions, the
seventh of which follows from the first six:
(1) If determinism is true, then the conjunction of Po and L
entails P.
(2) It is not possible that J have raised his hand at T and P be
true.
(3) If (2) is true, then if J could have raised his hand at T, J
could have rendered P false.
(4) If J could have rendered P false, and if the conjunction of Po
and L entails P, then J could have rendered the conjunction of
Po and L false.
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(5) If J could have rendered the conjunction of Po and L false,
then J could have rendered L false.
(6) J could not have rendered L false.
(7) If determinism is true, J could not have raised his hand at T.
That (7) follows from (1) - (6) is easy enough to establish,
and I won't really concern myself with Van Inwagen's rather laboured
and not obviously essential defence of each premise which follows
what I have just presented as his argument. I will asume, for
present purposes, that the argument is solid. It is, as I've said,
more than useful to keep it established in our minds, as I move on
to the 'language strata' theorists, such as Davidson. It's worth
noting also that, unlike Ginet, who at least takes trouble to
disclaim it, Van Inwagen doesn't even make any reference at this
point to the 'language strata' defence of free will. He perhaps
regards it unnecessary to even state the trans-vocabulary
consequences of determinism. (Incidentally, Van Inwagen also, in an
essay "The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism"^, expresses
admiration for Ginet's essay.) However, for the likes of Davidson,
whilst there may, at the bedrock level of human behaviour, (e.g.
neurophysiological and chemical) be laws of nature, expressible in a
physical vocabulary, our freedom is nevertheless secured via the
realm of the intentional, i.e. whilst a straightforward physical
determinism with regard to human behaviour, such as Ginet's 'H'
hypothesis,may well be true, human freedom is nevertheless
unimpeded, since the mental enjoys an essential autonomy vis ^ vis
the physical, mental concepts not being reducible to or translatable
into physical ones and mental events being only contingently related
to the physical events with which they are identical or correlated.
I am myself ultimately in agreement with Ginet, that the truth of a
hypothesis such as 'H' leaves us unable to sustain any attempt at
locating human freedom within some other non-physical, allegedly
autonomous vocabulary (and that Van Inwagen's First Formal Argument
is germane to the point). However, those who have endeavoured to
make this attempt at safeguarding freedom in the face of strict
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physical determinism coherent and defensible, include Donald
Davidson, Jerry Fodor, Jaegwon Kim and Daniel Dennett. The
arguments have to be taken seriously, and before returning to Ginet,
I will have to defend his claim regarding the consequences of the
truth of 'H' against the opposition provided by the likes of
Davidson, Fodor, Kim and Dennett. I now turn to this opposition,
and I will call its propounders the 'language strata' theorists.
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26
3. THE 'LANGUAGE STRATA* THEORISTS
By far the most distinguished proponent of this position is
Donald Davidson. Davidson wants to say that something significantly
like Ginet's 'H' is true, but that recourse to a different (i.e.
mental) vocabulary will reveal to us a refuge for our freedom.
Contributors such as Jerry Fodor and Jaegwon Kim have attempted to
make a stance such as Davidson's both clearer and more persuasive,
and so Davidson's efforts, whilst I will find them ultimately
defective, have to be taken seriously.
By way of preliminary, I think it interesting and useful (as
often), to note the contextualising of Davidson on this point, which
is provided by Van Inwagen. Van Inwagen is quite right, I think, to
say, as he does at the beginning, that discussions of the question
whether free will is compatible with determinism are usually not on
a very high level. As he says, they are very often the work of
compatibilists, and consist to a large degree in the ascription of
some childish fallacy or other to incompatibilists (conflation of
"descriptive" and "prescriptive" laws; failure to distinguish
between causal necessity and compulsion; equation of freedom and
mere randomness). As an incompatibilist, I have myself been
frequently irritated by these asciptions, and Davidson places
himself in this tradition when he writes:
I shall not be directly concerned with [arguments for the
incompatibility of freedom and causal determination] since I
know of none that is more than superficially plausible.
Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Moore, Schlick, Ayer, Stevenson, and a
host of others have done what can be done, or ought ever to
have been needed, to remove the confusions that can make
determinism seem to oppose freedom.1
I can only hope that, as I go on, I will demonstrate that not only
am I not suffering from any incompatibilist illusion that may exist,
but that, despite the efforts of the writers Davidson lists, as well
as Davidson's own dismissiveness, incompatibilism is indeed
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correct. A large part of this demonstration will, of course, entail
addressing myself to the compatibilist claims put forward by
Davidson and the like. (Indeed, I hope that by the end of this
work, it will appear reasonable to add the names of Lehrer, Dennett
and Mackie to this list of somewhat self-assured compatibilists.)
It ought perhaps to be said, at the outset, that not everyone
is likely to agree (immediately at any rate) that Davidson's
position actually amounts to the purported truth of something
significantly like Ginet's H, with which he must try to square
freedom. However, I hope to make it clear why it seems to me that,
at bottom, Davidson is a fairly ordinary physical determinist, and
has a job on his hands making any sense of the notion of human
freedom. Ginet, remember has said that the complete absence of
choice regarding which complete first-level description is going to
be true of us, undercuts any sensible idea of choice or freedom.
This is exactly the claim which 'language strata' theorists dispute,
and the key to understanding Davidson's position lies in unpacking
this statement, which he makes in the aforementioned "Freedom to
Act":
...His action, in the sense in which action depends on
intentionality, occurs or not as he wills; what he does in the
broader sense, may occur whether or not he wills it (emphasis
mine).
In order to make some sense of this it is, I think, necessary to
document more general features of Davidson's approach to mind and
action. Davidson, as is well-known, is the foremost proponent of
the theory Anomalous Monism. The theory is substance monist but
property dualistyi.e. there is one type of stuff, namely physical
stuff, but two types of properties (or property-types), physical and
mental, neither being reducible to or translatable into the other.
All events are physical, but some physical events are also mental
events, and the properties which make these events mental are
irreducibly mental in character, being conceptually tied to an
exclusively mental idiom. The theory is anomalous in virtue of the
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alleged Anomalism of the Mental,i.e. the assumption that there are
no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can
be predicted and explained. (In fact, whilst it isn't necessary to
be particularly concerned with it at the moment, Kim argues that,
despite Davidson's lack of rigour and clarity on the issue, the
principle of the Anomalism of the Mental is actually the conjunction
of two separate, more narrow premises, which Kim calls
Psychophysical Anomalism and Psychological Anomalism. The first is
that there are no laws connecting mental and physical phenomena, and
the second is that there are no laws connecting psychological events
with other psychological events, which can be used to predict and
explain these events^.) It is more than worth re-stating at this
point that it is only our seemingly indelible conviction that our
mental lives are both in some sense autonomous and ultimately
efficacious with regard to our actions, which gives rise to the
primitive, preverbal feeling of personal authorship (agency) and
consequently the whole problem of free will. It is the prospect
that this belief is entirely ungrounded that we are worried the
sciences of man could eventually reveal to us. I re-state this,
since Davidson is quite explicit in holding fast to these
fundamental cornerstones of our belief in our own agency, i.e. the
autonomy and the efficacy of the mental. And it should not, I
think, be difficult to see that if, as I have suggested, Davidson's
anomalous monism does bear significant similarities to Ginet's 'H'
hypothesis, then Davidson is faced with difficult demands in making
sense of psychological autonomy and efficacy. I have already
touched on Davidson's thesis of mental autonomy: it is not obvious
and perhaps not of special importance, how essential either or both
of Psychophysical Anomalism or Psychological Anomalism are to this.
What is of importance is the complete irreducibility of mental
categories and their holistic character. Mental concepts cannot be
reduced or translated into any other kinds, including the physical;
the constitutive criteria of the mental, are wholly different to
those of the physical, the former being constituted by its character
as a system,i.e. in Davidson's words:
Any effort at increasing the accuracy and power of a theory of
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behaviour forces us to bring more and more of the whole system
of the agent's beliefs and motives directly into account.
(From "Psychology as Philosophy"^) (Kim calls this the
Rationality Maximisation principle).
And as regards mental efficacy, Davidson wants to claim that
rationalisations are causes of action. In his essay "Actions,
Reasons and Causes", Davidson defends this claim against objections
which it has had to face. I won't concern myself with this at the
moment. What I will concern myself with is Davidson's attempt at
coping with what appear, prima facie, to be four imcompatible
strands within his position, i.e. rationalisations are causes of
action, all events are physical, the Anomalism of the Mental, and
the Nomological Character of Causality, this last one being that
where there is causality there must be a law: events related as
cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws. (This last
assumption is by no means embraced by everyone, as I've said.) I
hope to show here that Davidson's attempt to retain psychological
efficacy in the face of his anomalous monism, collapses in fact,
into a determinism which seems to leave no more space for personal
authorship than would Ginet's H hypothesis, were it true.
In tune generally, with his Psychophysical Anomalism and
Psychological Anomalism, Davidson claims throughout that the mental
is not the right kind of description to appear in deterministic
laws, and this seems to leave him with an obvious problem: any
singular statement of causality attributing the character of cause
to a reason must be "covered" by some strict deterministic law, but
if reasons are not the right kind of thing to get "into"
deterministic laws, then how can singular statements of causality be
so covered? Enter Davidson's assumption that all events are
physical: reasons have some true description in a purely physical
vocabulary, and it is as such that a singular statement of causality
giving reason as cause is covered by a strict deterministic law. As
Davidson puts it in "Actions, Reasons and Causes"^
The laws whose existence is required if reasons are causes of
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actions do not, we may be sure, deal in the concepts in which
rationalisations must deal...it does not follow that there is any
law connecting events classified as reasons with events classified
as actions - the classifications may even be neurological, chemical
or physical.
As I've already said, both Jerry Fodor in "Special Sciences"^
and Jaegwon Kim attempt to lay down a solid bedrock for a schemata
such as that of Davidson. Fodor's paper is a highly general effort,
concerning generally what he calls the "special sciences" (e.g.
psychology, sociology) and in particular, how singular statements of
causality within them can be true in the light of the apparent
absence of strict deterministic laws within the special sciences,
the apparent absence of type-identities between the categories of
the special sciences and those of the physical sciences, and the
apparently nomological character of causality. Fodor attempts to
make projects such as Davidson's, i.e. of a "descent" from singular
statements of causality within the special sciences to strict
deterministic law within the physical sciences, seem both
intelligible and likely. I will not concern myself with this
particularly, since despite the admirably rigorous approach of
Fodor, I don't think that anything said by him at all alleviates the
worries I will cite in connection with Davidson's approach. Kim's
essay, on the other hand, is specifically designed to make
Davidson's particular position more plausible and indeed, as I hope
to make clear, the factors cited by both Kim and Fodor by way of
making Anomalous Monism more persuasive are precisely the kind of
factors which I think must ultimately prove its undoing. Indeed, as
I hope to show, it is precisely the feature which particularly
concerns us here, vis a vis free will, i.e. the efficacy of the
mental, which Anomalous Monism seems to leave looking most
vulnerable.
Kim is wanting to distinguish between the kinds of relationship
between the mental and the physical which Davidson's anomalous
monism can allow, and those which it can't. The point of departure
for Kim is the entire concept of a law, and the crucial role that
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considerations of lawlikeness play in Davidson's central argument.
Kim asks us to consider a domain U of objects, and two sets, F and G
of properties, where U is a set of medium-sized material bodies, F a
set of colours and G a set of shapes. We would not expect to find
regular correlations between colours and shapes; we would not
expect true generalisations of the form (using Kim's notation):
(A) Every object in U with colour C has shape S,
or of the form
(B) Every object in U with shape S has colour C.
However, we may in fact find, say,
(C) Every red object in U is round.
The significant point, though, is that given what we know about
colours and shapes, we would not take the truth of (C) as indicating
a lawlike connection between being red and being round; the truth
of (C) is a coincidence, not a matter of law. Kim suggests,
similarly, that we let the domain be the set of persons, and F and G
respectively the set of psychological properties and the set of
physical properties. Davidson's point is that even if we should
find a true generalisation of the form
(D) All persons with mental property M have physical property P,
we will not, and should not, consider this a law.
For Davidson, a law is distinguished from a mere generalisation by
two marks:
(1) it can support counterfactuals and subjunctives, and
(2) it is confirmable by observation of its instances.
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(C), for instance, meets neither of these criteria; it fails to
back a counterfactual such as (Kim's example) 'If bananas were red,
they would be round', and the only way it could be confirmed is by
an exhaustive examination of all the objects in the domain.
Davidson's arugment is designed to show, not that there can be no
psychophysical generalities of the form (D), but that there can be
no psychophysical laws. Davidson thinks we can show from the very
idea of what it is to be psychoiogical, that no generalities of the
form (D), whether true or false, can be lawlike. In order for
Davidson's arguement to seem at all cogent, we must identify the
features of the mental and those of the phsyical which, whilst
apparently tolerating true psychophysical generalisations, are
inimical to these generalisations being lawlike. I have already
touched on this, but I think that it is more than worth some
re-statement and expansion. Davidson claims that both the mental
and the phsyical are characterised by certain 'synthetic a priori'
laws, which are constitutive of our conception of them. In the case
of the physical, these constitutive criteria make possible the
formulation of precise laws. Among these criteria, for instance,
are principles that make physical measurement possible, such as, the
transitivity of 'longer than' or 'earlier than'. According to
Davidson however, the constitutive criteria of the mental are quite
different, including the likes of coherence, rationality, and
consistency (Rationality Maximisation) and indeed, we can extract
from Davidson's seminal and most famous essay "Mental Events"^, that
there are no strict psychophysical laws because of the
disparate commitments of the mental and physical schemes,
and that
there cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is
to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence.
Several however, including (as will be echoed a bit later)
Honderich, have wondered about this,i.e. how the presence of
nomological links is inconsistent with each system's retaining its
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allegiance to its constitutive principles. And the crucial move on
Davidson's part which we must make sense of is the claim that the
essential characteristic of the mental, namely rationality, must
clash with an essential feature (or at least, a constitutive
element) of the physical, namely the absence of rationality. It is
this apparent clash which Davidson seems to see as precluding
psychophysical laws.
This seems, at the very least, however, a curious claim on the
part of Davidson. Aren't our physical theories also coherent,
rational and consistent? If a theory in the physical sciences
appears incoherent, irrational or inconsistent, don't we therefore
abandon it with as little hesitation, as in the case of a purported
explanation of someone's behaviour?
Kim seems to be well aware of the gaps needing filling here,
and I will now recount and consider his attempt at this. Kim is
attempting to show why the claims Davidson wants to retain on behalf
of the mental^i.e. (primarily) allegiance to its "proper source of
evidence" and efficacy with regard to action, could sustain
contingent psychophysical generalisations, but not psychophysical
laws. In the face of physical determinism (which Davidson is, at
bottom, committed to), I will be arguing ultimately that both
contingent psychophysical relations such as Davidson, Kim and Fodor
think there are, and nomological psychophysical links (such as
Honderich thinks there has to be), present very serious obstacles
for any coherent notion of freedom. I will be claiming that both
notions put an intolerable strain on the notion of psychological
efficacy and so, if deterministic law can indeed by discovered at
the neural or chemical level (as Davidson, Kim and Fodor think
likely, and as Ginet's 'H' hypothesis postulates), then a refuge for
freedom cannot be found through recourse to the safe and soothing
irreducible vocabulary of the mental^i.e. I will be arguing that
Ginet is correct in his claim that the absence of choice with regard
to what complete first-level description I satisfy entails what I
have already called a "trans-vocabulary" absence of choice.
However, this should become clearer after examining Kim's attempted
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patching-up of Davidson.
We are to allow that there are neural states and N2, which
are nomologically coextensive with My and M2 respectively, where M]_
and M2 are mental states; that is, we have laws affirming that, as
a matter of law, Ny occurs to an organism at a time just in case
occurs to it at that time; similarly for N2 and M2. The neural
states, N;l and N2, being theoretical states of physical theory, have
conditions of attribution, that is, conditions under which their
attribution to an organism is warranted. Kim stresses that what
matters is only that the ascertaining of whether they hold in a
given situation is regulated by the constitutive rules and
principles of physical theory, not by those of the mental. If we
let C]^ be an attribution condition for Nj and C2 an attribution
condition for N2, then we have:
(1) Necessarily, if C4 obtains, Nj occurs,
the psychophysical law
(2) Necessarily, Mp occurs if and only if N]^ occurs,
whence
(3) Necessarily, if obtains, occurs,
and in the same way
(4) Necessarily, if C2 obains, M2 occurs.
It is worth stressing that (3) and (4) affirm that, when a certain
set of physical conditions hold, a specific mental state necessarily
occurs, that we must attribute to an organism this mental state if
those conditions are observed to obtain for it. But, as Kim remarks
in "Psychophysical Laws":
...this means that the rationality maximisation principle as an
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essential constraint on the attribution of mental states is in
danger of being pre-empted, for the determination of whether
these physical attribution conditions obtain is not subject to
the constraint of this principle. (3) and (4)...would force
this (rationality maximisation) rule to share its jurisdiction
over mental attributions ...by becoming so intimately
associated with and C2 which are under the jurisdiction of
physical theory and its constitutive principles, they have in
effect ceased to be mental states (emphasis mine).
This, it should be clear, is a crucial notion. I agree with
Kim here that the truth of something like (3) and (4) would have
calamitous consequences for the supposed autonomy and irreducibility
of the mental; the idea of the efficacy of the psychological qua
psychological, of the purposive, would seem to have an unmanageable
strain put upon it. As Malcolm comments in "The Conceivability of
Mechanism", the neurophysiological cannot be more basic than the
purposive, the latter cannot, qua purposive, turn out to be
dependent on the former; there is an a priori relationship within
the purposive, it is a closed system of conceptual truths, logically
insupportable by experience (e.g. my desiring a beer is logically
linked to my getting up and opening one), whilst links between
neurophysiological states are contingent. It is perhaps in order to
add some clarification of this point here, since it will be seen, I
think, to be of greater importance as I proceed, particularly with
regard to what kind of concepts can occupy the 'A' slots within
Ginet's 'H' hypothesis.
It has, for instance, seemed to some that the links between
(say) desire and action are causal and must therefore be contingent,
this seeming to preclude my suggestion that Malcolm is right when he
says that there is an a priori relationship within the purposive, it
being a closed system of conceptual truths. However, I think that
the belief that there is a conflict between those two claims rests
on a confusion. I think it is possible to hold (as I would want to)
that there is an a priori relationship within the purposive, that
some intentional states are a cause of action and that there is
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something contingent about the relationship between (say) desire and
action. Let me explain. First, what is it precisely, that is a
priori, conceptual, about the relationship within the purposive?
The answer to this, I think, is discoverable, if we ask what the
essential nature of a purposive state is. And in fact, I think that
the answer to this points towards the solution to the whole
problem. The essential nature of a purposive state links it to
actio^i.e. where there are no 'countervailing factors' (to use
Malcolm's expression). For instance, from knowing that John desires
a beer, we can reasonably conclude, straight off, a priori, that if
there are no countervailing factors, then John will take a beer.
Conversely, if someone told me that John desired a beer, and on my
offering him one, he did not take it in the absence completely of
any countervailing factors such as health considerations, later
plans or whatever, then I would be justified in being highly
sceptical of the report I received about John's desire. This is
because it is part of the essential nature of a desire to move one
to action in the absence of countervailing factors - there is a
clear sense in which the link between purposive states and action is
not accidental. My hoping that it doesn't rain tomorrow, is
insufficient grounds for expecting me, straight off, from just
knowing this fact alone, to djD anything whatever. However, from
knowing that I desire to go to the cinema tonight, it is entirely
reasonable to expect me straight off, to d£ something. If I don't
do anything at all, then it is reasonable for someone to look around
for reasons why, for countervailing factors. And I don't think that
it should now be too difficult to see how this needn't conflict with
either of the suggestions, that purposive states cause actions and
that there is something contingent about the relationship between
the two. There is, as I have said, an essential link between
purposive states and action: it is an essential part of the nature
of a desire for the subject to move to bring about its satisfaction
in the absence of countervailing factors. And there seems to me to
be no reason why this essential relation between purposive states
and actions cannot be causal. It seems to me entirely reasonable to
suppose that it is essential to the nature of a desire to cause
action in the absence of countervailing factors: what is wrong with
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the suggestion, for instance, that it is essential to my desire to
go to the cinema tonight, that in the absence of countervailing
factors, it causes me to go to the cinema tonight? As I've already
suggested, it seems to me to be difficult to make sense of it qua
desire, otherwise. And it is (not surprisingly by now, I hope), in
the notion of 'countervailing factors', that I think the contingency
which seems to be a fact of the relationship between purposive
states and action can be found. That is, a desire will only cause
the action with which it is essentially linked if there are no
countervailing factors e.g. John's desire for a beer will not cause
him to take one if (say) he wants to study in an hour. (It is worth
saying just now that countervailing factors are essentially factors
which are causally relevant, and this notion will be explained
shortly in connection with Honderich's comments on anomalous monism,
and will be seen to be of some importance, as I go on.) The
significance of countervailing factors drives a wedge of contingency
between desire and action, but I hope to have demonstrated that this
does not entail denial of an a priori relationship between them.
The task, I think, is simply to identify where the a prioricity lies
and where the contingency lies. Indeed, I hope that the general
suggestion I am putting forward here will appear both clearer and
more obviously defensible, when I come, much later on to document
the contribution on these issues, made by John Searle, in
Intentionality (specifically, the chapter entitled "Intentional
Causation"). Searle, I think, makes a penetrating contribution, to
clarifying precisely where the a priori or 'logical' element of the
intention/action relation resides, and the general importance of
this within the theory of action, and of course within problems
surrounding free will, should be seen to be considerable. For the
time being, at any rate, I will rest content with saying merely that
I think the three intuitions I have mentioned, namely that there is
an a priori relationship within the purposive, that some intentional
states are a cause of action, and that there is something contingent
about the relationship between purposive states and action, can be
reconciled by saying that it is an essential part of the nature of
purposive states to cause action in the absence of countervailing
factors. This will, I hope, be seen to have some importance when I
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return specifically to Ginet in the next chapter, particularly with
regard to the question of what can occupy the 'A' slots, and (as
I've just said) when I eventually come to consider Searle's
contribution to the issues and their significance for questions
within free will/determinism.
Getting back to Davidson and Kim, the truth of (3) and (4)
would seem to have this consequence of compromise for the
psychological, of making the neurophysiological more basic than the
purposive, of making the a priori connections within the purposive
contingent in fact upon the neurophysiological. The most basic
question within free will/determinism (though by no means the only
interesting question, as we shall see) is whether purposive
principles have any application to the world - if they don't, then
we can wrap the whole thing up now - but the truth of (3) and (4)
would leave it very difficult to see how purposive principles have
any genuine application to the world at all. Davidson is, of
course, as I've already said, wanting to avoid this consequence;
despite his belief that physical determinism is true at the bedrock
level (^ la Ginet's 'H' hypothesis) he still believes that he is
able to hold on to full-blown mental efficacy through recourse to
the distinct and irreducible categories of the mental. As I've
already said, I don't think that Davidson can, in fact, sustain his
claim of mental efficacy in the face of his ground-floor physical
determinism (I will attempt to provide more reasons for this in a
moment), but what is undoubtedly certain at least is that it could
not be sustainted if (3) and (4) were true. This is because, if (3)
and (4) were true, it would make it very difficult to see what the
mental descriptions (Mj and M2) would actually add by way of
explanation of anything. And this factor would be merely reinforced
by the fact that according to Davidson, each mental event is
identical with some physical event i.e. there would seem to be
absoultely nothing lost by simply explaining actions by means of
physical/neural causation - as Kim has said, the specifically
mental, with all its irreducibility, efficacy and allegiance to
appropriate source of evidence, would seem to just perish away, with
desperate consequences for psychological efficacy and therefore, of
course, human freedom. The mental would seem here at best, to be
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relegated to the status of superfluous accompaniment to what goes on
inexorably by means of physical causation, and so much the worse for
our illusions of agency.
However, what of the Davidson alternative? Can psychological
efficacy be sustained either in the face of merely contingent
psychophysical identity? I think not. In an excellent article,
"The Argument for Anomalous Monism"^, Ted Honderich considers the
consequences of the absence of nomological links between the mental
and physical for the autonomy and efficacy of the mental. Honderich
concerns himself, in particular, with the notion of a causally
relevant property. By way of clarifying this notion, Honderich
considers an example: some French green pears are placed on a
scale, causing the pointer to move to the two-pound mark. Given
that the pears being both green and French are essential properties
of the event, are the pears being green and French causally relevant
to the given effect? The answer, of course, is "no"; the pears
could have been yellow and Italian, for instance, and the pointer
would still have gone to the two-pound mark had the pears still
weighed two pounds. And there will be a lawlike connection, it
seems, between the pears' weighing two pounds and the pointer's
going to the two-pound mark. In general (as Honderich points out),
it follows from the fact that event Ej caused event E2 in virtue of
a property f of E]^ and a property g of E2 that E^ and E2 are in
lawlike connection wholly in virtue of properties f and g.
Honderich goes on to pose the crucial question: if a mental event
causes a physical event (as Davidson would want to claim), what is
the causally relevant property of the mental event? In order to
preserve the efficacy of the mental, it seems (surely) that mental
events must be causal as mental^i.e. the causally relevant
properties must be mental. This would surely force us to strengthen
Davidson's premise of the Nomological Character of Causality into
one of the Nomological Character of Causally Relevant Properties
and, in the face of mental-physical causation, we are, it seems,
left with a denial (despite Kim) of Davidson's thesis that there are
no psychophysical lawlike connections, i.e. a denial of
Psychophysical Anomalism. To retain Psychophysical Anomalism would
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leave the connection between the mental and physical accidental i.e.
there would be no nomic necessity about the event as physical being
the mental event it is. Therefore we have lost the efficacy of the
mental. According to Davidson's Psychophysical Anomalism , it is
nomologically inessential to the event's being the physical event it
was that it was the mental event that it was. Hence, it is
inessential to the relevant effect, the action, that the event was
the mental event it was. I think that these criticisms made by
Honderich are devastating, every bit as damaging as the consequences
brought out (it seems) by Kim of the prospect of presence of
nomological links between the mental and physical, i.e. when either
is conjoined with physical determinism. It seems to me that, either
way, the mental cannot win: in both the presence and the absence of
nomological mental-physical links, physical determinism (despite the
desperate attempts of Davidson, Fodor, Kim and others to locate it
at some apparently inconsequential level) deprives the psychological
of its autonomy and efficacy and makes it intractably difficult to
sustain any notion of free will. Indeed, the stances adopted by
Honderich in "The Argument for Anomalous Monism" and his essay "One
Determinism" are both revealing in this respect and, I think,
slightly curious. Let us dwell on Honderich for a moment. I have
already documented his criticisms, vis a vis the efficacy of the
mental, of the notion, prevalent in Davidson's Anomalous Monism,
that there are contingent links between mental events and physical
events with which they are (allegedly) identical. However, one
should beware of leaping therefore, to the conclusion that Honderich
is himself of the belief that the presence of nomological
mental-physical links would make it easier to sustain a coherent
notion of free will, if physical determinism were true. On the
contrary, he seems to be in complete agreement with what I have just
said, namely that, in the face of physical determinism, the presence
of nomological psychophysical links would not help us one iota
towards regarding ourselves as free agents. This seems clear from
"One Determinism", where the determinism he actually argues is true,
features nomological psychophysical links, and which, as he states
explicitly, must leave us lacking free will. It is, I think, worth
spelling this out in some detail.
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Honderich's ("One") determinism is a conjunction of three
fairly straightforward premises:
(i) States of the brain are effects, the effects of other
physical states.
(ii) Many states of the brain are correlates of conscious states
(The Correlation thesis).
(iii) States of the brain are causes, both of other states of the
brain and also of certain movements of one's body.
The latter are actions.
The crucial premise, for my present purposes, is the second one, the
Correlation thesis. Before being any more specific about it
however, it is very useful to merely bear in mind that, from these
three straightforward premises, Honderich concludes that, on every
occasion when we act, we can only act as in fact we do, that we are
not responsible for our actions and that we do not possess selves of
a certain character. Both the first and third premises would get
the assent of the likes of Davidson, Fodor and Kim (-and of couroc,
-Cinot-). They are, at ground-floor level, as I've already said,
physical determinists, just like Honderich, and in fact, should
anyone still think that Davidson and the like are being badly
represented by being thought of as physical determinists (or indeed,
determinists of any description), it is, I think, salutary to note
that, in his essay "Rational Explanation of Actions and
Psychological Determinism"^ , David Pears takes up a position
significantly similar to that of Davidson, and goes on to state that
it would be fair to regard it as either a psychological or_ physical
determinism. (Indeed, I will go on later to make the important
claim that the only "determinism" which it really makes sense to
speak of is physical determinism, a fact not only implicitly
acknowledged by Davidson, but also haveing significant consequences
throughout the family of debates on free will/determinism.)
However, Honderich's second premise would clearly not get the
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agreement of the anomalous monists. This is because the correlation
thesis claims that there are much tighter (i.e. nomological)
psychophysical links than the anomalous monists believe (as we have
just seen Kim try to spell out) the mental can bear. The
Correlation thesis is that
Any particular description of consciousness D is true of an
individual if and only if his brain or part of it is in one
particular state or sequence of states S.
Before saying any more, it is therefore perhaps worth noting that
Honderich realises that, rather than talk of states of a part or
whole of the brain, we might be better, given certain propositions
in contemporary neurophysiology, to talk of states of the central
nervous system or a part of it. At any rate, Honderich intends the
term part, to be no more than a stand-in for other more adequate
descriptions. A word is also in order about what is meant, and what
is not entailed, in the notion correlate: there is no implication
here regarding the non-identity, or identity, of brain states and
conscious states. All that is to be understood concerns
descriptions of consciousness and brain states, and I agree with
Honderich that the numerous problems concerning the individuation
and truth conditions of descriptions of consciousness are not
impediments to the thesis, and needn't be settled. Also the term
brain state may be so construed as to take as its referent either
one state or one disjunctive set of states.
The crucial point for Davidson and Kim, the factor which must
prevent them embracing this Honderich premise is the iff; from
seeing that someone's brain is in one of a particular disjunctive
set of states, we can (in principle, at least) conclude that he is
in a particular mental state. We have already seen Kim elaborate
upon how such a prospect would undermine the autonomy and efficacy
of the mental by making the neurophysiological more basic. I have
already expressed agreement with this, and there can be absolutely
no doubt from what Honderich has to say, that he is also in
agreement that the presence of psychophysical nomological links
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(such as he documents here) is as damning a prospect for mental
efficacy (and therefore free will), as he has already claimed (in
"The Argument For Anomalous Monism") the absence of nomological
links is, in the face of physical determinism and mental-physical
event identity. I already noted that he concludes that his three
premises entail that on every occasion we act we can only act as in
fact we do, that we are not responsible for our actions, and that we
do not possess selves of a certain character. That is, despite his
claiming, in "The Argument For Anomalous Monism", that the presence
of merely contingent psychophysical links has intolerable
consequences for the integrity of the mental (which Kim seems not to
appreciate), he seems to be aware, (in "One Determinism", at any
rate) also that the mental can do little better in the presence of
nomological psychophysical links. I do myself believe (as Honderich
seems to) that contingent or nomological, it's really all the same
at the end of the day, i.e. the game is up, the mental simply cannot
win, once physical causation is allowed to be ultimately so
comprehensive as either Davidson, Kim, Fodor, Pears or Honderich (or
Ginet of course) suggest it is. Once Honderich's first and third
premises are admitted, it seems to me not to matter, from the point
of view of mental efficacy and free will, whether what goes in to
the slot waiting for the second premise, states contingent
psychophysical relations, or supposedly "stronger" nomological
ties. Kim is right to say that the mental cannot bear the weight of
nomological mental-physical ties and Honderich is right if he is
saying (as I think he is) that, in the presence of physical
determinism, a la his first and third premises, the mental can bear
neither the weight of nomological ties with the physical, nor that
of merely contingent psychophysical links. Either way, nomological
or contingent, it is surely the same,i.e. how do I get into things,
how is my mental life qua mental life, choices qua choices, causally
relevant? All of my actions would be the outcome of a set of
sufficient (physical) conditions, so where do I, with my (seemingly)
complex intentional network, comprising agonising choices,
decisions, feelings, etc. get in there? There may be contingent
psychophysical links, there may in fact be nomological links, but
then so what? The significant point is surely that, no matter, my
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actions are wholly explicable in terms of sets of sufficient
(physical) conditions and indeed (in the presence of whatever links)
why should we even be especially interested in what would appear to
be the superfluous and unnecessarily complicating factor of mental
facts? If all of my actions are wholly explicable in terms of the
vocabulary of physical causal law, then what can possibly be gained
by introducing the intentional into explanation of my actions?
Physical causation will trundle on, no matter. However much sweat
is broken at this point, there seems to be no clear way in which
Ginet's claim (with which I started this section) looks over-hasty,,
i.e. if no human being ever has a choice as to whether or not his
behaviour shall satisfy the first-level description it does, then no
one has any choice as to what descriptions of any kind his behaviour
satisfies. I hope that I have shown so far however that whilst it
may be correct, it is certainly not gratuitous.
I have already mentioned Daniel Dennett (a functionalist) as
among those who have been unconvinced that comprehensive physical
causation of our actions deprives the intentional of its full-blown
efficacy. And indeed, although I will, again, have to disagree with
him, he cannot be ignored, not least of all because some of his
attempts at appeasing those with free will predilections could be
regarded as either novel or desperate or both. The Dennett
enterprise is constituted in two essays, the well-known "Mechanism
and Responsibility"^ and the aforementioned "On Giving Libertarians
What They Say They Want". Having looked at the likes of Davidson
and Kim, the former essay appears as fairly mainstream
compatibilism, whilst it is the latter where I think the trickery
and hint of desperation makes itself apparent. Both essays attempt,
of course, to downgrade the supposed impact that the prospect of
comprehensive physical (causal) explanation of our actions must have
on our conception of ourselves as free agents in the world. I will
eventually look at the latter work, but for the time being, let us
have a look at "Mechanism and Responsibility". This essay leans
heavily on a purported analogy between human beings and the finite
mechanical systems which comprise computers. Dennett is preoccupied
here with the question of whether a mechanistic explanation of a set
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of events,i.e. explanation in terms of straightforward physical
causation, is incompatible with an intentional explanation of the
same set of events. However, I hope that I have made it clear by
now that the mere prospect of compatibility of physical and
intentional explanation has little import for the issue with which I
am concerned,i.e. free will. This point should be clear from the
treatments alone which I gave Davidson's Anomalous Monism (or
perhaps, it would be more accurate to say, Kim's re-statement of
it), and Honderich's ("One") determinism. Indeed, it is worth
saying yet again at this point, and indeed I feel it cannot be
over-stressed, that Honderich's determinism clearly allows
intentional explanation of actions, yet its unavoidable upshot is,
as he says, that on every occasion when we act, we can only act as
in fact we do, we are not responsible for our actions and that we do
not possess selves of a certain character. His Correlation thesis
quite obviously introduces the intentional lives of humans into the
picture, and allows us to explain actions by invoking it in the
fairly normal way. However, again I feel that I cannot over-stress
that this prospect would hardly be enough to give the concept of
freedom any genuine content. Indeed, a sceptic about free will may
quite easily concede the compatibility of physical and intentional
explanation, without being convinced one iota that there is such a
thing as free will. What is needed surely, for free will is a
specifically psychological efficacy, a psychological efficacy which
can only accrue if the intentional is not only irreducible, but also
entirely indispensable as a means of explanation. And that surely
means that physical determinism cannot be true if free will claims
are to be sustained. This is because, if physical determinism is
true, then however much we may invoke the intentional ordinarily to
explain things, we need not invoke the intentional ever,i.e. we
could (in principle, at least) explain every action ever performed,
every thought ever had, every statement ever made, wholly in the
vocabulary of physical causes and physical effects. A look again at
the three premises of Honderich's determinism should confirm this.
Let me re-state the first and third:
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(i) states of the brain are effects, the effects of other
physical states,
(iii) states of the brain are causes, both of other states of the
brain and also of certain movements of one's body.
The latter are actions.
It should not, I think, be difficult to appreciate that, if (i) and
(iii) are true, then every action ever performed, every thought ever
had and every statement ever made can be entirely accounted for
without recourse to intentional vocabulary, without mentioning
anyone's desires, beliefs, hopes, fears, intentions, purposes,
projects, etc. We could (in principle, at least) explain all of
these phenomena simply by talking of neurons, nerve cells, states of
the central nervous system, etc. and whatever neurophysiological
tools happen to be in vogue at the time. Of course, the Correlation
thesis (the second premise) would allow us to invoke intentional
concepts in explanation, would facilitate this but the crucial point
would be that whilst we may, if only for sake of simplicity, use the
intentional idiom in explanation, we need not. That is, the
intentional would, in fact add absolutely nothing, it could be done
away with entirely, and nothing would be any different. It would
not be indispensable, it would not have an essential explanatory
function, and this is surely what free will cannot sustain. For
mental efficacy to genuinely explain, it must surely be the case
that the actions of ours which we regard as free, those actions
which are genuinely and full-bloodedly ours, can only be given a
complete explanation through recourse, at some point at least, to
the intentional idiom, to a vocabulary of purposes, intentions,
hopes, fears, etc. For instance, my opening the fridge for a can of
beer or my going to London to see an exhibition, can surely only be
explained, if they are to be regarded as free actions of mine, by
talking of my desire for a can of beer, and my belief that there was
one in the fridge or, in the latter case, my belief that a certain
exhibition was taking place in London and my belief (say) that I
would enjoy it (of course, as I will discuss more specifically
later, I am not claiming that the indispensability of intentional
47
explanation is sufficient for free action, but only necessary). The
truth of a determinism such as that suggested by Honderich or Ginet
would deprive the intentional of this indispensable position, kill the
efficacy of the mental, and leave free will without a foothold. That
is, despite the possibility of intentional explanation of my opening
the fridge or going to London, the prospect of its being fully
accounted for in the vocabulary of physical/neural causation would
surely leave it impossible to see where _I get onto the stage. That is
why I find Ginet's clarity and explicitness on this point particularly
helpful, and this should become clearer when I eventually return to
him. The 'H' hypothesis is a straightforward physical determinism,
little different to that of Honderich's ("One") determinism, but Ginet
does not muddy the waters in any way by even considering what kind of
relationship (if any) the intentional may have with the physical, and
whether the intentional could even get a foothold in explanation. The
complete first-level description contains purely physical concepts and
the 'A' slots can only be occupied by physical concepts also. That
is, Ginet's 'H' hypothesis is, I think, like Honderich's determinism
without the Correlation thesis,i.e. it is really, I think, like a
statement of Honderich's first and third premises, and any free will
defenders cannot be temporarily deceived by the presence of something
unnecessarily complicating such as the Correlation thesis. Perhaps it
should be pointed out that Ginet is not particularly at pains to deny
that something like the Correlation thesis may be true; for all he
seems to be concerned, it may _b<B true, but this surely points to what
is really significant^i.e. from the point of view of free will, if H
is true (or for that matter Honderich's determinism), it does not
matter in the slightest whether the Correlation thesis is true. The
truth of H, or anything significantly like it, surely damns free will,
and as I've already suggested, this should become reinforced even
further when I get back to Ginet.
As I've already said, equivalent worries for freedom must
accrue even in the presence of a physical determinism so diluted and
undercover as that of Davidson's, and of course, that of Dennett
also. As I've already touched on, in "Mechanism and Responsibility",
Dennett goes to some lengths and constructs analogies with both
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computers and less sophisticated living creatures in defence of his
claim that humans are finite mechanical objects. The point of both
analogies is really little different: the bottom line is (as I've
said) that the historical horror that the prospect of comprehensive
physical explanation of human endeavour would rule out intentional
explanation, is ill-founded. It should not be difficult to imagine
the supposed import of the computers case: it is, says Dennett
entirely in order to adopt both the mechanistic stance and the
intentional stance towards computers. Everything they do can (with
the required knowledge) be accounted for in terms of physical
causation; however it is also, suggests Dennett, fair to talk of
the activities of the computer in straightforwardly intentional
terms,i.e. we can reasonably say that the computer is thinking,
calculating, pondering, believing, etc. This, Dennett thinks, can
be extended to "machines" even so complex and sophisticated as
humans: like the computer, mechanism can wholly embrace us.
Simultaneously however, we are (like the computer, it is alleged)
also finite and rational - we can be characterised in intentional
terms. Dennett does make the concession to traditional
incompatibilism that, whilst it would in principle be possible,
humans are such complex mechanical systems that it would be wildly
optimistic to ever hope that we could achieve comprehensive
mechanical explanation. And, with specific regard to the issue of
free will and moral responsbility, Dennett concludes, in Section
VII, that
The Intentional stance towards human beings which is a
precondition of any ascriptions of responsbility, may coexist
with mechanistic explanations of their motions.
As the use of Dennetts alleged "computer" analogy wasn't difficult
to imagine, I hope that it is not now difficult to imagine my
response to it, vis a vis free will. Whilst it may not of itself be
of ultimately crushing importance, I don't actually think myself
that it is fair to say that computers, however sophisticated, have
genuine intentional faculties - they don't actually think or believe
anything, but at best, only undergo analogies or representations of
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these procedures (it is unnecessary to pursue this specific point
here, but precise comments on the matter, I think, can be found in
John Searle's essay, "Analytic Philosophy and Mental Phenomena"^).
However, the important point is that, even if they do, it would not,
I think, be reasonable to hold them responsible for anything they
think or believe, or calculate or whatever (in Strawson's language,
to adopt the "personal reactive attitude" towards them^-l) and so, if
humans are more complex finite mechanisms, and nothing besides, then
there seems no more reason to adopt reactive attitudes towards
humans than towards computers. Ironically, the case of the computer
does turn out, I think, to be uncannily instructive. Even if it is
fair to regard the computer as having a full-blooded intentional
existence, there can be no doubt that there is a very clear,
identifiable sense in which the physical is more basic than this;
whatever the computer thinks, believes, calculates or whatever
(whether one regards this as genuine or metaphorical intentionality)
is entirely dependent on physical causes and effects, which is in
turn dependent on how someone has constructed it. Intentional
concepts, however usefully they may be utilised in explanation of
the computer's movements, could be entirely dispensed with, leaving
us with a complete explanation of everything the computer "says" in
terms of physical causation. It is precisely because of this, I
suggest, that the 'participant' attitude towards the computer is not
a possibility. Similarly, regardless of the possibility or
usefulness of intentional explanation, if humans are similar in this
significant sense to computers, there is then a serious problem
regarding rational justification of the participant attitude. If
the neurophysiological is more basic than the intentional (and the
equivalent is clearly so with computers), then it is not at all easy
to see how the participant attitude can be justified. That is why
it is extremely short-sighted of Dennett to say (as I've quoted
earlier) that it is the mere possibility of the Intentional stance
which is the precondition of any ascriptions of responsbility. As I
hope to have made clear by now, the mere intentional stance is not
itself enough to ground the participant attitude: what is also a
condition is a belief about the mental life of the person in
question^i.e. that it is, in some crucial sense, irreducible,
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autonomous, indispensable to an explanation of their actions.
Itjcannot refer us back to something more basic (e.g. the
neurophysiological) in which it is grounded, and which could explain
exhaustively anyway (in principle); as soon as something like
Ginet's 'H' hypothesis, Honderich's first and third premises, or
Dennett's "finite mechanisms" is admitted, then the participant
attitude is in real trouble. This perhaps make it unsurprising
that, in order to ground participant attitudes, Dennett is forced to
fall back rather tamely on Strawsonian "irremoveable component of
our humanity" theses (about which I will say more nearer the end of
this thesis). Dennett's analogy with other creatures of the animal
kingdom really does little better, I think. He places the (by all
accounts, unintelligent) Sphex wasp at one end of a spectrum and
humans at the other, this being the line of mechanical
sophistication. Not surprisingly, the point for Dennett is that the
wasp is so lacking in intelligence because of its ultra-primitive
mechanical organisation, and humans have so much more intelligence
because of their much more sophisticated mechanical organisations.
At some apparently arbitrary point on this line of mechanical
sophistication, we being to invoke a completely different mode of
explanation^i.e. the intentional mode, which is (supposedly) running
in tandem the whole time with physical explanation (in an excellent
essay12t Adrian Cussins calls this effect "Miraculous
Coincidence"). More than enough should have been said by now
however, to know what I would reply. The point of this analogy is
really the same as the computer thing. If we share with the Sphex
wasp, the feature of all our actions being explicable in mechanistic
terms, then intentional explanation is as unnecessary for us, as it
is for the Sphex wasp, and we can no more be held responsible for
our actions than can the wasp. It may be a bit easier, due to the
complexity of our mechanics to describe us in the intentional idiom,
that's all.
As I've said, it's in "On Giving Libertarians What They Say
They Want", that Dennett's efforts become a bit less mundane and
more novel, if only because he tricks us all along by keeping what I
think is the punch-line to the very end (although he does have grace
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enough to be embarrassed by this). It appears initially that he is
gainsaying a central thesis of "Mechanism and Reponsibility": this
is because the task he sets himself in "On Giving Libertarians What
They Say They Want" is that of finding a possible area of
indeterminism which will at least help facilitate confidence in our
belief that we are the authors of at least some of our actions. That
is, he has claimed in "Mechanism and Reponsibility" that we are
finite mechanisms, a clear consequence of this being that (whilst it
may, in practice, be hopeless fantasy) all our thoughts and actions
can, in principle, be accounted for wholly in the apparatus of
physical causation, but in roaming around here for a useful area of
indeterminism, his project appears to come into conflict with this
mechanistic thesis. This, however, is where the trick is; as I
hope to explain, what I think are odd, curious and ultimately futile
liberties seem to be taken with concepts such as randomness,
determinism and indeterminism and it should eventually become clear
that there is, in fact, no real conflict between the respective
positions taken up in the two essays. Mechanism (as should become
clear) turns out not to be denied, after all, in the "libertarian"
essay which I think (as I've already hinted) turns out to be little
more than a slightly off-beat attempt at disparaging the ultimate
importance of physical causation vis a vis agency and the related
notions such as moral responsibility. Therefore, despite its title,
the essay turns out not to be libertarian in the traditional sense
in that Dennett ultimately recoils from denying physical determinism
(indeed, he admits, after all, that he believes it still to be true)
- it would be less misleading, I suppose, to call it compatibilist.
Dennett is well aware that, as well as the problem set for
agency by determinism, there is also a problem set for it by
indeterminism,i.e. if my actions are not determined by anything,
then they appear to just happen at random, in which case there seems
no reason either to hold me responsible for them, to regard them as
mine. That is why Dennett's task is to find an area and kind of
indeterminism which will help make it possible for me to see my
actions as mine - not just any old indeterminism will do, since
indeterminism could well just leave us with the old Libertarian's
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Dilemma, which I've just elucidated. Indeed, I will consider later
a very challenging compatibilist argument (the Mind argument) that
free will in fact entails determinism, that the idea of a free act
which is undetermined (or indeed, any undetermined act, for that
matter) is incoherent. And in fact, before moving on to Dennett's
explicit treatment of the problem, it's more than worthwhile, I
think, to cite comments made by Van Inwagen in his preamble to the
Mind argument, comments which clearly display the problem to which
Dennett is addressing himself (the language strata claim, as I hope
will become clear, goes fairly easily with all of the more
formalised compatibilist arguments which I will deal with, such as
Paradigm Case, Conditionalism and Mind). Van Inwagen asks us to
suppose, for example, that there is exactly one undetermined
particle of matter somewhere in the universe, and that it is far
from any rational agent, the rest of the universe being governed
entirely by strict deterministic laws. In that case determinism is,
strictly speaking, false. But clearly, if determinism is
incompatible with free will, so is the thesis that everything except
one distant particle of matter is determined. Let us suppose,
however, that at every moment many undetermined events take place
inside each human body. But let us also suppose that these
undetermined events play no role in shaping or influencing anyone's
acts. If determinism is incompatible with free will, then so is
this postulated state of affairs. It is crucial to be clear on the
point (which is stressed by Van Inwagen) that if the question
whether there are any undetermined events is relevant to the question
whether we have free will, this can only be because the question
whether there are undetermined events that shape or influence our
acts is relevant to the question whether we have free will.
Therefore the incompatibilist must believe that free will entails
that there are undetermined events that shape our behaviour. And
even then, not just any such event will do. Van Inwagen provides
another example which clarifies this. Suppost that among the events
that have shaped my behaviour are certain events that I have
witnessed or experienced between the ages of one and twelve, events
that were central to my moral education and to the formation of my
character. Suppose that these events were somehow undetermined, but
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that all subsequent events that made up my history were determined -
or at least were determined given these earlier undetermined
events. This too, incompatible with my having free will, provided
determinism simpliciter is. Indeed, as is about to be borne out,
Dennett is at least aware of the point Van Inwagen makes immediately
afterwards, namely that there is only one point in the history of
each of my acts at which the positing of any undetermined event
could be conceptually relevant to the question whether that act was
a free act: the point at which the act itself (or the deliberation
that immediately preceded it) occured.
Dennett postulates an electronic "answer box", with two
buttons, a Yes button and a No button, and two foot pedals, a Yes
pedal and a No pedal. It also has a display screen divided in half
and one side it says "Use the buttons" and on the other side it says
"Use the pedals". Once a minute a radium randomiser determines, in
an entirely undetermined way (this is how Dennett characterises it
at this point anyway), whether the display screen says "use the
buttons" or "use the pedals" (and this whole idea, again, of what
appears on the display screen being supposedly "random",
undetermined will be seen, I hope, once properly explicated, to be
of monumental significance within free will/determinism, even if
Dennett doesn't quite think so). The experiment: we draw up a list
of ten very simple questions that have Yes or No answers, questions
of the order of difficulty of "Do fish swim?" and "Is Texas bigger
than Rhode Island?" We seat a subject at the answer box and
announce that a handsome reward will be given to those who correctly
follow all the experimental instructions, and a bonus will be given
to those who answer all our questions correctly. Dennett poses the
question of whether the physicist can in principle predict the
subject's behaviour. We suppost that the subject is in fact a
physically deterministic system, and further that the physicist has
perfect knowledge of the subject's initial state, all the relevant
deterministic laws, and all the interactions within the closed
situation of the experimental set-up. Even the unpredictable
behaviour of the answer box will infect the subject on a macroscopic
scale with its own indeterminacy on at least ten occasions during
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the period the physicist must predict. So the best the physicist
can do is issue a multiple disjunctive or multiple conditional
prediction. Dennett then asks us to consider whether the
intentionalist can do any better and, by way of introducing what he
calls his "cheap trick" tells us that yes, of course, he can (and I
hope it will become clear that the argument of this essay is at the
end of the day of the 'language strata' type I have been
discrediting, with a few odd supplementations); given certain
ordinary, straightforward, perfectly imaginable assumptions, the
intentionalist can say something like: "The subject will give Yes
answers to 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, and the subject will answer the rest
of the questions in the negative". And the reason, of course, that
Dennett regards this as a cheap trick is that there is no real
difference, as he points out, in the predictive power of the two
predicitors,i.e. the intentionalist, for instance, is no more in a
position to predict whether the subject will move finger or foot
than the physicist is. Moreover, the physicist may well be able to
provide a detailed conditional prediction of the skeletal motion of
the subject. However, what Dennett regards as a crucial point (the
precise import of this should become clear) is that what we are
normally interested in, what we are normally interested in
predicting, is not the skeletal motion of human beings, but their
actions, and the intentionalist can predict the actions of the
subject (at least in so far as most of us would take any interest in
them) without (as Dennett puts it) "the elaborate rigmarole and
calculations of the physicist". That is, whilst neither the
physicist nor the intentionalist can tell us outright,
unconditionally, exactly when the subject will move his finger, and
exactly when he will move his foot, the intentionalist can, once he
knows the questions and with the aid of some banal assumptions, tell
us precisely what we're interested in/i.e. precisely when the
subject will give a Yes answer and precisly then he will give a No
answer. From the point of view of predicting an action, we are not
interested in whether the subject uses the buttons or the pedals -
all we are interested in is whether he answers Yes or No. The
possibility of indeterminacy in the environment of the kind
introduced here, and hence the possibility of indeterminacy in the
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subject's reaction to that environment is something with regard to
which the intentionalistic predictive power is quite neutral.
It is important, I think, to pause briefly at this point, and
reflect on what exactly is going on here with Dennett. Again, we
have, first and foremost, the distinction between the physical and
the intentional modes of description. There is no obvious attempt
on the part of Dennett to deny the predictive facility and insight
of the physicist, there is no obvious attempt at denying that human
beings are as physically deterministic as the next thing (remember,
Dennett askes us to suppose that the subject "is in fact a
physically deterministic system"), and so, in so far as these
fundamentals are concerned, it seems no more clear than it has done
in any other case where any sort of indeterminism which could allow
agency to get a foothold, can get in. So far, then, the idea of
human freedom seems to make no greater sense than I have already
suggested it makes in the case of Davidson, Kim, Fodor, Honderich,
Pears and the Dennett of "Mechanism and Responsibility". However,
Dennett seems to think that he has an extra card up his sleeve here
which he can play on behalf of the intentional and this comes
really, in the shape of the supposed random, undetermined fashion in
which the answer box instructs the subject to use either the buttons
or the pedals. This, together with the power of the intentionalist
to predict "what we are normally interested in" (i.e. actions)
allows us, Dennett thinks, to insert some primacy of the
intentional. What kind of primacy this is, however, and what
consequences it has, if any, for human freedom, is by no means
obvious at this point. As I've already said, I'll be wanting to
argue that nothing, in fact, said by Dennett throughout this essay,
on the supposed behalf of the intentional, is of any ultimate use
for the concept of freedom. The 'language strata' thesis, given
this form, will be seen (I hope) to be as misguided as ever, and in
fact, I will pre-empt matters slightly by saying that what is really
the first principle of Dennett's whole effort here, i.e. what finds
its way into the analogy of the experiment as the "random" component
within the answer box will be seen, in actual fact, to be a complete
(and pointless) fraud. This can all be best elucidated, I think, by
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going on now to document and consider the use which Dennett tries to
make of his analogy.
The predictable enough extrapolation Dennett suggests is that
we have something like the answer box inside the agent. We can
begin by noting that it is a commonplace of action theory that
virtually all human actions can be accomplished or realised in a
wide variety of ways. It appears that Dennett is not a man for
mundane and hackneyed examples, and he points our that there are,
for instance, indefinitely many ways of insulting your neighbour, or
even of asserting that snow is white (in precisely the same way that
in our experiment, there was more than one way of answering Yes, and
more than one way of answering No). And just as we were not much
interested in whether our subject moved finger or foot by way of
answering (all we were interested in was what he answered), we are
often not much interested in exactly which particular physical
motion accomplishes the act we intend. Dennett asks us to suppose
that our nervous system is so constructed and designed that whenever
in the implementation of an intention, our control system is faced
with two or more options with regard to which we are non-partisan, a
purely undetermined tie-breaking "choice" is made. Displaying again
his predilection for example which will stick in one's mind, Dennett
presents us with the picture of our standing in the supermarket,
wanting a can of Campbell's Tomato Soup, all roughly equidistant
from our hands. We are then asked to suppose that a perfectly
random factor determines which can my hand reaches out for. Dennett
then goes on to make remarks which will, again I think, be seen to
be crucial to his enterprise, but lacking in the import for freedom
which he thinks. First, he notes that this little area of
indeterminism seems completely inconsequential. This is because it
seems that it could only secure freedom for such a small and trivial
class of our choices. What does it avail me if I am free to choose
this can of soup, but not free to choose between buying it and
stealing it? Dennett however, is convinced that he is onto
something of importance here, though of course, I will be wanting to
say eventually that he isnt't. We must not, he thinks,
underestimate the possible scope of application of this idea; for
57
all we know (emphasis mine), which variation (in ways of
implementing any action) occurs is undetermined ,i. e. the
implementation of any one of our intentional actions may encounter
undetermined choice points in many places in the causal chain. And
Dennett's next observation will again be seen to be of such
significance for his efforts that I feel I ought to simply recount
it:
The resulting behaviour would not be distinguishable to our
everyday eyes, or from the point of view of our everyday
interests, from behaviour that was rigidly determined.
This should really, I think, provide something more than a whiff of
what is to come, of what is actually going on. And in fact, at the
end of this section, I will group together Dennett, Donald Davidson,
J.L. Mackie and Keith Lehrer (who will be discussed in some detail
later) as examples of a class of contributor within free
will/determinism who display the same basic shortcoming, this
shortcoming being pretty clearly displayed in the extract just
quoted. As I hope to make much more explicit as I proceed, this
general shortcoming has provided many a bogus reason for believing
that compatibilism is true, a fact which Van Inwagen seems to
appreciate. I feel that I cannot over-stress the importance of
identifying precisely the kind of move which is being made by
Dennett here, though I will nevertheless say that I think the best
approach is simply to bear with him for the time being, and allow
the picture to gradually emerge,i.e. the picture which reveals the
four contributors I have cited (and Strawson is really another, at
bottom) to be among those who commit the same compatibilist crime.
We can detect, in this extract, a slightly undercover downgrading of
the strict importance of physical determinism, a shift in the idea
of what is supposedly primary, of what the issue is really all
about. We can see that the shift is from strict physical
determinism to observable distinctions which we can make; this
strikes me, prima facie, as an odd shift in emphasis, precisely
because we are perfectly well aware that the question of whether
determinism is true, quite aside of whether it can be squared with
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freedom, is not something which can be settled by banal observation
of human behaviour. Indeed, the whole free will/determinism issue
has such a grand philosophical history precisely because simple
observation leaves the truth or falsity of determinism unsettled,
and consequently (I think, as an incompatibilist) leaves the
coherence of notions such as moral responsbility unsettled also.
However, it seems quite clear here that Dennett seems to believe
that the significant distinctions with regard to freedom, are
actually to be made within simple observation,i.e. with no regard to
the question of whether what is observed is actually wholly
determined or not. And indeed I can now state what seems to me to
be the punch-line of Dennett's story, which should come as little
surprise now. As I've already said, Dennett, to his credit, regards
it as something of an embarrassment, though as far as the
aspirations of the libertarian are concerned, I think it is a great
deal more than that. It concerns the alleged causal indeterminacy
of the consideration generator. We have been supposing that the
process generates considerations at least in part by a physically or
causally undetermined or random process. However, throughout the
essay, Dennett has made a lot of ambiguities in the word "random",
and here he thinks that he can exploit another one. He notes that
when a system designer or programmer relies on a "random" generation
process, it is not (my emphasis) a physically undetermined process
that is required, but simply a patternless process. Computers are
typically equipped with a random number generator but the process
that generates the sequence is a perfectly deterministic and
determinate process. There will just be a complete absence of
regularities on which to base predictions about unexamined portions
of the sequence. And the "indeterminism" in the agent is really of
a piece with this^i.e. strict physical determinism does not stop,
but then, according to Dennett that is not ultimately important.
According to Dennett, it is patternlessness which is important, and
Dennett thinks that, as well as examples of patternlessness in the
computer and "Campbell's Tomato Soup" kind of cases, there seems to
be another case when we are faced with decisions to make/i.e. a
consideration generator which is "random" in the required sense
(patternless) is thrown into action. And as we shall see in a
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moment, the question of whether this consideration generator is
strictly physically deterministic is one Dennett holds to be of
secondary importance - what is important for him is that it is
patternless. It would have seemed reasonable then to ask Dennett
whether he is giving libertarians what they want (or trying to give
them what they want) without giving them indeterminism, but Dennett
is clearly largely unperturbed by this prospect. As I've already
said, he regards those who would view the ultimate presence of
physical determinism as a calamity for libertarianism as mislocating
the issue. Indeed, I think it worthwhile to quote outright a fairly
large part of Dennett's reply to this misgiving, demonstrating
clearly what Dennett takes to be the significant point of impact:
Just as the presence or absence of macroscopic indeterminism in
the implementation style of intentional actions turned out to
be something essentially undetectable from the vantage point of
our Lebenswelt, a feature with no significant repercussions in
the "manifest image", to use Sellars' term, so the rival
descriptions of the consideration generator, as
random-but-causally-deterministic versus random-and-causally
indeterministic, will have no clearly testable and contrary
implications at the level of micro-neurophysiology, even if we
succeed beyond our most optimistic fantasies in mapping
deliberation processes onto neural activity.(emphasis mine)
There can be no doubt that something much more than trivial is going
on here - specifically (as I've already suggested), there can be
little doubt from this that Dennett holds the presnce of across the
board causal determinism not to be by itself the killing blow to the
head which the libertarian has traditionally taken it to be.
Specifically, Dennett appears to by saying that beyond a certain
level of complexity, the strict question of causal (physical)
determinism, declines in importance, becomes secondary, as regards
the libertarian's aspirations. It is at this point that Dennett is
claiming there is no significant difference between the causally
deterministic and the causally indeterministic - as we have already
seen him suggest, the observations to which they would respectively
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give rise would not be in the slightest bit different. So,
according to Dennett, beyond the given level of physical complexity,
whether the system is, in fact, causally determinstic or causally
indeterministic, does not matter one iota to the libertarian, should
not worry him in the slightest. And the significant point of
complexity, the point beyond which the question of causal
determinism or otherwise is inconsequential (for Dennett) is the
point of patternlessness. Once patternlessness is observed, he
thinks the libertarian can relax.
Whilst I have somewhat more specific questions to raise about
Dennett's offering here, the central thrust of my remarks should be
imaginable enough by now. That is, it, as the randomiser in the
answer box was ultimately physically determined, the consideration
generator in the agent is also physically determined, then I have to
part company with Dennett right away and say that this fact is of
itself of the utmost importance vis a vis freedom. The consequences
or absence of consequences of this determinism for what we observe
does not seem to me to matter; whether its upshot is something
which is patternless seems to me inconsequential. What seems to me
of the utmost importance is the mere fact of physical causation
itself: if the consideration thrown up by the ("random")
considerataion generator "within" the agent are physically
determined (a la the third premise of Honderich's determinism, say),
then again it would seem to me to be very difficult to see what they
have to do with the agent, how he is in any sense the author of
them. Regardless of pattern or whatever, the intentional again
seems to have its integrity supplanted by a more basic
neurophysiological. That is why the supposed indeterminism, which
could conceivably allow freedom to get a foothold, is ultimately a
fraud. Dennett's consideration generator is, at the end of the day,
as physically deterministic as anything, and, of course, I suppose
it would have to be to square with the central thesis of "Mechanism
and Responsibility", that humans are finitely rational mechanisms.
Indeed, Dennett seems to me to make rather odd and (as I've
said) ultimately futile use of this notion of patternlessness-amidst-
61
strict-physical-determinism in order to try to restore the
intentional to the position of primacy and integrity which the
libertarian needs. Let me say first that this area of
"indeterminism" seems to be the only one which Dennett seriously
entertains: the consideration generator throws up considerations in
a fashion which is physically determined but patternless and from
there on in Dennett seems to think that the libertarian should be
quite at peace with the idea of everything being wholly
straightforwardly determined (I suppose this means "physically
determined and not patternless"). As I've said, this really seems
to me no different, when all is said and done, from a determinism so
thorough-going as Honderich's and the consequent death knell for
libertarianism. However, as I've also said, Dennett seems to do odd
things with his notion of randomness, in order to try restoring the
intentional to a position of primacy and giving flesh and blood to
the concept of agency. And before actually saying anything about
this manoeuvring on the part of Dennett, I will just repeat once
more what I think cannot be over-stressed, namely that the random
consideration generator _is. physically deterministic, and that
between this essay and "Mechanism and Responsibility", there is
every reason to think that Dennett holds everything which happens
subsequent to the generation of considerations, to be physically
determined. Dennett, remember, thinks that, despite the presence of
what is across the board strict physical determinism, he has hit
upon an "indeterminism", in the notion of the "undetermined"
consideration generator, which is an aid to the libertarian cause.
I have already said that I believe the presence of physical
determinism to be a devastating blow to the libertarian. But even
if it were not itself the case, I still find it difficult to see how
the supposed "indeterminism" of the "random" consideration generator
could help the libertarian one iota. On Dennett's model, even the
most monumental decisions one will take will depend upon whatever
considerations happen to be thrown up by a random generator, over
which I am totally powerless. Why am I not, therefore, entirely
impotent with regard to my actions? At any rate how this specific
"indeterminism" posited by Dennett would help me to claim authorship
of my actions is something over which I am in the dark. How would
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it be any worse for the libertarian if the consideration generator
was wholly unambiguously determined (I suppose this must mean, for
Dennett's purposes "displays pattern"): how would this frustrate
the notion of personal authorship, whilst the parallel
"indeterminism" helps us, supposedly, to make a case for it?
Consider for the moment, Dennett's illustrative example. Jones, who
is finishing her dissertation on Aristotle and the practical
syllogism, must decide within a week whether to accept the assistant
professorship at the University of Chicago, or the assistant
professorship at Swarthmore. We are asked to suppose that
considerations A - F occur to her, and that those are the only
considerations that occur to her, and that on the basis of those,
she decides to accept the job at Swarthmore. She does this knowing
of course, that she could devote more time and energy to this
deliberation. Dennett also asks us to suppose that, after
committing herself irrevocably, consideration G occurs to her, and
that had G occured to her before she committed herself, she would
have gone to Chicago instead. Dennett, strangely, seems almost
manic in his desire to stress the intelligible nature of the action
in the face of this possible "indeterminism" e.g. although we are
supposing that the decision is strictly unpredictable, except
conditionally by the intentionalist (despite its being ultimately
physically determined), whatever choice Jones makes is
retrospectively intelligible. There will be a rationale for the
decision in either case; in the former case a rational argument in
favour of Swarthmore based on A - F and in the latter case, a
rational argument in favour of Chicago based on A - G. However, I
don't myself see how this can possible elevate the intentional to
the position of primacy and autonomy which the libertarian requires
- indeed, it seems to me that this whole suggestion on the part of
Dennett would be unpalatable to the libertarian. Let us recap.
Considerations A - F have occured to Jones at the moment she decides
where to go and so, on the basis of A - F, she decides to go to
Swarthmore; however, had G occured to her before she made that
fatal phone call, she would have gone to Chicago instead. This is
surely one of the biggest decisions Jones will make in her life, and
yet the eventual choice she makes will turn upon whatever
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considerations (if Dennett is right), by processes over which she
has no control, happen to get into her mind. That going to Chicago
on the basis of A - G would have been no less and no more
intelligible than going to Swarthmore on the basis of A - F is, I
think, of little help to the libertarian. And Dennett, I think,
simply compounds the implausibility of this idea by adding that
there could be yet another rational argument, based on A - H, or I
or J, in favour of Swarthmore, or in favour of going on welfare, or
in favour of suicide. Not only may Jones choose to take the
assistant professorship at Swarthmore on the grounds of
considerations which spring up out of her control, but she may even
decide to kill herself on the grounds of considerations which have a
similarly autonomous origin! And this (Dennett thinks) raises the
intentional to a position of integrity, helps us claim authorship in
the face of physical determinism. This idea does not seem at all
reasonable to me and indeed, the general suggestions made by Dennett
about this example from which he thinks he can derive a useful
"indeterminism" and primacy of the intentional, seem themselves to
me to be difficult to swallow. It does not seem to me to be at all
typical of important decision-making that a crucial consideration
which carries such weight that it is sufficient reason to completely
reverse one's original decision, occurs to one after one's decision
has been made. Jones, Dennett suggests, considers the difference in
salaries, the probable quality of the students, the quality of her
colleagues, the teaching load, the location of the schools, and so
forth. She then makes her decision (on the basis of A - F), knowing
that she could devote more time and energy to this deliberation,
could cast about for other deliberations, etc. And, as I've said,
we're asked to imagine that after committing herself, consideration
G occurs to Jones, which is enough to make her prefer the option she
has already decided against. What seems to me to be wholly
untypical about this is that, short of being given about two seconds
in which to make up one's mind, all the major relevant factors occur
to one more or less immediately, i.e. at first time of asking. The
kind of considerations I've just documented Dennett as giving are
precisely the kind on which a decision will be founded; these kind
tend to occur en bloc, whilst the ones which don't occur straight
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away will be relatively trivial e.g. the general quality of Indian
restaurants in the area. The idea of something cataclysmic striking
Jones after she has opted for Swarthmore seems to me implausible. I
repeat however, that even if Dennett's remarks here are reasonable,
how they provide a pathway for the integrity of the intentional and
consequently for human freedom is not at all clear to me; indeed,
as should be clear by now, the consequences of this are, I think,
dire for freedom. Physical determinism seems just as haunting as
ever.
Later remarks made by Dennett in supposed defence of the
intentional make his efforts, I think, all the more perplexing.
Near the end of his essay, Dennett says that
in many cases our ultimate decision as to which way to act is
less important phenomenologically as a contributor to our sense
of free will than the prior decision affecting the deliberation
process itself: the decision, for instance, not to consider
any further, to terminate deliberation; or the decision to
ignore certain lines of enquiry.
How is this feature connected with the "indeterminism" which Dennett
has postulated as being instrumental for the libertarian? Let us
suppose that Dennett is correct in his suggestion of the "random"
consideration generator; the show gets on the road (let's say) with
the random throwing up of considerations affecting the decision. On
Dennett's model, it is perfectly possible however that everything
that subsequently happens is quite straightforwardly physically
determined (surely likely, in fact, given other general positions
taken up by Dennett), and this must surely include the decision not
to consider any further, to terminate deliberation, etc. And so, if
these decisions affecting the deliberation process itself are
themselves determined in the full-blooded sense (and of course, I
would also say this even of the "weak" sense in which Dennett speaks
of the random consideration generator), how can we be right in any
feeling that they reveal the freedom of our will? Whether Dennett
specifically thinks that the prior decisions affecting the
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deliberation process are themselves determined, and what the
relation of this to the random consideration generator is meant to
be, is not clear to me, i.e. on the one hand, Dennett presents (as
I've said, I think misguidedly) the random consideration generator
as a condition of the success of the libertarian project and, on the
other hand, he tells us that the decisions affecting the
deliberation process itself are, more than anything, what makes us
inclined to attempt the libertarian project in the first place. But
of the connection between those two (alleged) aspects, he says
absolutely nothing. I have already cast doubt on whether Dennett's
suggested "random" consideration generator actually could reinforce
any sense of personal authorship and, if I am correct about this,
and also if everything which subsequently happens is determined,
then the libertarian would seem to be back at square one i.e. the
physical has won out, the intentional has lost, we have no freedom.
And I think that similar remarks apply regarding another juncture
which Dennett regards as having libertarian import,i.e. the
intelligent selection from the considerations supposedly randomly
thrown up by the generator - if, again, this intelligent selection
is itself causally determined, then it seems to me that the game is
up here also for the libertarian. Forget finding freedom here. But
Dennett is conspicuously quiet on all this. One would expect him to
provide an account of this "intelligent selection" which marks it as
mine, in the same way as one may expect it of the (allegedly)
phenomenologically important factor of the ending of deliberation,
as one may expect on account also of how it is connected to what
seems to be (for Dennett) the libertarian bedrock of everything,i.e.
the "random" consideration generator. It is by no means clear how
personal authorship is enhanced one iota by the supposed features
Dennett takes to enhance it. Physical determinism, I think, still
won't go away, and with it the consequences, which I think are every
bit as monumental as we have seen Honderich say that they are. If
physical determinism is true, if (in Ginet's terms) we have no
choice as to which complete first-level description we are to
satisfy, then despite the zealous and occasionally desperate
attempts of 'language strata' theorists such as Davidson, Kim,
Fodor, Pears and Dennett, we have no genuine choice at all regarding
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our actions or thoughts - we cannot suddenly jump into this magical
realm of the intentional to recover our freedom. Ginet and Van
Inwagen seem right, despite everything. And in fact, this case
against language strata compatibilism is reinforced succinctly in an
extract of Malcolm's aforementioned essay "The Conceivability of
Mechanism". Malcolm, by way of example, imagines the case of a man
climbing a ladder to get onto a roof, in order to retrieve his hat,
which the wind has put there. I have myself already said that any
physical theory, if physical determinism is true (quite regardless
of anything else), provides sufficient causal explanations of
behaviour and Malcolm reinforces this, saying that a
neurophysiological explanation of some behaviour that has occured is
assumed to have the following form:
Whenever an organism of structure S is in neurophysiological
state Q it will emit movement M.
Organism 0 of structure S was in neurophysiological state Q.
Therefore, 0 emitted M.13
So as Malcolm goes on to point out, it would follow that the
movements of the man on the ladder would be completely accounted for
in terms of electrical, chemical and mechanical processes in his
body. And, as Malcolm puts it:
this would surely imply that his desire or intention to
retrieve his hat had nothing to do with his movement up the
ladder. It would imply that on this same occasion he would
have moved up the ladder in exactly this way even if he had had
no intention to retrieve his hat, or even no intention to climb
the ladder. To mention his intention or purpose would be no
explanation, nor even part of an explanation, of his movements
on the ladder.
That is, it would not be true that those movements occured because
he wanted or intended to get his hat; events in the remote past
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conjoined with the laws of nature (neither of which are up to the
man on the ladder), uniquely determine the movements of the man on
the ladder, (or in Ginet's vocabulary, the man's movements are
contingently necessitated through laws not of his making).
I hope that I have, by now, given some reasons for believing
that despite the weight of philosophical writing against them,
Malcolm, Van Inwagen and Ginet are correct regarding this
consequence of the truth of strict, universal, physical determinism,
with regard to human behaviour, though I will later be documenting
further formalisations of Van Inwagen's incompatibilism and
considering more challenging compatibilist arguments. 'Language
strata' compatibilism, despite the toil and sweat which have clearly
gone into articulating it, is ultimately indefensible. Later, I
will consider (and ultimately reject) other compatibilist projects,
specifically those which may, for shorthand purposes, can be called
'empirical' ones, those focusing on conditions of meaning and
application of power-ascription statements e.g. that of Keith Lehrer
in 'An Empirical Disproof of Determinism?' Other attempts at
disparaging the supposed importance of the prospect of universal
physical causation vis a vis our conception of ourselves as free
agents will also eventually be considered e.g. that of Harry G.
Frankfurt in "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person"^,
where Frankfurt postulates the kind of person who "lacks nothing in
the way of freedom", yet also says that the life of such a person is
entirely independent of whether determinism is true. Before going
on, however, I feel it worth considering a small contribution to the
issue made by someone whose suggestions appear to display
significant similarities with (in different facets) those of Dennett
and Honderich. In the section of his well-known Ethics: Inventing
Right and Wrong entitled "Determinism, Responsibility and Choice",
J.L. Mackie (a philosopher whose works I tend to admire) argues for
what is basically a compatibilist position, and a position which is
similar to that of Honderich in that the determinism he concedes may
be true is very similar to that of Honderich, but also similar to
that of Dennett in that Mackie seems to believe the ultimate
consequences of the truth of such a determinism to be fairly
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minimal. Indeed, I think the comparison with Honderich is
especially interesting. I will expound.
As the primary subject-matter is ethics, Mackie is, of course,
concerned primarily with moral responsibility, and it is as one of
the frontiers of ethics that the question of free will and
determinism gets consideration. Mackie has less confidence than
Honderich that the determinism he discusses is likely to be true -
the argument he claims, is "far from watertight, but does provide
the basis of a good case for determinism about actions". It should
be clear that the argument consists of three premises very much like
those of Honderich's ('One') determinism, namely that all physical
states and events are causally determined, including states of the
brain, that brain states are correlated with mental states in such a
way that given a certain brain state just such a mental state must
occur, and that actions are causally determined by mental states.
Accepting the possibility of this being true, Mackie goes on to
document the incompatibilist worry as the worry that choices are not
open in any absolute sense. That is, they are fixed in advance
because they are predictable in principle (despite the practical
implausibility of such predicitions). The perfect predictor, as
Mackie puts it, would be a relevantly exact replica of the agent and
his environment, since determinism accepts the 'same cause, same
effect' principle it implies that whatever choice the replica makes,
the agent will also make (the echoes of Dennett's picture should be
clear here). Mackie admits that this does go against our intuitive
view of choice; we tend to assume, however unwarrantably, that
decisions are not fixed in advance even in this minimal way.
However, where I think Mackie is wrong here, and Honderich right, is
that Mackie does not see why this should matter. Mackie wonders
what it is that the free will apologist is worried about when he
regards the consequences of this picture as damning: he asks
whether the incoherent demand is being made that "the 'I' should be
able to make that same 'I', itself at that moment, different from
what it is". However, I don't think that this (incoherent) demand
is the demand which is being made. The incompatibilist worry here
is generated, not by the inability of the 'I' to make itself
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different at any given moment, from what it is, but by the features
of the world which make the 'I' precisely the 'I' which it is at
that moment. That is, if the determinism documented by Honderich or
Mackie is true, then the 'I' can, in principle, be exhaustively
explained, at any given moment, by reference to physical states and
physical laws (which are not up to me), the language of nerve cells,
neuron firings, etc. How and when do I possibly get into the action
i.e. if reference to my choices, desires, etc. are ultimately
inessential to its explanation? Honderich is much more clear on
this and with this in mind, I find it especially interesting to note
Mackie's subsequent diagnosis of the incompatibilist worry:
The most plausible interpretation is that it presupposes a
distinction and contrast between my character, desires, and so
on, all my contingent empirical features, and my real self - in
Kantian terms between an empirical self and a noumenal or
metaphysical self. The complaint is that if determinism holds,
the empirical self is no doubt operative and effective, a cause
as well as an effect, but the metaphysical self is an idle
spectator of a causal order in which it cannot intervene.
I am as aware as Mackie is, of the difficulty of coherence created
by the entire notion of the metaphysical self. And moreover, as I
will make more explicit in a moment, so is Honderich. However, the
interesting thing, I think, is that Mackie is mistaken to believe
that there only is an incompatibilist worry if one attempts or
wishes (or appears to fail) to find a role for a metaphysical
self-type entity. As I've already said, Honderich is much less
blase than Mackie about the possibility of encompassing physical
explanation, he believes that it does present a genuine threat to
our feelings about authorship and responsibility, but it should be
clear from the following passage from "One Determinism" that this
belief of Honderich does not itself turn upon a prior hankering for
any kind of metaphysical self:
It is not a matter of importance, but it is worth notice that
to accept determinism is not to be deprived of a satisfactorily
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articulated conception of responsibility. The blank occurs at
that point where one should have an account of the non-causal
agency that is ordinarily supposed to enter into responsible
action. No one has ever offered more, by way of explanation,
than a certain amount of dubious machinery, notably the
'Creative Self'. It is pretty hard to maintain the required
suspension of disbelief in such items, or rather, it is hard to
see what it is that one is trying not to disbelieve.
This is interesting, for a number of reasons. As I've
suggested, Honderich clearly is as sceptical as Mackie as regards
any metaphysical self. However, it seems that Honderich thinks
that, if his determinism is true, then the kind of factors which
make the empirical self the precise empirical self which it is at
any given time (i.e. physical) require that we at least revise our
conception of ourselves and our supposed responsfcility for our
actions. Mackie does not seem to grant this, since the truth of a
Honderich-like determinism, according to him, needn't impinge one
iota on our responsibility - ascriptions - one could, he thinks,
only believe otherwise if one is already holding on to the
mysterious notion of a metaphysical self. I think Mackie wrong (as
I've suggested) to think the issue of the genesis of the empirical,
contingent self irrelevant to questions of responsibility: if it is
not up to me how my empirical, contingent self is constituted, then
how can I make sense of my being responsible for my actions? I
think it noteworthy that Honderich says only that his determinism
would require some fundamental revision of ourselves (i.e. not a
complete abandoning of all idea of responsibility), without actually
spelling out what this revision would be like, how we could retain
responsibility in the face of his ('One') determinism. Unlike
Mackie however, he at least accepts that it would require some
fundamental change in our conception of ourselves. Indeed, in two
relatively straightforward, uncontroversial sections, "Voluntary or
intentional actions" and "The straight rule of responsibility",
which concern themselves more with our present practices and
descriptions than anything else, Mackie believes that he makes out a
powerful case for compatibilism. However, like a great many
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compatibilist projects I have encountered (some of which I have
already discussed, and some more of which I will discuss later), I
don't believe that freedom or responsibility can be bought nearly so
cheaply as the proponent believes. In Section 4, "Hard and soft
determinism", Mackie notes that the distinctions drawn between
intentional and non-intentional actions, the explanation suggested
for the straight rule of responsibility, and the considerations that
might justify real or apparent divergences from this straight rule,
were all developed without even raising the question of
contra-causal freedom. However, «\y reply to this is that what this
does not show is that the question of contra-causal freedom is not
relevant, that it does not impinge on what Mackie documents as
having been fairly effortlessly discussed. That is, it may have
been a mistake not to raise the question of contra-causal freedom
and indeed, I believe (like Honderich) that if determinism is true,
questions of responsibility must begin with an acknowledgement of
that fact. Mackie seems to be guilty here of something which he
warns against elsewhere,i.e. of believing that one set of facts do
not impinge on the consideration of another set when, in fact they
do. Indeed, anyone with general experience of the two of them may
think it unlikely, but I think there is something rather Strawsonian
in this approach of Mackie,i.e. he seems to believe that since we
have an ethical life we want to get on with, that we d^ get on with,
then questions regarding the rational justification of particular
ethical stances can only make sense within the system itself, which
is already given. It makes no sense to place the entire network in
doubt via a question such as physical determinism. As I will argue
later, I agree with Nagel that this view is incorrect. Indeed,
before moving on, I think it will be very expedient for me to pause,
do a bit of assimilation, and provide a foretaste of something which
is to come a bit later, something which I hope will be seen to play
a major role in supporting incompatibilism. When I come to devote
some attention specifically to Keith Lehrer's variant of empirical
compatibilism, I will cite a fanciful, but logically possible
hypothesis postulated by Van Inwagen, a hypothesis Van Inwagen calls
"(M)". All I will say about (M) at the moment is that it is a
determinist hypothesis, the truth of which (it seems to Van Inwagen
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and me, at least) would clearly preclude free will. Yet the point I
want to make is that, having talked of Davidson, Dennett and Mackie,
there is nothing said by any of them, the truth of which entails the
falsity of (M). Everything said by Davidson, Dennett and Mackie
regarding language strata, standpoints, practices, etc. could be
true, and yet (M), also be true. One of the major objectives of Van
Inwagen's in his floating of the (M) hypothesis, one of the points
he is most anxious to make is one which I myself regard as of the
most fundamental importance and will be stating repeatedly and in
varying contexts throughout, namely that there are possible worlds
in which things may appear exactly as they appear in the actual
world, and yet one of the possible worlds in question be
deterministic and the other one not. Identity of appearance or
practice does not entail an identical answer to the question "Is
determinism true?" This is a major problem, I think, with any kind
of contributor who thinks that the question of determinism or
compatibilism can be settled by an appeal to the world as it
appears, to our language, practices and habits. Whether determinism
is true is something we may only be able to settle by going beyond
these primitive kind of features; hypothesis (M) is deliberately
formulated so as to make explicit, not only that its truth would
preclude free will, but also that its truth or falsity is perfectly
compatible with the way the world appears to us, with the phenomena
described by the likes of Davidson, Dennett and Mackie. Davidson,
Dennett and Mackie could go on forever reiterating their points
about language, standpoints, practices, etc. and yet not move one
iota in the direction of establishing whether (M) is true or false.
And in fact, I also think it of great importance to be clear that
whilst (as Van Inwagen himself comments), there are significant
differences in contrast between hypothesis (M) and the likes of
Ginet's 'H' hypothesis or Honderich's ('One') determinism, the
parallels are also crucial. Indeed, I think that a large part of
the beauty of (M) for the incompatibilist is that, once one agrees
that its truth precludes free will, then one would lose just about
all reluctance to accept that the truth of H or Honderich's
determinism would likewise kill off free will. Similarly, as Ginet
and Honderich are no doubt perfectly well aware, one or other of
73
their deterrainist hypotheses could be true, or be found to be so,
quite independently of how the world appears to us. As with (M),
their respective suggestions can only really be discovered to be
true or otherwise by probing beyond appearances and, as with (M)
also, no amount of accuracy of documenting of language, standpoint
or practice can counter-evidence them. Like (M), I think (as I will
continue to adduce arguments for) the truth of either of them is
imcompatible with free will, and like (M), I think that we cannot
know their truth value, or counter-evidence their alleged
incompatibility with free will though the descriptive analysis
(however rigorous) of the likes of Davidson, Dennett, Mackie or (as
I hope will become clear) Lehrer and Flew. For the moment, I think
it very important to realise that, when presented with any argument
for compatibilism or free will, we can always ask whether the
argument invalidates Van Inwagen's First Formal (incompatibilist)
argument, or whether it would help square free will with hypothesis
(M), were it true. This is a highly useful approach, I think, and
it seems to me that nothing offered by way of the contributors I
have just been considering either invalidates Van Inwagen's First
Formal Argument, or helps square free will with (M).
Indeed, I think that the significance of this kind of
realisation really cannot be over-stressed, and believe that failure
to grasp its importance has been at the bottom of a lot of what has
been ultimately empty or insipid writing within free
will/determinism. It should be clear that it has certainly been at
the root of much compatibilist jinking. In fact, the approach of
the likes of Davidson, Dennett and Mackie has an even more
distinguished history than I have documented so far. In a
well-known essay "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man",15
Wilrid Sellars documents what is really a language
strata/"standpoints" distinction, when he distinguishes between the
scientific image and the manifest image of man. Not surprisingly,
the former is one which we adopt when we wish to view ourselves as
creatures in the natural world of cause and effect, and the latter
is (supposedly) one we go in for when we wish to view ourselves as
agents with intentions, purposes, objective, etc., and deserving of
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praise, blame, gratitude, resentment and the like. The parallels
with Dennett's mechanistic/intentional distinction in standpoints
(or Strawson's objective/participant distinction in attitudes) are
clear enough. As I've already indicated, I will later be looking at
the comments of Nagel (with whom I am largely in agreement), on this
kind of distinction and the use to which it has been put within
discussions of free will/determinism. And, as well as Lehrer and
Flew, I will also be considering another (to me) surprisingly
influential and respected tradition within compatibilism which seems
to me to harbour the same kinds of dismissive confusions^i.e.
conditionalism. And, (to conclude the piece of preamble), let me
say that, whilst Van Inwagen is highly useful in making this strand
within compatibilism and its shortcomings explicit, an irony is that
I will ultimately find Van Inwagen guilty of a crime not too
different from the one which he has helped to describe, when I come
to consider whether there is reason to believe that we have free
will.
In the meantime, it may help us to establish some sort of
attitude towards determinism if we could get some more tangible
grasp of the kind of thing being talked about, some better grasp of
the cash value of determinism.
By working his 'H' hypothesis through, Ginet allows us to see
what determinism actually looks like in practice, how (if true) it
would cash out in the actual world. Having established (I hope)
that he is on a sure footing so far, we can now go back to Ginet,
and see a thorough-going H, so to speak. Through seeing how this
would look, we may be able to establish some confidence regarding
whether it is reasonable or fanciful to think that it is true and
more generally, whether it is reasonable or fanciful to think that
anything like it could be true.
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4. A WORKING DETERMINISM
I referred throughout the last part to Ginet's 'H' hypothesis
as a straightforward physical determinism, and this may, I suppose,
have been pre-empting matters very slightly. From what the complete
first-level description 'B' contains, and what it does not contain,
it would be a bit rash, I suppose, to conclude straight off that the
'A' slots could not, for instance, contain the likes of
psychological descriptions. That H must be a straightforward
physical determinism, however, is made admirably clear by Ginet
himself. Ginet notes (as I have just done) that, as it stands at
the moment, H contains no restrictions as to the kind of
descriptions that may occupy the 'A' slots. However, he continues,
were descriptions of certain sorts of psychological factors -
desires, intentions, beliefs and the like, to be put in the 'A'
slots, then stipulation (2) of H would not have a chance of being
true. To remind ourselves, stipulation (2) is that
Ay contingently necessitates A2, A2 contingently necessitates
A3,...An_i contingently necessitates An, An contingently
necessitates B, where 'B' is a complete first-level description
of a temporal segment of a human being's behaviour, and 'Ay'
^2',...^^ are a series of antecedent circumstances.
Ginet suggests that the reason he makes this claim is that such
psychological factors, though commonly used in explaining behaviour,
can never be regarded as contingently necessitating that behaviour,
because they must always fail to meet either the first or the third
condition defining contingent necessitation. That is, if they are
described in such a way as to leave it a logical possibility that a
person should satisfy the description but behave in some way other
than the one being explained (thus satisfying the first condition),
then it will always be found that we have no reason to doubt that a
person does, while satisfying the description, have a choice as to
whether or not he shall behave in that way (thus failing to satisfy
the third condition). And if, on the other hand, these
psychological factors are described in such a way as to make us feel
confident that no one satisfying the description has any choice, but
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must behave in the way that they explain, then it will always be
found that this is because the description entails that sort of
behaviour (thus denying the first condition) - the connection will
have been made necessary at the expense of its contingency. It is,
I think, worth reflecting on this for a moment. I think that Ginet
is correct here about psychological concepts and indeed, it seems to
me that if one accepts the (Davidsonian) assumptions of
indeterminacy of translation and the holism of the mental, then he
cannot be other than correct. As Davidson has so famously pointed
out, the intentional descriptions which are applicable to a subject
derive their meaning, at least in part, from their position as a
component part within a coherent system (network) of intentional
characterisations,i.e. of purpose, beliefs, desires, goals, etc. In
so far as an intentional ascription fails to cohere with other
intentional ascriptions to the same subject, then we will be
sceptical of it - something, at any rate, either the new
characterisation or a previously held belief about the intentional
network of the subject, would have to go. This holistic character
of the intentional leaves us generally with a certain leeway and
openness as to how to characterise a subject intentionally and
explain his behaviour intentionally (indeterminacy of translation),
and therefore there must always (as we have just seen Ginet point
out) be a gap between, say, purpose and appropriate behaviour.
Someone, for instance, may have a specific desire, but act so as not
to fulfil it because of other held desires, or goals, or whatever.
Therefore, there is the gap between desire and appropriate
behaviour, and our description of the subject as one with this
particular desire, whilst correct, does not facilitate the
conclusion that he will act so as to satisfy the desire.
Conversely, we may correctly describe the subject with reference to
the set of goals and purposes which we know to be incompatible with
the satisfaction of this desire, and confidently predict that he
will not attempt to satisfy it (if he does we will be sceptical
about whether he actually has the broader set of goals and
purposes). And I don't think that this suggestion is in conflict
with what is said by Malcolm in "The Conceivability of Mechanism",
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when he contrasts the neurophysiological and the intentional,i.e.
that the relationship between purpose and action is not a contingent
one, but is an a priori one. As I considered to some degree
earlier, the relationship between purpose and behaviour can, I
think, be a priori, conceptual, without compromising the claim we
have just seen Ginet make, or any of the Davidson premises. This,
in fact, receives some echo in Malcolm's own example (which I have
already alluded to) of the man trying to retrieve his hat from the
roof. Let us look, for a moment, at the form Malcolm suggests an
intentional explanation of the man's climbing the ladder would take:
If a man wants to retrieve his hat, and believes this requires
him to climb a ladder, he will do so provided there are no
countervailing factors, (emphasis mine)
This man wanted to retrieve his hat and believed that this required
him to climb a ladder, and there were no countervailing factors.
Therefore he climbed the ladder.
The notion of 'countervailing factors' hints strongly at the
Davidson premises, and at what Ginet has said. And indeed, the echo
becomes even stronger when Malcolm goes on to ask what sorts of
things might be included under 'countervailing factors' in such a
case. His suggestions include the unavailability of a ladder, the
fear of climbing one and the belief that someone would remove the
ladder while he was on the roof,i.e. more components within the
network of the man's intentional states. I hope that I have helped
make it clear here why Ginet is correct to say that psychological
descriptions are precluded from the 'A' slots and why this does not
mean disclaiming the a priori relationship between intentional
states and action.
Indeed, perhaps I can really make it clearest of all by saying
that all that Ginet is really saying with regard to the relationship
between psychological states and action, what it really amounts to,
is that (what Kim has called) Davidson's thesis of Psychophysical
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Anomalism is true. (What Ginet is saying may or may not also entail
that Psychological Anomalism is true, but I don't think it essential
to pursue this presently.) For reasons which have already been
discussed, the psychological is just not the kind of thing to enter
into lawlike relations with the physical; because of features of
the mental such as rationality maximisation, indeterminacy of
translation, and holism, psychological concepts are nomologically
incompatible with behaviour descriptions. If we go back a little
bit, what Ginet is actually pointing out is that which recurs
throughout Davidson's work, namely that any appearance of genuine
lawlike relations between the psychological and behaviour must be
illusory. Like Davidson, however, Ginet is perfectly well aware
that there can b£ such an appearance and in the face of
Psychophysical Anomalism, what he does is account for this
appearance, and explain why it must be illusory. This is, really,
the import of his comment that psychological factors can never be
regarded as contingently necessitating behaviour, because they must
always fail to meet either the first or the third condition defining
contingent necessitation. The illusion of lawlikeness, in any given
case, can be shattered by exposing the fact that the "law" in
question has only been purchased at the price of having the
psychological description entail the type of behaviour in question.
And, of course, this has to be the case, given Psychophysical
Anomalism i.e. any resistance, any apparent counter-evidence to a
purported psychophysical law must be "explained away", and explained
away again, ad infinitum, until the psychological description
entails the behaviour in question, and the "law" collapses into
nothing. It can, I hope, be seen from everything I have already
discussed, especially vis a vis Davidson and Ginet that these are
two mutually supporting features, they are not accidentally placed
together, i.e. since we see, on inspection, that any psychophysical
"law" is explained away into nothing, then we get very good evidence
(on those grounds) for Psychophysical Anomalisra, and (proceeding in
the other direction) since Psychophysical Anomalism is something
which seems to be true (on other grounds), then it is to be expected
that any supposed psychophysical "law" can only be sustained by
explaining it away into a stipulation. Psychophysical "laws" must
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be stipulations because Psychophysical Anomalism is true, and
Psychophysical Anomalism seems to be true because we find that an
attempt at discovering a psychophysical law collapses into our
fixing them by stipulation. What is really significant here is the
result of things which are going on at the ground-floor; there are,
really, ground-floor reasons why the 'A' slots within Ginet's 'H'
hypothesis cannot contain psychological descriptions. Indeed, these
ground-floor features (or equivalent ones at any rate) will become
important again later on, when I come to address what I have called
"Empirical Determinism/Incompatibilism". Within this species of
determinism/incompatibilism, the "explaining away" manoeuvre is
probably easier to identify than it is in the kind of case I would
imagine Ginet (or Davidson) have specifically in mind (indeed, I
will first discuss "explaining away" arguments in general), but the
reasons why empirical determinism/incompatibilism can only be
supported (I will conclude) by "explaining away" means are largely
equivalent^i.e. that the kind of alleged relations, put forward to
support it contain the wrong kind of thing to get into laws. And,
as has been reinforced strongly enough up till now, and will be
reinforced more as I go on, if there is one thing which determinism
does entail, it is laws.
It now seems little more than trite to say that the sets of
circumstances that might be candidates for the 'A' slots in H are
restricted to the physical sort, and Ginet's follow-through, as I've
suggested, shows precisely what the consequences of physical
determinism would be, for how we would be forced to think of
ordinary human conduct. Ginet states that we could imagine future
observations that would make it reasonable to believe H, or to
accept it, in the sense in which it is commonly said of an
hypothesis in a science that it is accepted. He asks us to consider
the following first-level descriptions of common behaviour sequences:
The body moves from a standing position to position of being
seated on a chair, and then the left leg rises and crosses over
and settles on the right leg.
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The head turns slightly from left to right...and at the same
time there issues from the mouth the sounds "In this paper I
shall be concerned with..."
The hand and arm move towards a pen...and then the hand and
fingers move in such a way that the pen traces on the paper the
following marks: "My Last Will and Testament..."
Ginet then goes on to ask a whole series of rhetorical questions
about this behaviour sequence he has just imagined:
Isn't it entirely conceivable that for each of these behaviour
patterns we might observe that a certain sort of internal state
of a human being (one, say, that is physiologically and
neurologically very, very complex), when occuring in certain
environmental circumstances, is always accompanied by that sort
of behaviour, no matter how we vary the other circumstances?
And isn't it just as conceivable that we should discover for
each such physiological-cum-environmental state (that appears
to necessitate contingently a certain sort of behaviour) a kind
of antecedent set of circumstances that Tt always and
inescapably accompanies? And so on, until we arrive at a set
of antecedent circumstances that contingently necessitates a
considerable chain of bodily-cum-environmental changes, ending
in the sort of behaviour sequence we started with, and with
regard to each of which remote antecedents it is obvious that
the person whose behaviour is at the end of the chain could
have had no choice?
It is, I think, worth repeating that, whilst this may appear
particularly rough and ready to some and, I would expect, bizarre to
others, it is my contention that, despite all their desperate
squirming and writhing about, the anomalous monists, Dennett and
Pears (Honderich, too) are committed to something much like this
suggestion of Ginet. Despite the zealous efforts of those
contributors to preserve some sort of integrity for the intentional
and consequently for freedom, they must, ultimately, seriously
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entertain something like the suggestion I have just cited Ginet as
making. Ginet stresses that this is a logical possibility. And (he
continues), we can imagine accumulating such observations for a
great many different kinds of behaviour-sequences, until the grounds
become strong enough to justify accepting H as a well-confirmed
hypothesis.
Can this picture put forward by Ginet be swallowed,
ultimately? The first point which I think worth making is not
itself an argument but it is really only a persuasive point - I
feel, however, that it is germane to what looks like the real
stumbling block to an acceptance of H. This is simply that it does
seem prima facie fanciful to imagine observations taking place which
would make it reasonable to accept H. Perhaps my own imagination is
just not so dynamic as Ginet's, but the suggestion that we could
even confirm a relationship of contingent necessitation between one
set of purely physically described antecedent circumstances, and one
complete first-level behaviour-kind, doesn't seem especially hopeful
to me, so the prospect of discovering enough such relationships to
accept H seems to me completely wild. Take his own example: is it
really that easy to imagine that we might arrive at the discovery of
(say) some extremely complex internal state of a human being which
contingently necessitates the cited movement of the body, the left
leg crossing over the right leg, etc., which in turn contingently
necessitates the sounds "In this paper I shall be concerned
with...", and all of which, through a chain of contingent
necessitation, ultimately contingently necessitates the pen tracing
on the paper the marks "My Last Will and Testament"? As I've said,
perhaps the reason why this seems to me so difficult to imagine
hints at the real problem for something such as the H hypothesis,
and that is precisely the essential presence of the intentional to
an exhaustive account of the world. And I don't think I can
over-stress "essential" here. As I've already said in connection
with a number of manoeuvres on behalf of free will, it is of no
consequence whatever if the intentional manages to get into the
picture in some fortuitous fashion which leaves it ultimately
secondary and inessential,i.e. if the behaviour which is supposedly
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being explained would happen anyway, given the purely physical/
neurophysiological conditions holding at the time, leaving the
behaviour in question wholly explicable in the absence of
intentional characterisation of the subject. This would be the
case, I said, if the pictures suggested by the likes of Davidson,
Kim, Fodor, Pears, Dennett and Honderich were correct - everything
which goes on in the world could be explained without any reference
whatever to the intentional mode. As we've already seen Malcolm say
in "The Conceivability of Mechanism", if this were the case, then it
would not be true that the movements of the man in his example
occurred because he wanted or intended to get his hat. It should be
clear by now, of course, that Ginet's H hypothesis has this upshot,
and it is precisely this feature which makes it seem impossible to
accept. In Malcolm's example, it seems simply bizarre to suggest
the man's movements did not occur because he wanted or intended to
get his hat; it seems that the man's desire or intention to get his
hat, as described in precisely this way, is indispensable in
explanation of his movements. And, of course, equivalent remarks
seem to apply in the case of Ginet's example - it seems (prima facie
at least) that the series of antecedent circumstances relevant to an
explanation of the whole affair must include intentional concepts.
The subject in this example is (presumably) giving a paper to an
audience. The circumstances which, it seems, must be cited by way
of explanation of this include the likes of his being asked to give
a paper by someone in charge who thought that his audience would
wish to hear and would enjoy such a paper, the person's
understanding of this offer, his subsequent acceptance of it,
research into the topic, further work, planning, pondering,
revising, etc. This kind of facet would seem to be an essential
part of the person's body being where it is in the first place. And
we could go on: the person sits on a chair perhaps because he wants
to, or because he feels slightly fatigued after having to run to
catch his train (this itself being the result of his becoming too
absorbed in a book in the waiting room), because his audience would
prefer it or whatever. His head and eyes move as they do because he
wants to read his paper to his audience, his mouth only emits the
first sounds that they do because the sounds have a meaning, which
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both he and his audience understand, and because of accepted
conventions of paper-giving; the hand moves towards the pen because
he knows that the pen is an instrument with which to write, and he
wants to write a set of meaningful marks on his paper. And so on.
As I've said, it seems that those kind of features, whose essential
nature seems to be as they are described (i.e. in the intentional
mode) cannot be left out of a complete account of what happens. But
if H is true, then they can be left out. This makes H look unlikely.
Purposive states qua purposive states seem to be essential to
an explanation of action and so, if my arguments so far have been
sound, determinism cannot be true. However, a rather unlikely and
particularly radical source of danger to the entire schemata assumed
so far could, if defensible, throw everything into some disarray. I
can hint at it first by citing a rather lengthy extract from Book V
of Nietzsche's The Gay Science:
Even the most circumspect...think that the known is at least
more easily understood than the strange...Error of errors! The
known is the accustomed, and the accustomed is the most
difficult of all to "understand", that is to say, to perceive
as a problem, to perceive as strange, distant, "outside of
us"...The great certainty of the natural sciences in comparison
with psychology and the criticism of the elements of
consciousness - unnatural sciences as one might almost be
entitled to call them - rests precisely on the fact that they
take what is strange as their object: while it is almost like
something contradictory and absurd to wish to take generally
what is not strange as an object... .1
N i*tzsche was making a point specifically about the Cartesian
project here, but it is this general kind of lead N Letzsche gives
which is behind the endeavour I now wish to consider. All along, it
has been tacitly assumed that we have straightforwardly intentional
states, a sub-class of which are purposive states, a central
question for free will being whether purposive states actually have
any genuine application to the world, or whether we could explain
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everything that happens without them. However, is this assumption
itself well-grounded? What do we mean when we say that we have
purposive states, and what do we know about them? If the whole idea
of purposive states can be discredited, then perhaps a crucial part
of the apparatus which generates the free will problem will have
gone, and we will have to start thinking of ourselves in wholly new
terms and, who knows, perhaps even terms which will transform the
whole traditional problem of free will for us. For the eliminative
materialist Paul Churchland, such a move seems to be a possibility,
indeed, in his paper, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional
Attitudes", Churchland puts forward the idea that "intentional
states" are, quite conceivably, an eliminable construct of what he
calls "folk psychology", and could well be replaced by something
much more useful. As we shall see, there are two essential
components in his disparaging of intentional states:
(i) that folk psychology, of which intentional states are a part,
is a theory, and
(ii) that, given what is required of a theory, folk psychology is
a barely credible theory.
It should be clear that, if these claims can be sustained,
then the free will problem may take on a whole new complexion, or
may even disappear. I will be forced, ultimately, to disagree with
Churchland but, nevertheless, his efforts have to be taken
seriously, and I will now turn to them.
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Notes
1. In 355: "The Origin of our Conception of 'Knowledge'".
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5. ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF PURPOSIVE STATES
In order to properly place the threat of eliminative
materialism in perspective, it is, I think, worthwhile to recap on
features of the picture which I have already described. Away at the
beginning, I talked of the primitive, preverbal kind of intuitions
which are at the bottom of a great many of the classical
philosophical problems, of which free will is one. I attempted to
clarify this notion with regard to freedom, saying that what really
generates a problem about freedom is the persistence of two
conflicting impressions,i.e. on the one hand, the apparently
unavoidable impression, on a great many occasions when we act, that
we are the authors of our actions, that it is within our power to do
other than what we, in fact, do, and that those actions (with regard
to which are free) cannot be exhaustively explained without recourse
to the irreducible intentional categories, and on the other hand,
the almost equally unavoidable impression that, being (at least)
physical objects in a natural world, cause and effect and our mental
lives being, in some way at least, intimately related to the
functionings of a brute physical entity (i.e. the brain), on each
occasion on which we act, we are merely the focus of causal
summation for external influence, leaving it very difficult to
attach any sense to the idea that we could have done otherwise and
that we are responsible for any of our actions. The feeling that it
is the latter intuition, and not the former one, which points the
way to where the truth lies, finds formalisation in the likes of
Ginet's H hypothesis, which explicitly states the intentional to be
(ultimately) inessential to explanation of any human action, and
Honderich's ('One') determinism, which may not, prima facie, appear
to be so hard-line regarding the intentional as Ginet's H, but which
really has exactly the same significant consequence,i.e. the
explanatory superfluity of the intentional.
I went on to say that it was precisely this failure on the part
of a hypothesis such as Ginet's H to appear to do any sort of
justice to the former intuition above, as opposed to the latter one,
which made it look so implausible. This feeling was reinforced by
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looking at a rigorous working-through of H, and in particular, at
Ginet's purported illustrative example of H in practice; I said
that it seemed essential to an explanation of the particular
goings-on documented by Ginet that (for instance) the speaker
understood the invitation to speak, knew something about his topic,
etc., and an entire set of other things similarly constituted
essentially by irreducible intentional concepts. The idea that
these intentional categories could, in principle, disappear in
favour of something more basic (i.e. the neurophysiological) seemed
implausible in the extreme. Now enter what must be regarded as a
knight in shining armour for someone impressed by H, i.e.
Eliminative Materialism. I have already made clear, I hope, that
what appears as a central strand in the worry about freedom is the
fear that, whilst the intentional may have unambiguous,
straightforward, full-blooded reality (e.g. I really do have an
intention to go home), it is nevertheless a function of something
yet more basic,i.e. the neurophysiological, which could, in
principle, be invoked to explain exhaustively. I hope that I have
also made clear by now that it is precisely this seeming
full-blooded reality of the intentional, and its apparently
essential links with behaviour which we have already seen Malcolm
speak of, which makes this notion of a more basic neurophysiological
seem unlikely. However, it is the business of eliminative
materialism to get a foothold even prior to all of this/i.e. not to
wonder (as Honderich clearly would) whether the neurophysiological
may be more basic than a patently real intentional, but to
facilitate the explanatory comprehensiveness of the
neurophysiological by casting doubt on the entire presupposition of
the intentional itself. As Paul Churchland puts it in the opening
sentence of "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional
Attitudes":
Eliminative Materialism is the thesis that our common-sense
conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically
false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the
principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be
displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed
neuroscience. (emphasis mine)
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My emphasis will be seen, I hope, not to be gratuitous. One prong
of my attack on eliminative materialism will be my claim, which I
regard as of the utmost significance, that what Churchland calls
"our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena" is not, in
fact, a theory in any serious sense (Churchland calls this alleged
theory "folk psychology", or FP). The other prong of my attack will
concern Churchland's specific treatment of what, really, I have
documented as one of the apparent intuitions giving rise to the
whole issue of free willyi.e. propositional attitudes (beliefs,
desires, intentions, purposes, etc.). As I've already said, the
entire assumed existence of the likes of desires, intentions and
purposes is something which Churchland thinks is, at best,
presumptious, and this claim is really part of his more general
claim that FP is a theory, and one whose credentials are, at that,
in serious doubt.
Churchland spends a few pages attempting to support his claim
that it is in fact only a theory that humans have desires,
intentions, beliefs, purposes, etc., features which are (as Malcolm
stresses) conceptually linked to their actions. However, I don't
myself see that Churchland says anything in serious support of his
claim that what he calls "folk psychology" is only a theory. I
don't have the space here to devote to a consideration of the
essential nature of a theory. However, I don't think either that
this is quite essential. All we need know, I think, are the rough
and ready features of FP, and whether these features problematise
intentions, desires, beliefs, etc., in the way in which Churchland
supposes; that is really, I think, what is essential to
Churchland's claim that FP is a theory, i.e. that intentions,
desires, beliefs, purposes and the like are not (as seems to be
generally supposed) unambiguously real, "untouchable", given
features of reality, but that such notions only derive any import
through their position in an entire holism of concepts and relations
(Churchland's "folk psychology"), which may itself be radically
unsatisfactory. As I've said, Churchland cites some features of the
mental, features which he thinks give the notion of intentional
states this questionable credibility. He characterises FP generally:
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Each of us understands others, as well as we do, because we
share a tacit command of an integrated body of lore concerning
the lawlike relations holding among external circumstances,
internal states, and overt behaviour.
In general support, Churchland notes the the average person is able
to explain, and even predict, the behaviour of other persons with a
facility and success that is remarkable. Such explanations and
predictions standardly make reference to the desires, beliefs,
fears, intentions, perceptions, and so forth, to which the agents
are presumed subject. But such explanations (Churchland goes on)
presuppose laws - rough and ready ones at least - that connect the
explanatory conditions with the behaviour explained. Similarly,
Churchland thinks that the intentionality itself of mental states
has a clearly theoretical status:
...the intentionality of mental states here emerges not as a
mystery of nature, but as a structural feature of the concepts
of folk psychology...
e.g. (x) (p) (q) [((x desires that p) & (x believes that {if
q, then p}) & (x is able to bring it about that q))
> (barring conflicting desires or preferred strategies,
x brings it about that q)]
(Churchland's example.)
However, it is my own view that, far from the kind of features I
have just cited Churchland as documenting, pointing to dubiously
theory-laden conclusions we (allegedly) leap to regarding the mental
and its connections with external circumstances and behaviour, these
features are, on the contrary, facts about the mental itself, about
the mental qua mental. Intentional states are not a theoretical
postulate, but are a part of the full-blooded reality of mental
phenomena; similarly, the kind of "rough and ready" laws which
Churchland speaks of relating the intentional with behaviour are not
merely components of an entire theoretical holism which we may be
able to dispense with, but are a part of the essential nature
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of actual real intentional states e.g. (in Malcolm's already cited
example), it may be a part of a man's mental life at a given time
that he wants to retrieve his hat (i.e. nothing "theoretical" here),
that he (similarly) believes this requires him to climb a ladder
and, if this is true, he will climb the ladder provided there are no
countervailing factors (as an essential part of the nature of
intentional states). (An excellent and thorough discussion of this,
which I don't feel it necessary to pursue here, occurs in John
Searle's Book Intentionality, Chapter 1, "The Nature of Intentional
States" and Chapter 3, "Intention and action"). In his
aforementioned essay "Analytic Philosophy and Mental Phenomena",
John Searle makes, I think, what are very persausive remarks on this
issue. He concerns himself at one point with the functionalism of
Dennett, Dennett's position being one with significant similarities
to that of Churchland, in that the actual, real existence of
intentional states as an essential feature of the mental seems cast
in doubt and instead, we are left only with "intentional systems"
and the "intentional stance". On Dennett's account both humans and
computers with certain sorts of program are "intentional systems",
and an intentional system is just one where we find it appropriate
to adopt "the intentional stance". In the adoption of the
intentional stance, "One predicts behaviour...by ascribing to the
system the possession of certain information, and supposing it to be
directed by certain goals and then working out the most reasonable
or appropriate action on the basis of these ascriptions and
suppositions" ('Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness'^). It
is then, Dennett says, but a small step to describe this information
and these goals as beliefs and desires. But we must not ask if these
really are beliefs and desires because "the definition I have given
of intentional systems does not say that intentional systems really
have beliefs and desires, but that one can explain and predict their
behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them, and the decision
to adopt this strategy is pragmatic and is not intrinsically right
or wrong". The echoes with Churchland's suggestion that FP is a
theory should be unmistakeable. I am, however, in agreement with
Searle, who agrees that it is open to anybody to adopt any strategy
he finds useful, but adds that the question remains (my emphasis),
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what is the status of the ascription of the mental states, whether
the ascription is of information and goals, or beliefs and desires.
Indeed, I hope it is clear by now why I regard it reasonable to
simply quote outright the following crucial sentence of Searle's:
Even if we have not defined intentional systems in such a way
that we say that they really have beliefs and desires, there
will still be a difference between those intentional systems
that really have beliefs and desires and those that do not, and
in the case of those that do, the ascriptions have entirely
different interpretations from the case of those that do not.
(emphasis mine)
It is this definition drawn above by Searle which Churchland (along
with Dennett) is questioning. According to Churchland's thesis that
FP is a theory, there is no significant difference whatever between
our ascriptions of intentional states to ourselves and to the
computer - in both cases we simply employ a holism of concepts
which, as it happens, has some efficacy in explaining respective
behaviour. As I've said however, the likes of Churchland and
Dennett appear to me to be completely in error here. As Searle
comments, there is an enormous difference between my attributing a
"desire" to a chess-playing computer to castle on the strong side,
and my saying I have a desire to drink a glass of cold beer:
...in my own case I do not attribute to myself a desire for a
beer because I find it useful in predicting my behaviour, but
because I want a beer (emphasis mine)...whether or not people
find it useful to adopt "the intentional stance" towards me is
quite irrelevant to what the facts really are, (emphasis mine)
Indeed, in an ingenious analogy a bit later, Searle, I think,
exposes the absurdity of the claims of Churchland and Dennett, that
the alleged existence of mental phenomena such as beliefs and
desires with intrinsic relations to behaviour is mere theoretical,
not (in principle) indispensable holism. Suppose that there were a
group of philosophers who were puzzled by the existence of hands.
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And suppose that we were told that we do not have to worry about the
existence of hands because it is all a matter of adopting the
"manual stance" toward certain systems which we will describe as
"manual systems". We can paraphrase Dennett here: "the definition
of a manual system does not say that manual systems really have
hands but that one can explain and predict their behaviour by
attributing hands to them, and the decision to adopt this strategy
is pragmatic and not intrinsically right or wrong". It should be
perfectly clear by now what the point is here, namely that the
intentional stance approach to understanding beliefs and desires is
about as useful as the manual stance approach would be to
understanding hands. As Searle points out, in each case the
question of analysing the intrinsic features of mental states (or
hands) gets replaced by a different question: under what conditions
do we find it useful to talk as if a system had mental states (or
hands)? As I've said, this is the distinction which the likes of
Churchland and Dennett are doubting, but Searle, I think, reinforces
it even more strongly by the penetrating observation that we
understand the metaphorical non-literal use of "belief" and "desire"
as applied to computers because we see these attributions as based
on an analogy with systems such as human beings who literally have
intrinsic beliefs and desires. That is, despite the desperate
efforts of Dennett and Churchland, I think that Searle is clearly
correct here: there is nothing "metaphorical" or "theoretical" in
the ascription of mental states to human beings who simply have
unambiguously genuine mental states, some of which have as an
essential feature (as we have seen Malcolm say), a relation to
action. The ascription to the likes of computers, on the other
hand, of mental states, is metaphorical (or "theoretical"), in that
it is merely a part of a convenient holism of concepts used to
explain and predict behaviour, and is itself (as we have seen Searle
point out) parasitic on the primary, non-theoretical ascription of
intentional states to human beings. And whilst it is not, strictly
speaking, an argument, I find a more than persuasive afterthought
Searle's suggestion that one thinks what it is actually like to have
a pain in the stomach or a passionate desire for a cold beer and ask
one's self whether one is talking about real mental phenomena or
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just adopting a stance. That is, we must ask what is the source of
the explanatory categories which constitute the 'intentional
stance'. According to the likes of Dennett and Churchland, the
intentional stance would appear to be something which appears, as
though by magic, from nowhere in particular, and which, somehow or
other, allows us to predict the behaviour of 'intentional systems'
i.e. as well as the physical categories, there appears to just
spring up the entire intentional network of beliefs, desires,
purposes, thoughts, etc. which we somehow are warranted in applying,
in exactly the same way to some human beings, some animals and some
machines, in order to predict and explain their behaviour. We just
impose it (it goes on) upon certain classes of things and lo and
behold, we find that it works sometimes in order to explain their
behaviour. This, however, seems to me (and Searle) to be wholly
unacceptable - it seems to me ludicrous to assume that, when in some
cases we find the physical categories too cumbersome to explain and
predict behaviour, we can simply hire, as it were, this other,
completely different set of categories (i.e. with some humans, some
animals, and some machines) for the purpose, without ascribing any
sort of primacy to one kind of application over another, and leaving
us completely in the dark as to where this other and curiously
useful set of categories has come from in the first place. On the
contrary, I would claim (as Searle would appear to), that we know
perfectly well where the intentional categories, and all their
logic, come from, and that is from the case of human beings, who
literally have intentional states. This is where the primary use of
the intentional categories is to be found, and the ascription of
intentional states to machines is a metaphorical ascription, made
possible because we already have, prior to this, the network of
intentional concepts, which is a result of our literally having
intentional states. Indeed, this whole claim on the part of
eliminativists, that no particular primacy can be given to any
specific application of the intentional categories, seems to generate
the following infinite regress problem: if it is only under some
interpretation or other that a physical set-up can be credited with
mental states, is it only under some interpretation that what is
offered is an interpretation? That is, it is suggested that it is
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only under an interpretation (apparently arbitrary, as I've said )
that even human beings can be ascribed mental states (i.e. the
adoption of the intentional stance); however, if thoughts, beliefs
and the like can only be ascribed under a particular interpretation,
then an interpretation, being of the same category in this respect
as thoughts, beliefs, etc. (intentional) can only be ascribed under
a particular interpretation (the intentional stance). That is, it
is claimed, on the one hand, that the intentional stance is only an
interpretation, but on the other hand the intentional stance seems
to be a condition of recognising something as an interpretation.
The intentional stance, according to this, seems to be both a
condition ascribing the character of an interpretation to something,
but also an interpretation itself, which seems incoherent. Indeed,
this seeming primacy of the intentional, this basicness, will
eventually turn out to be of great importance, with regard to what
conclusions I will ultimately reach regarding free will. In the
meantime, we can get clear on the confusions of Dennett and
Churchland by insisting at least at some point on a first-person
point of view.
If my argument has been sound, then what makes Ginet's 'H'
hypothesis seem implausible (and, of course, several variants of
determinism, which despite disguise, I have claimed are
significantly similar), namely the seemingly essential role of
intentional concepts in explanation of human action, cannot be
explained away via the claim that this feature itself is merely a
component of an overarching theory which may well be defective and
replaceable. As I hope I have successfully argued, what generates
the implausibility of a theory such as 'H' is not a theory which the
truth of H could itself falsify, or which may be false on
independent grounds anyway, but unambiguously real features of the
world. Indeed, if we have a look now at some of the points
Churchland advances in favour of his claim, not only that FP is a
theory, but that it is a radically defective theory, what I hope
will be reinforced are precisely the counter-claims for which I have
been arguing.
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The first point Churchland attempts to advance to the supposed
discredit of FP is the alleged failures of FP. He cites a whole set
of apparently large-scale shortcomings: the nature and dynamics of
mental illness, the faculty of creative imagination, the ground of
intelligence differences between individuals, the nature and
psychological functions of sleep, the common ability to catch an
outfield fly ball on the run or hit a moving car with a snowball,
the internal construction of a 3-D visual image and the subtle
differences with the 2-D array of stimulations in our respective
retinas, the rich variety of perceptual illusions (visual and
otherwise), the miracle of memory, with its lightning capacity for
relevant retrieval. On these and many other mental phenomena, FP,
claims Churchland, sheds negligible light. He adds that "one
particularly outstanding mystery is the nature of the learning
process itself, especially where it involves large-scale conceptual
change, and especially as it appears in its pre-linguistic or
entirely nonlinguistic form (as in infants and animals). However,
there are a number of reasons why these claims appear to me to be
spurious and indeed, somewhat curious. Leaving aside for one moment
the question of whether FP can be plausibly construed as a theory,
it becomes very difficult, once these alleged shortcomings on the
part of FP are scanned, to see precisely what theory Churchland
takes FP to be. It appears as a very suspicious fact at this point,
that Churchland has at no point set forth rigorously a supposed
theory called "FP". Until we know what theory FP is, what claims
are (supposedly) made by FP, we cannot say whether the areas of
ignorance documented by Churchland are actually shortcomings of FP.
As should already by clear, Churchland has certainly spoken at
points as though what is essential to FP is the conceptual holism of
the intentional categories, with its intrinsic connections with
action.
But, should Churchland actually be correct (despite Searle and
myself) that there is something which can be called "folk
psychology", and that it is a theory, then if this supposed theory
is merely this intentional holism, then it is difficult to see how
the areas of ignorance which he has cited are actually shortcomings
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of the theory in question. Doubtless there are a lot of things
about and related to the mental about which very little is known;
there is indeed ignorance, largely, in the areas mentioned by
Churchland. However, again assuming (I stress) that the intentional
categories and their essential connections with action are only a
theory, then it is not at all clear to me how such a theory is put
in jeopardy by the lack of insight in the areas documented by
Churchland. For instance, should it ultimately only be some sort of
theory (though I think it isn't) that the explanation of a man's
climbing a ladder is that he believed that by doing so, he could
attain his objective of retrieving his hat from the roof, it is not
clear to me how such a theory would be threatened by, for instance,
the fact that we don't know a great deal about mental illness. Why
need a "theory" of intentional categories explain everything within
its purview in order to be taken seriously as an explanation of
anything? We can surely see this by comparing the comparable, since
it seems to me to be the case in a great many areas that, whilst
there may be unsolved problems at the extremities of our concerns,
this does not entail that these aren't more mainstream cases within
the domain about which we can feel sure: for instance, physicists
may still be unsure, ultimately, about whether light is a wave or a
particle, but this problem need not throw everything that they
hitherto thought they know about light into jeopardy. Similarly,
the fact that a cure for a cancer still seems some way off does not
mean that everything which physiologists thought they had
established must go by the board, nor even more specific claims such
as (say) that smoking increases the risk of cancer. In ethics,
whilst debates may rage on issues such as nuclear weapons, capital
punishment and abortion, this does not mean that we need be thrust
into scepticism about whether (say) kicking an innocent old person
at a bus stop out of frustration that one has missed the bus, is
morally defensible. And so on. The point is, I hope, clear by
now. Undoubted cases of problems within the domain of the
psychological don't entail the entire collapse of everything we
thought we knew about the psychological. And, as I've already said,
one thing I think that we do know here is that there are intentional
states, some of which (e.g. purposes) are essentially linked to
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action, and unlike Dennett and Churchland, I do not see this as in
any sense a theory, as some sort of "stance" or conceptual holism
which may turn out to have some explanatory efficacy.
Indeed, the later remarks of Churchland in attempted
disparagement of the "theory" of FP turn out, on inspection, to be
most revealing of all, I think. This is the supposed "stagnation"
of FP, and its alleged failure to integrate successfully with
theories in the physical sciences. On the "stagnation" theme:
...both the content and the success of FP have not advanced
sensibly in two or three thousand years. The FP of the Greeks
is essentially the FP we use today...one must query the
integrity of its basic categories.
And, on the "poor integration" theme:
...the greatest theoretical synthesis in the history of the
human race is currently on our hands, and parts of it already
provide searching descriptions and explanations of human
sensory input, neural activity, and motor control. But FP is
no part of this growing synthesis. Its intentional categories
stand magnificently alone, without visible prospect of
reduction to that larger corpus.
It should not by now be difficult to imagine why I think the correct
replies to Churchland here support the conclusions he doesn't want
to entertain. Churchland doesn't really seem to wonder why this
supposed theory called "folk psychology" appears to have been
"stagnant" for so long, or why it appears to be so poorly integrated
with other established (physical) theories. The answers, I would
say, are that there is no theory called "folk psychology", that
intentional categories describe (when applied to humans)
unambiguously real phenomena in the world which in some cases have
essential links with action, and that the intentional categories
must stand alone, since they could not, by their nature, be
integrated with physical categories. This is, in fact, the correct
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account, I believe, of what Churchland views as shortcomings, and
damning shortcomings, of the "theory", "folk psychology". So these
alleged shortcomings are actually no accident: they are a
consequence of, and evidence for, what I have been claiming all
along. Intentional states, for instance, have not altered for
thousands of years, in that they have been both genuine phenomena
and constituted essentially by their directedness, their
representing something other than themselves, this feature being
precisely the reason why intentional categories could not be a part
of a theoretical synthesis of physical categories. Not only are
intentional states perfectly real phenomena, but they are
essentially constituted by this representative content, and it is
this essential feature which no level of sophistication of
explanation within the neurosciences could possibly get a hold of.
That is, no amount and complexity of explanation involving neuron
firings, nerve cells, or whatever, would mention content of my
intentional state, my belief (say) "that it is raining outside".
These are the reasons why the intentional categories stand alone, it
is no shortcoming on the part of the intentional, but an essential
feature of real phenomena. (And I'm not sure why Churchland makes
such an issue out of the existence of nonlinguistic intentional
states - I think it indisputable that they exist, and exactly the
same kind of remarks would apply: no degree of physical explanation
could grasp the essential nature of nonlinguistic intentional states
either). It can be no surprise altogether, therefore, that in the
section "Beyond Folk Psychology", Churchland gives no hint as to how
we could make this fundamental step from neural dynamics to the
intentional,i.e. that outside of the brain which is represented.
Indeed, it ought to be remembered that eliminativism is itself
a theory, and yet it seems to eliminate just those intentional
states which are necessary to the formulation of any theory. We
must pause at this point and ask what we know about the whole notion
of a theory. A theory is surely something which it is possible to
believe, accept, doubt, understand, etc., believing, accepting,
doubting, understanding and the like being things eliminativism is
ultimately committed to denying. How, for instance, could anyone be
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coherently said to accept eliminativisra if it were actually true? A
theory is surely about something other than itself, it has meaning,
but this also would seem to look very tricky if eliminativism were
true. And what is the process of actually arriving at any theory in
the first place? The things which Churchland would seem to be doing
in "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes", and
which, it seems, he would have to have done before he could have
written it, are surely things he would be forced to deny if
eliminativism were true e.g. thinking, researching, gathering
evidence, reassuring, doubting, inferring, believing, etc. And
isn't it self-defeating to say that one believes that there are no
beliefs?
It seems very difficult to see therefore, how a determinism
such as Ginet's H could be made to look more plausible by attempted
downgrading of the entire intentional realm. I hope I have
successfully argued that such a project is doomed to fail. As Nagel
says, physicalism is a kind of idealism, an idealism of restricted
objectivity, i.e. turning on the belief that the real features of the
world must be accessible to the physical sciences. But, from what I
have said, it would seem that the reality which is intentional
states, with their essential feature of directedness, cannot be
captured by the physical sciences. As Nietzsche says, an
essentially mechanical world would be an essentially meaningless
world - we simply could not get to the likes of beliefs, desires,
intentions, purposes, projects and the likes with only physical
categories.
What I have said does not falsify determinism; despite the
full-blooded reality and irreducibility of the intentional, I have
said nothing which precludes it from being (say) the function of a
mere basic neurophysiological, the kind of which has already been
talked of. Indeed, I think it worth pausing to re-trace some
steps. I have been concerned in this part specifically with
eliminative materialism, but I am only concerned with eliminative
materialism at all because of the consequences it could have for a
discussion of free will. Eliminative materialism, remember, if
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true, would make it at least seem much more plausible that
determinism is true, since that which seems prima facie, to make
determinism most difficult to accept,i.e. the intentional
categories, would entirely disappear. The world would be described
exhaustively in the physical categories. Eliminative materialism, I
concluded, is untenable. However, it must be appreciated that the
falsity of eliminative materialism hardly entails either
\/ap
compatibilism or free will. I will very soon be elucidating can
Inwagen's (M) hypothesis and, going back to what I earlier suggested
as useful rules of thumb, the falsity of eliminative materialism is
perfectly compatible with the truth of (M), a hypothesis which, if
true, would kill off any notion of free will; nor does it seem to
do anything to invalidate Van Inwagen's First Formal Argument. It
is quite consistent to believe eliminativism false, (M) true, Van
Inwagen's First Formal Argument sound, and no free will. The
significant point of impact here is that the falsity of
eliminativism means that one of the conditions of any belief that we
sometimes act freely,i.e. the intentional, cannot be thought of as
some bogus or inauthentic alleged feature of the world, the
intentional is a straightforward real feature of the world.
However, I repeat that the reality of the intentional is only a
condition (a necessary one) of the existence of free will; it is
not sufficient. The falsity of eliminativism only means that an
attempt at disparaging the authenticity of the intentional fails,
and consequently an attempt at denying a necessary condition of the
existence of free will fails.
Before I go on to consider whether it is reasonable to suppose
that remaining conditions of free will are satisfied, I want to deal
with something else. This is what can be called 'empirical'
compatibilism. I have already looked at compatibilist theories
which allow that something like Ginet's H may be true, but hold that
we can rediscover our freedom in the sacred realm of intentional. I
concluded that it can only be by varyingly transparent cheap tricks
that such claims can seem plausible. I have also just looked (in
Eliminiative Materialism) at a theory which, if true, would help
facilitate the truth of physical determinism by downgrading the
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impact of the 'given' intentional. I concluded that this could not
be sustained either, that the intentional is here to stay.
Empirical compatibilism, like 'language strata' compatibilism,
allows that something like H may be true, but holds that worries
about freedom can nevertheless be shown to be ungrounded simply by
becoming aware of conditions of power-ascription. I will conclude
that this is ultimately just another compatibilist cheap trick, but





6. EMPIRICAL COMPATIBILISM: MORE CHEAP TRICKS
Away at the beginning, I mentioned Keith Lehrer, M.R. Ayers,
and J.L. Austin as examples of contributors who, by some means or
other, wished to uphold human freedom in the face of the apparent
threat of determinism but who (I wanted to claim) can all be seen to
be operating with an ultimately futile notion of capacity, which
they don't appear to recognise as a problem. A bit later, I also
mentioned Harry G. Frankfurt as an example of someone who has tried
to purge causality of (at any rate, what I see as) its full-blooded
centrality and significance within the problem of free will. In
this part, I wish to expand on this.
A cursory reading of the offerings of the people concerned
could leave one with the impression that there are significant
differences between their respective positions on free will e.g.
Lehrer's position in "An Empirical Disproof of Determinism?" is
explicitly compatibilist, Frankfurt's position in "Freedom of the
Will and the Concept of a Person", whilst less explicit on the
matter, is also compatibilist, whilst the mere title of M.R. Ayers'
book, The Refutation of Determinism, would seem to suggest that he
is, first and foremost libertarian and therefore needn't really
concern himself with the question of compatibilism and
incompatibilism. However, I would wish to regard those contributors
as tied together with regard to what is significant; what is common
to them, is, I think, of more consequence than what separates them.
What seems to me to link them essentially, is the inclination to
ultimately relegate or downgrade causality (with all its alleged
importance) with regard to problems of human freedom, on the grounds
that the real, substantive issues here can be settled by focusing on
much more ordinary and mundane features e.g. the criteria we use to
ascribe a power of capacity to someone or (more in Frankfurt's case)
the psychological constitution of the kind of person who can be
regarded as free. I will now devote some attention to these kind of
efforts and, whilst I will recognise that they contain some genuine,
valuable insight, and that they help facilitate the clearing away of
a lot of dust within the area of free will, I will be arguing that
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they are ultimately futile as regards allaying the worries about
human freedom which are generated by the prospect of the truth of
determinism such as that floated by Ginet or Honderich. (In a
previous section, I spoke of Dennett as someone who attempted to
divest causality of its ultimate importance, but I do not throw him
in with those mentioned here, since his compatibilism is of a
significantly different kind. Dennett's position in the face of the
determinist threat is, as I've already mentioned, in alignment with
that famously propounded by Strawson in "Freedom and Resentment", a
position which I will specifically criticise later. The 'empirical'
compatibilists, on the other hand, hold that last-gasp saving
measures such as those attempted by Strawson are really unnecessary,
that we can take the determinist threat at face value and quell it
fairly painlessly).
Let me turn now, specially, to Keith Lehrer. I have already
noted that Lehrer is explicitly compatibilist. And, in fact, this
is really the whole point of his framing the title of his essay in
the form of a question,,i.e. he claims to have demonstrated, on the
one hand, that we can act in a way other than how we do, in fact,
act but he wants to ask, on the other hand, whether the success
alone of this particular demonstration would falsify determinism
("An Empirical Disposal of Determinism?_" - emphasis mine). And
indeed, he goes on to argue that it doesn't,i.e. that we can know
that someone could have done otherwise, and all our actions may yet
be causally determined, indeed, ancestorially determined (Lehrer's
expression), this being that the conditions which determine
behaviour are themselves determined, etc. The significant
similarities that the thesis of universal causal and ancestorial
determination has with Ginet's 'H' hypothesis are I expect, plain to
see. However, whilst it seemed, after all was said and done, to be
an outcome of H that no one could ever act in any way other than how
they did, in fact, act, Lehrer (as I've said) is wanting to claim
that even the truth of the thesis of universal causal and
ancestorial determination does not prevent us from knowing that we
could have done other than what we did, in fact, do. This demands
examination.
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According to Lehrer, we can know empirically that a person
could have done otherwise. It is not, he says, merely a matter of
seeing him do something at some other time which would justify our
claim to know that he can do it at the time when we do not see him
do it, but of seeing him do it when certain other epistemic
conditions are satisfied:
(a) Temporal propinquity: e.g. if I saw a man perform forty
push-ups twenty years ago and have not seen him do it since,
that would hardly justify my claim to know now that he could do
it. On the other hand, if I saw him do it yesterday, my claim
would have much greater merit. The factor of temporal
propinquity would, it seems, function in varying ways depending
on the particular case, but I think it is a familiar and
uncomplicated enough factor for me not to have to labour the
point here.
(b) Circumstantial variety: the greater the variety of
circumstances under which we have seen the person perform an
action, the more justified we are in claiming to know that he
can perform it. There would, I suppose be cases for
qualification here and there, but again, I don't feel this need
be laboured.
(c) Agent similarity: e.g. if we see a man lift a two-hundred
pound weight, and he subsequently breaks his arm, our having
seen him lift the weight is surely not good evidence that he
can do it, now that his arm is broken. Thus, the greater the
similarity of the condition of the agent, at the time when we
see him perform the action, to the condition of the agent at
the time at which we claim that he can perform it, the greater
the justification of our claim. Again however, to some extent
this condition could be formulated as a condition of variety
rather than one of similarity,i.e. if we have seen the agent
perform an action at times when his condition has varied
greatly, then even though the condition of the agent at the
time at which it is claimed that he can perform the action is
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quite different from what it was when we saw him perform it,
the claim might, nevertheless, be fairly well justified.
(d) Simple frequency: Other conditions aside, the more frequently
we have seen a person perform an action, the more justified we
are in claiming to know that he can perform the action when we
do not see him perform it.
Lehrer goes on to say that if all of these conditions are very
well satisfied with respect to any action, we possess sufficient
empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that a person can
perform it, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we
are certainly justified in claiming to know that the hypothesis is
true. And indeed (Lehrer concludes), by the usual canons of
inductive evidence, our evidence is excellent. He goes on and asks
us to imagine an expirement which would enable us to obtain such
evidence. We are to imagine a subject who is normal in every way,
and fabricate an expirement to investigate when he can, and when he
cannot, lift an arm. We might first instruct him to lift his arm
whenever we tell him to, and see that he does this. We might then
(the experiment goes on) tell him to lift his arm whenever we tell
him not to and see that he does this. We might then tell him to
heed or not to heed our instructions, and see that he sometimes
lifts his arm when we tell him to, and sometimes does not, and that
he sometimes lifts his arm when we tell him not to, and that he
sometimes does not. We could (Lehrer continues) then run the
experiment under a variety of circumstances, indoors and outdoors,
under stress and under relaxed conditions, with a weight attached to
his foot and without impediments, etc. We might also keep careful
records of the subject throughout, and finally, vary his condition
by drugs, hypnotism, etc. And suppose that we then instruct the
subject to heed or not heed our instructions, and ensure that both
he and the conditions are those we have found most propitious for
arm-lifting. Moreover, suppose that we watch him lift his arm, then
avert our eyes for a moment, and subsequently see him lift his arm
again. In this case, notes Lehrer, the conditions of temporal
propinquity, circumstantial variety, agent similarity, and simple
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frequency would be satisfied. According to the thesis we have
already seen Lehrer put forward, we would consequently have
sufficient empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that the
agent could have lifted his arm during that brief period when we did
not see him lift his arm, and consequently we would be justified in
claiming to know that the hypothesis is true. Indeed, this claim
would be justified whether or not the agent lifted his arm at the
time in question and indeed, would be justified even if we knew that
he did not lift it. If (Lehrer claims) we are able to rule out the
hypothesis that the agent tried and failed, and if the condition of
the agent as well as the circumstances in which he is placed are
those we have found to be most favourable for arm-lifting, then the
mere fact that he does not lift his arm would not support the
hypothesis that he cannot lift it.
So Lehrer has, it seems, demonstrated that, regardless of the
truth of determinism, we can know that a person can do otherwise.
But I have already agreed with Ginet and Van Inwagen that, if H is
true, then a person cannot behave in any way other than he, in fact,
does. Are those two hypotheses irrevocably at odds, and if so,
which one is correct? If H is true, can we, or can't we, do other
than what we do? It has to be said right away that the Lehrer
enterprise that I have just presented does seem to go through so
smoothly that it is difficult not to find it appealing. However,
after exploring ways in which it may be helped to look convincing
i.e. moves which may help to make it look reasonable to say that we
can do otherwise in the face of the truth of H, I will be forced to
conclude that this appeal is ultimately illusory.
We can be pointed towards the source of this illusion I feel,
by considering the different usages of the word 'can'. This is
because I think that one could only be deceived by Lehrer's
compatibilist manoeuvrings if one invests too much in the undoubted
fact that there are significantly different uses of 'can' (or 'could
have done'). I will clarify, at some length. There is the usage of
'can' which has one say that what is the outcome of a set of
sufficient conditions cannot fail to happen, a usage which, were
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Ginet's 'H' hypothesis or Honderich's ('One') determinism true,
would always render false the claim that I can do something other
than what I, in fact, do. However, Honderich himself, in 'One
Determinism', recognises another usage of 'can', according to which
what does not happen can happen, even if determinism is true:
We sometimes say that B can happen in a certain situation and
mean, essentially, that B will happen if some further condition
is satisfied. This is not, as in the first usage, a denial
that not - B will be caused to happen. Indeed, something that
cannot happen, in the first usage, will be something that can
happen in the second usage.
It should not be difficult to see what Honderich is getting at
here. In what Honderich cites as the second usage of 'can', 'can'
is logically linked to some set of conditions. 'Can' reduces here
to 'will if...'. This is, I think, uncontroversial enough and there
can be little doubt that there are both these usages of 'can', as
documented by Honderich. This can be reinforced even by fairly
banal examples. The heavy rain may have been so unpleasant that I
coughed up the money for a bus ride and, whilst sitting on the bus,
I lament that I could have avoided thisyi.e. if I had remembered my
umbrella. The rain caused me (with the proviso of various
background conditions perhaps) to do one thing (and which in the
first sense of 'can', I could not have avoided doing), but I would
have done a different thing had a particular condition been
satisfied (this providing the second sense of 'can', according to
which I could have walked, instead of taking the bus). So let us,
for the moment, postulate that the sense of 'can' or 'could have',
which Lehrer is employing, according to which we can act otherwise
even if determinism is true, is some form of the second sense. It
clearly cannot be the first sense (since the mere truth of
determinism, which Lehrer does not disclaim, would preclude this),
but perhaps there could be a variant of the second sense which
Lehrer could be putting forward, which could give plausible content
to the notion of genuinely open possibilities of action, in the face
of determinism. Let us see if it is possible to effect this sort of
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marriage between Ginet's 'H' hypothesis and Lehrer's claim that we
can know empirically that we can act other than how we do act.
Lehrer, remember believes that something like H could well be true,
so what we must do here is examine what content Lehrer's specific
thesis regarding our doing otherwise could actually have. The
attempt I will make at displaying compatibility between Ginet's H
hypothesis and Lehrer's claim that we can know empirically that we
can do something at a time when we are not doing it will be, I
think, ultimately revealing regarding Lehrer's compatibilism, and
the specific sense of 'can' or 'could have' which Lehrer is
employing.
It should be clear by now, having noted what is Honderich's
second sense of 'can' that in the face of the truth of H, it is yet
possible to attach some sense to the notion of a person's being able
to act in a way other than how they do act. However, we must be
very clear as to precisely what this sense is. That is, if H is
true, we could say (sticking to Ginet's original variables) that
when a person did B and could have done otherwise, we mean that he
would have done otherwise if Ap had not occured, and some other
circumstance (say, Dp) had been the first of the antecedent
circumstances. If that had happened (we could clarify), instead of
A2 being contingently necessitated, D2 would have been contingently
necessitated, which in turn, would have contingently necessitated D3
(instead of the A3 which actually happened)... and Dn_p would have
contingently necessitated Dn, which would have contingently
necessitated (say) C (instead of the B which actually occured). The
fact of the matter is (we could finish) it was Ap, and not Dp that
occured, and that was why he did B and not C. That is:
(1) Ap contingently necessitates A2, A2 contingently necessitates
A3,..., An_p contingently necessitates An, An contingently
necessitates B
(and of course, the man had no choice as to whether Ap would
occur), and
(2) Dp contingently necessitates D2, D2 contingently necessitates
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Dg, ..., Dn_i contingently necessitates Dn, Dn contingently
necessitates C
(the man had no choice as to whether would occur).
So perhaps we may be able to say that, whilst we will use Lehrer's
four conditions by way of establishing whether a person can do
something that he is not doing, whether or not he actually does it
is itself ancestorially determined by the kind of factors H
includes. Again, we could employ Lehrer's four criteria and say, at
a time when a person is not doing L: "He can do L", and then refer
to H to discover that he would be doing L just now if , which
contingently necessitates it, had occcured, and that the reason he
is doing M just now and not doing L is that Yj, which contingently
necessitates M, in fact occured, and TL\ did not occur.
However a shrewd reading of what has just gone should move one
towards what I think is really the punch-line. And that is that,
whilst I have distinguished, a la Honderich, between two different
usages of 'can', it is now clear that, when Lehrer claims that we
can know empirically that someone can do otherwise, he is not using
'can' in either of those two senses. Since Lehrer is not denying
determinism, he is clearly not using 'can' in the first sense
specified. But what of the second sense? With this, to say that a
person can do otherwise, is to say that under a certain set of
conditions different to those which held, he would have done
otherwise. Before going on however, it may well be worth pausing
and asking what import this itself has. That is, if Ginet's H
hypothesis is true, then no one ever has any part anyway in
determining which set of conditions (e.g. 'Aj' or 'D]_') happen to be
true of him at any given time, and consequently no part in deciding
how he ultimately behaves. So, if 'H' is true, it is not at all
clear how this second usage of 'can' does anything at all for the
cause of freedom and indeed this feature, as well as the ultimate
fate of Lehrer's efforts, should be especially clear soon, when I
document Van Inwagen's Second Formal Argument. That is specifically
why I spoke earlier of variants of this second usage of 'can', since
its mere existence clearly secures nothing for freedom; the
question for freedom seems to turn on what the conditions are which
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fill the gap in 'will if...'. It cannot be just anything, it has to
be something which facilitates my_ getting into my action somehow
(and, of course, the position of the conditional analysis of power
within the history of free will/determinism, e.g.'I can' means 'I
will, if I choose', is itself well-known, conditionalism being
something I will properly consider later). However, as I've already
suggested, this doesn't really seem itself to be a problem for
Lehrer and, as I've also hinted, Lehrer's problem seems to me to be
much worse than this. On Lehrer's analysis, to say that someone
could have done otherwise is not to say that he would have done
otherwise under a certain specified set of antecedent conditions
which didn't in fact hold (any set). It seems, on the contrary,
that all one would be committing one's self to is the satisfaction
of Lehrer's four conditions of power-ascription i.e. absolutely not
to the claim that there is a certain set of conditions under which
someone would have done otherwise. Those conditions could go on
being satisfied forever, with the 'other' action never occuring.
The man (in Lehrer's example) may never lift his arm, despite the
persistent satisfaction of the conditions which, according to
Lehrer, allows us to say that he can lift it. That is why (the
other problem I have posed about this being waived for the moment),
(1) and (2), or anything significantly like them are, by their
nature, crucially incorrect as an account of Lehrer's claims for his
example, as well as his more general claims about powers. (1) and
(2) display our second usage of 'can' but as I've said, Lehrer's
usage of 'can' is clearly not this one. It is therefore appropriate
to ask what Lehrer is up to. What significance do his efforts have
for free will/determinism? Given that Lehrer accepts that something
like Ginet's 'H' hypothesis may be true (and that his use of 'can'
is not our second usage), what can his claim, that we can do other
than what we do, actually amount to?. Remember that Lehrer's defence
of our ability to do otherwise consists, basically, of a recounting
of our fairly ordinary power-ascription procedures. According to
Lehrer, by employing these banal procedures in the given situation,
we will come to know fairly unproblematically, whether we are
entitled to say that someone can or cannot do a particular thing
which he is not now doing. If one views the matter as Lehrer seems
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to do,i.e. if one believes that questions of powers, or at least,
the only questions regarding powers that we need be interested in,
are entirely settled in this simple, empirical way, then free
will/determinism seems a sadly vacuous issue, on which a lot of
pointless energy would seem to have been wasted. Quite regardless
of whether the suggestions of the likes of Ginet and Honderich are
correct, we know that we could go on indefinitely, employing those
simple, empirical power-criteria, criteria which (Lehrer thinks)
yield the conclusion that we can often do something at a time when
we are not doing it. According to this, even if determinism is
true, the attendant worry regarding our freedom is bogus, and a
simple reminder to ourselves of our ordinary procedures will allay
the worry. However, such claims seem to me far from being
implausible, to be actually a side-stepping, an evasion of the
entire issue, the kind of manoeuvre which Nagel calls in his
introduction to The View from Nowhere, a "cognitive
wish-fulfilment". As Nagel himself recognises, much recent
philosophy has been sadly infected with the tendency to construe the
traditional problems of the subject as being much less genuine or
difficult than they are, and Lehrer's enterprise here seems to me to
be a case in point. If all worries regarding determinism were as
groundless as the empirical analysis which Lehrer (and some others)
suggest, then it would be very difficult to see why the question has
occupied the minds of so many people over such a long period. It is
surely worth saying that the likes of Ginet and Honderich (and Van
Inwagen, who will be especially noted soon) would have little
problem recognising that we do, in fact, employ criteria of
power-ascription in a fashion something like that documented by
Lehrer e.g. we do tend to say the likes of 'I can do twenty
press-ups' on the grounds that I did it yesterday, there having been
no deterioration in my fitness since then, etc. I don't think,
however, that this fact is any better than banal, as regards
contributing to the free will/determinism issue. If Lehrer is
really to make any serious contribution to free will/determinism, it
seems to me incumbent upon him to move beyond what is really only a
descriptive exercise, a piece of linguistic commentary almost, and
ask another set of questions e.g. what do I mean exactly when I say
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that I can do twenty press-ups? What is the connection between this
claim and the power-ascription criteria I use? How could it square
with the truth of determinism? It is on these questions that I find
comments made by Van Inwagen in An Essay on Free Will especially
illuminating. In fact, I think that he is more than helpful on this
issue at several junctures in the book, and in somewhat differing
contexts. Because of the deceptively appealing look of Lehrer's
compatibilism, and the consequent need to reinforce the illusory
grounding of this appeal as strongly and precisely as possible, I
will cite several strands within Van Inwagen's approach which I
consider pertinent. Early on in the book (1.4) Van Inwagen
distinguishes between a skill, accomplishment, or general ability,
on the one hand and, on the other, the power to exercise it on a
given occasion. It seems to me that Lehrer has, all too covertly
and with calamitous consequences for the discussion of free
will/determinism, managed to conflate what it is essential to
distinguish. I have already talked of different usages of 'can' and
in fairness to Lehrer, his conflation has been facilitated somewhat
by something Van Inwagen recognises, namely that 'can' is clearly
used in both kinds of situation. However, as Van Inwagen
(crucially) recognises:
It is plain that the 'can' that figures in discussion of free
will and determinism is not the 'can' of skill: the thesis of
determinism may or may not be relevant to the question whether
someone on a particular occasion can or cannot speak French;
it is certainly irrelevant whether that person is a
French-speaker.
I hope that my major point is becoming fairly clear by now, and is
looking defensible. Despite the warning we have just seen Van
Inwagen give, it looks very much as though Lehrer has allowed the
'can' of skill to slip into his discussion of free will and
determinism. As with Van Inwagen's example of the French-speaker
(or otherwise), the thesis of determinism is indeed irrelevant to
the question of whether I satisfy various kinds of conditions (those
loosely documented by Lehrer) associated with the performing of
115
twenty press-ups; Lehrer is correct about this. However, the
thesis of determinism may well be relevant as to whether I can, on a
particular occasion, perform twenty press-ups. As I've already
indicated by my general disparaging of Lehrer's contribution, I am
in agreement with Van Inwagen that it is this point which is
important with regard to free will and determinism. Lehrer seems
unable to recognise this. In fact, I believe that even more
penetrating comments on this are made by Van Inwagen later in his
book, in Chapter IV, "Three Arguments for Compatibilism", where he
specifically discusses the Paradigm Case argument. I think it
reasonable to regard Lehrer's position as a variant of this
argument. The classical statement of it, of course, is due to
Antony Flew, and it is useful, I feel, to recount a part of it at
this point.
There are various words and phrases we use in ascribing free
activity to people besides the obvious 'acted freely' and 'did it of
his own free will', there are such phrases as 'could have done
otherwise', 'had a choice about what she did', 'had alternatives',
and 'could have helped doing what he did'. We learn these phrases
by watching people apply them in concrete situations in everyday
life, just as we learn, for example, colour words. These concrete
situations serve as paradigms for the application of these words:
the words mean things of that sort. Therefore they must apply to
something; they must apply at least to the paradigmatic objects or
situations. As Van Inwagen recognises this is not, of itself, an
argument for the compatibility of free will and determinism; rather
it is an argument for the existence of free will. However, it is
when we note one of the arguments put forward by Flew to supplement
this one, to show that free will (as well as existing) is compatible
with determinism, that we ought to be clearly reminded of Lehrer's
enterprise. That is, when we carefully investigate the paradigm
cases of free action, we find that their common feature is just
this: we apply the word 'free' to a person's act just in the case
that "if he had chosen to do otherwise he would have been able to do
so; that there were alternatives, within the capacity of one of his
physical strength, of his IQ, with his knowledge, and open to a
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person in his situation". And, of course, a person's act may have
this feature whether or not determinism is true. Indeed, later, Van
Inwagen puts this general compatibilist argument yet another way:
Our everyday ascriptions of the ability to act otherwise make
no reference to determinism. That is, we do not find out
whether an agent's act was undetermined by past events in order
to find out whether he could have acted otherwise. Therefore,
the thesis normally expressed by 'he could have acted
otherwise' does not entail the falsity of determinism.
Although it is not really of great importance for my purposes, it
strikes me as slightly odd that, despite Van Inwagen's displaying
acquaintance with Lehrer's article a moment later, he reports that
he is unable to find a clear example of this (above) argument in
print. Lehrer's argument strikes me as a very clear example of it.
However, the main thrust remains unaffected. As Mackie instructs in
his essay "Responsibility and Language",1 it is a mistake to start
with the assumption that spheres of thought (and practice, I would
add) are separable and do not really conflict, this being a mistake
into which a linguistic philosopher is particularly liable to fall
(though, as I said earlier, irony of ironies, Mackie seems to make
precisely this mistake vis ^ vis free will/determinism and moral
responsibility). Indeed part of the objective of Van Inwagen's
Second Formal Argument (which I will document soon), is to ensure
against such an illusion by talking (unlike Lehrer and Flew) of free
will and determinism in the self-same vocabulary (of "possible
worlds"). I am myself wholly in agreement with Van Inwagen (and in
disagreement with Lehrer and Flew) that it is false that the thesis
normally expressed by 'he could have acted otherwise' does not
entail the falsity of any general thesis to which our everyday
ascriptions of the ability to act otherwise make no reference. This
point is brought out most shrewdly by Van Inwagen when he postulates
an imaginary state of affairs which I, in fact, believe that all
empirical (or "over-empirical") contributors to the free
will/determinism issue should note. I have pre-empted this,
specifically in my discussion of the approach of Davidson, Dennett
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and Mackie to issues in free will/determinism (and my own remarks
must have the same consequences for Strawson, and, as I note in the
next section, M.R. Ayers). Whilst it is, as Van Inwagen concedes,
fanciful, it is also as he says, logically adequate, and I believe
that it is of the greatest importance with regard to the specific
point presently being discussed. Van Inwagen calls this proposition
'(M)':
(M) When any human being is born, the Martians implant in his
brain a tiny device - one that is undetectable by any
observational technique we have at our disposal, though it is
not in principle undetectable - which contains a "program" for
that person's entire life: whenever that person must make a
decision, the device causes him to decide one way or the other
according to the requirements of a table of instructions that
were incorporated into the structure of the device before that
person was conceived.
I hope that it is not, by now difficult to see that the crucial
point about (M) is that it is consistent with all our observations
(and practices), but has the consequence (despite Lehrer and Flew)
that no one can do otherwise than he does. As Van Inwagen is
himself aware, someone might object that (M) is not in fact
consistent with our observations, since we can normally "feel" our
decisions "flowing" naturally from our desires and our beliefs; but
if (M) were true (the objection runs), we should "feel" ourselves
being interfered with. But of course, to meet this objection we
need only suppose that the Martian device causes us to have desires
and beliefs appropriate to the decisions it will cause us to make.
If the Paradigm Case argument were valid, then it would follow that
(M) was compatible with free will. If (M) were true, the world
would look the way it in fact looks, and our linguistic practices
would be the same - or at least (as Van Inwagen points out), we
should emit the same sounds in the same situations, and our
production of these sounds and their reception by our audience would
be accompanied by the same internal sensations. If the Paradigm
Case argument were correct, the extension of the term 'free' could
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be just what it in fact is even if (M) were true, since (M) does not
require any observable features of the world to be different from
what they are in actuality. But (M) obviously does entail that no
one can act otherwise than he does. As Van Inwagen says, if we
should discover that some particular person acted as he did because
a Martian device, implanted in his brain at the moment of his birth,
had caused all his decisions, then we should hardly want to say that
he had free will, that he could have helped what he did, that he had
any choice about the way he acted, or that he could ever have done
otherwise. And if we discovered that everyone was directed by a
Martian device, then we should have to make these judgements about
everyone. As I suggested earlier, when I spoke specifically about
them, this argument can be issued to good effect against 'language
strata' theorists such as Davidson. Van Inwagen is perfectly well
aware that there are all sorts of important differences between
determinism and (M), which we can quite easily appreciate, I think,
by setting (M) alongside the formulations of determinism attempted
by not only Van Inwagen, but also Ginet and Honderich. For
instance, (M) entails that each human being's dispositions to act
are chosen for him by a non-human intelligence, and determinism does
not. However, this is not really what is important: what is
important is that the fact that we can construct propositions such
as (M) shows that it is at least possible that certain propositions
that we know of but have not ourselves constructed are also
consistent with our observations but inconsistent with the free will
thesis. And, of course, for incompatibilists such as Ginet,
Honderich, Van Inwagen and myself, determinism is such a
proposition. As Van Inwagen suggests, this conclusion can hardly be
shocking, since determinism is a very general thesis, essentially
involving concepts (like 'law of nature') that are intimately
connected with the concept of ability (since no one is able to
change the laws of nature). Indeed, I want to reinforce this
connection (and then incompatibilist conclusion), by considering Van
Inwagen's Second Formal Argument in favour of incompatibilism.
Before doing even this however, let us reflect on Lehrer's efforts
vis a vis what I have called the two useful "rules of thumb". Does
anything said by Lehrer discredit Van Inwagen's First Formal
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Argument? I don't see that this is the case. And, having now seen
(M), we can ask whether anything said by Lehrer would make it
possible to save free will, if (M)) were true? Again, I don't see
that Lehrer has done this.
It is, I think, especially salutary to introduce Van Inwagen's
Second Formal Argument at this point. As I've already hinted, this
is because so much confusion (and, alas, compatibilism) has been
encouraged by differing vocabularies within the debate. We have
already seen the kind of vocabulary which the H hypothesis or a law
of nature is going to be expressed in and this, of course, seems of
an altogether different type from that which will be used, for
instance, in attributing skills to persons. We can recall Mackie's
intellectually invaluable point again, and ensure that free will and
determinism occupy the same territory. Indeed, Van Inwagen
anticipates the charge of artificiality against the language of his
Second Formal Argument, with the rebuttal that the "artificiality"
has a good excuse: if we are to investigate the conceptual
relations between free will and determinism, it is hardly to be
supposed that we shall succeed if the vocabulary we use to state the
thesis of determinism and the vocabulary we use to state the thesis
of free will have no elements in common. Therefore, if determinism
is formulated as a thesis about possible worlds (or about
porpositions), the best plan would seem to be to try to formulate
the free will thesis as a thesis about possible worlds (or
propositions). I agree with Van Inwagen that the concept of a
possible world is an extremely useful one and, like him, find it
difficult to understand the number of otherwise intellectually
responsible people who have amused themselves by sneering at it. It
is worthwhile therefore, to cite some of the remarks made by Van
Inwagen in defence of this notion, a defence which Van Inwagen
admits is largely cribbed from Alvin Plantinga's The Nature of
Necessity.
Possible worlds are members of the class of ways things might
be or possible ways things might be arranged or, simply,
possibilities. We quantify over such objects when we say (for
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instance) "There are three ways in which the Earth could be
destroyed", or "There are still a few possibilities that we haven't
investigated" (Van Inwagen's examples). A possibility includes a
second possibility if it is impossible, for the former to be
realised and the latter unrealised (and every possibility includes
itself). A possibility precludes a second possibility if it is
impossible for them both to be realised (no possibility precludes
itself). Thus, the possibility that Socrates teach Plato includes
the possibility that 2+2=4, the possibility that Socrates exist, the
possibility that Plato exist, and the possibility that Socrates
teach someone. It precludes the possibility that Socrates fail to
exist and the possibility that Socrates teach no one. It neither
includes nor precludes the possibility that Socrates teach Aristotle
or the possibility that the most famous snub-nosed Greek philosopher
teach Plato (courtesy Van Inwagen). There is a good deal more said
by Van Inwagen by way of preliminary explication and defence of the
vocabulary employed in the Second Formal Argument, but I believe
that much of it can be waived without great loss. If only because
of the basic limitations of time and space, one must sometimes, in
philosophy as in any other discipline, take on board the assumption
that a solution is possible to some or other problem, without being
sure precisely what the solution is. This hardly means, of course,
that one goes around doing it willy-nilly or gratuitously because,
beyond a certain domain, it would bring one's entire efforts into
disrepute. Where I think it is a defensible strategy is in the case
where there already seem to be very good reasons for being
sympathetic to some or other general notion, these reasons grounding
a confidence that the specific problems generated by the idea to
which one does not presently have the solution, do in fact admit of
a solution. For instance, I would, in some kinds of context, regard
the notion of personal identity over time (continuity of) as such a
case. I cannot say with confidence what it is exactly that accounts
for what seems to me to be the undoubted fact that I am identical
with one Paul Davis who existed ten years ago, and who was then
about to enter his fifth session at a secondary school, etc.
However, because I think there are compelling reasons for believing
in continuity of personal identity over time, I would think it no
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great liberty to simply assume that there is a solution to the
specific issue of the continuity of my_ identity over time.
Similarly, I think, with the "possible worlds" notion: since (as
I've said) I am, like Van Inwagen, generally sympathetic to the
belief that the whole idea is useful and defensible, I think that I
can be allowed, whilst recognising the existence of a host of highly
specific and complex problems generated by the notion, to simply get
on, and assume that these problems admit of a solution. (Indeed,
frequently of course, the outcome of one's attempted use of the
notion further grounds one's confidence that a solution to the
outstanding problems can be found.) Van Inwagen himself ends up
just saying this kind of thing occasionally. So, before getting
down to the actual statement of the Second Formal Argument, I will
restrict myself to only two more stage-setting preliminaries, and
simply clarify as I go along, should I think it necessary.
A proposition is true at, or in, a given world if that
proposition would be true if that world were actual. It is an
obvious consequence of this definition that there are objects that
exist in more than one world. For instance, there are possible
worlds, none of them actual, at which Socrates had a long, straight
nose (again let us simply assume a solution to any problem thre may
be of "trans-world identity"). One world shares a slice with
another if the two worlds are indistinguishable at some instant (I
will waive any problem regarding absolute indistinguishability at
any instant). The property of being deterministic is informally
characterised by Van Inwagen as follows: a world is determinstic if
that world itself is the only world that both shares a slice with it
and has the same laws of nature it does. With his characteristic
shrewdness, Van Inwagen goes on to provide an example which
splendidly illuminates this definition. Let W be some possible
world that shares with the actual world, A a slice taken at the
instant Harold's eye was pierced by a Norman arrow. And let us
suppose that in A and W the laws of nature are the same. A and W
can plausibly be called 'deterministic' only if they are identical.
For suppose they are not identical: let us say that W is one of
those worlds in which a thermonuclear war was fought in 1966. If
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there is a world that has all the properties we have ascribed to W,
it would be odd to say that anything that could reasonably be called
'determinism' is true. The actual world is a world in which a
certain situation in 1066 did not precede a thermonuclear war by
nine hundred years. But in W, a world having exactly the same laws
of nature, precisely the same situation was followed, after nine
hundred years, by a thermonuclear war. In other words (Van Inwagen
goes on), if our description of W is consistent - that is, if W
exists - then, though there was in actuality no thermonuclear war in
1966, such a war was a possibility relative to the laws of nature
and the state of the world in 1066. But 'determinism' is the thesis
that there are no such alternative possibilities: according to
determinism, every world distinct from the actual world either
differs from it at every instant, or if it differs from the actual
world at only some instants, is governed by a different set of laws
of nature. That is, to all intents and purposes, what Van Inwagen,
in his Second Formal Argument, has to say about determinism within
the vocabulary of possible worlds, and I hope that it is now
beginning to look to any sceptics there may have been that there is
some substance to the belief that "possible worlds" can do a job.
As I've already said, one of the primary objectives of this approach
on the part of Van Inwagen is to ensure that we can talk about free
will and determinism in the same vocabulary, and I reiterate that I
cite it at this juncture precisely that we can be disabused of the
compatibilist confusions facilitated by the duplicity of language
allowed by the likes of Lehrer and Flew. So it should be clear that
we must (and why we must), when we move from determinism to free
will, continue to speak in the language of possible worlds. In
another locution which more than adequately, I think, captures
exactly what is required, Van Inwagen talks of a person's abilities
in terms of which worlds he "has access to". Non-actual worlds are
unrealised possibilities. Thus "access" talk is a way of organising
our talk about unexercised abilities by reference to unrealised
possibilities: an unexercised ability is treated to realise some
unrealised possibility. For instance (Van Inwagen's example), we
translate, 'Napoleon could have defeated Wellington at Waterloo' as
'Napoleon had access to some possible world in which he defeated
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Wellington at Waterloo', and we translate 'It is within my power to
keep the money I found and I have access to some world in which I
return it'. Again, of course, as Van Inwagen is perfectly well
aware, there are fringe difficulties, at least, with this idea;
there are undoubtedly ways in which it is unrealistic. However, as
Van Inwagen points out, there are ways in which the Kinetic Theory
of Gases is unrealistic; it ignores certain features of the real
world, such as inter-molecular forces. The point of the simplifying
assumptions is to lay bare the most important features of an
interrelated family of phenomena. Before eventually going on
properly with Van Inwagen's Second Formal Argument, I will restrict
myself to citing a metaphor he provides for his notions of access to
possible worlds, a metaphor which, although laden (as he recognises)
with the kind of difficulties I have alluded to, is nevertheless,
highly illuminating on the primitive terms on which it is intended
to be taken. Consider a man who is walking through an infinite
system of branching corridors. He has always been walking and must
always keep walking, never stopping and never retracing his steps.
He finds that some branches are sealed off by bars and some are
not. Frequently he comes to a branching of the corridor from which
at least two unbarred branches lead away, and he must make a choice
about which to take. We can call a possible world any infinitely
long path through the system of corridors that does not cross
itself. The actual world is that one path, through the corridors
along which the man always has walked, is walking, and always will
walk. Those worlds to which the man has access at any given moment
are just those infinite paths that do not pass through any barred
corridors, and which are continuations of the path-segment along
which he has already walked.
Getting back to the free will side of the Second Formal
Argument proper, Van Inwagen states the minimal free will thesis
(MFT):
Gx) (3y) (Hxy & y | A), where 'A' is the actual world and
'Hxy' means 'x has access to y'.
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MFT tells us only that some person, past or present or future, had,
has or will have access to some possible world besides the actual
world. MFT is true, for example, if Julius Caesar had access to
some world W in which he did not cross the Rubicon, even if no other
person, past, present, or future, has access to any world besides
'A', and Caesar himself had access only to W and A (Van Inwagen's
example). But if MFT is false, then any more interesting free will
thesis is false. And, therefore, if determinism is incompatible
with MFT, it is incompatible with any more interesting free will
thesis. Van Inwagen is aware that, as it stands, it is not obvious
that bare determinism is incompatible with MFT. However, with the
augmentation of two seemingly fairly painless assumptions cited by
Van Inwagen, it seems that the denial of MFT may be formally deduced
from determinism. Van Inwagen calls these specific assumptions
"metaphysical assumptions":
MAA (x)(y) (Hxy > SyA)
MAB (x)(y) (Hxy > NyA)
where 'SyA' means 'y shares a slice with A (the actual world)', and
'NyA' means 'y is nomologically congruent with A' (or 'y has the
same laws of nature as the actual world'). MAA asserts that every
world to which any person has access must be indistinguishable from
the actual world at some instant. For example, as Van Inwagen puts
it, however many possible worlds I have access to, surely they must
all be indistinguishable from the actual world at some time in the
remote past - say, 10,000 BC, or indeed, any time before I was
born. MAA may be regarded as a statement of the familiar principle
that no one can change the past. MAB asserts that no person has
access to any world in which the laws of nature are different from
what they are in the actual world. And this seems undeniable, for
no one can render a law of nature false. Laws of nature are not a
matter of human choice. And it should hardly require Van Inwagen's
finishing formal touches to see that the denial of MFT is derivable
from determinism, MAA and MAB. I shall indulge a bit however. If,
like Van Inwagen, we formalise 'x is deterministic' (Dx), a la
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Dx = (3y)(Sxy) & (y)(Syx & Nyx > y = x), and
represent determinism in the present vocabulary by the formula 'DA',
then the argument having 'DA', MAA and MAB as its premises, and the
denial of MFT as its conclusion, is the Second Formal Argument.
Assume 'Hxy'. Universally instantiate MAA and MAB. Modus Ponens
yields 'SyA' and 'NyA'. From these two formulae and the universal
instantiation of the second conjunct of the formula that 'DA'
abbreviates, we get, by Modus Ponens, 'y = A'. Thus by Conditional
Proof and Universal Generalisation, we have '(x)(y)(Hxy > y = A)',
which is logically equivalent to the denial of MFT.
The bottom line is this: if determinism is true, then no one
has any access to any non-actual world. That is, no one has an
ability that may correctly be described as an ability to realise
some in fact unrealised possibility. I think that Van Inwagen's
Second Argument is not only admirably rigorous (like his First
Argument), but brings out into the light exactly what the
consequences are, in cash terms, of the truth of determinism,
consequences which no amount of huffing and puffing or duplicity on
the part of the likes of Lehrer and Flew (or for that matter,
Davidson, Dennett, Mackie or Ayers) can alter. Lehrer's empirical
criteria (which, as we've seen, are criteria of skill-ascription)
are no metaphysical (or moral) knight in shining armour, to save us
from what may be the ultimate consequences of our containment in the
natural world. As I hope is completely clear by now, what is of
importance is that if determinism is true, then there is one world,
and one world only (i.e. the actual world) open to us. There seems
no way that the maiden can be rescued from the dragon or, at any
rate, if there is a way, it is certainly not as Lehrer (or Flew)
seem to believe.
If my preceding argument has been sound, then another attempt
at downgrading the ultimate importance of determinism vis a vis
freedom looks doomed. However, this attempt at marginalising
determinism is not entirely exhausted by the specific forms of it
which I have so far considered. I have already mentioned Harry G.
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Frankfurt in this connection and, whilst I don't intend to elucidate
on him until a bit later, I think it worth giving a foretaste of his
position. By attempting to exploit a purported distinction between
"free will" and "freedom of the will", Frankfurt thinks that he can
describe the significant features of someone who "lacks nothing in
the way of freedom", whilst remaining entirely neutral with regard
to the question of free will and determinism. That is, Frankfurt
thinks that determinism could be true, and yet there still be a
person who lacks nothing in the way of freedom, since the question
of determinism needn't even be relevant. How such a prima facie
implausible position can be entertained is something I will document
later.
In the meantime, I wish to consider something else I think of
relevance to the whole issue of free will/determinism. I have
already considered a version of empirical compatibilism, the claim
that a fairly straightforward examination of facts about the world
and of our ordinary power-ascription procedures reveals that,
regardless of the truth of determinism, we do have free will, we can
act other than how we do, in fact, act. I argued that this just
won't do. However, I now wish to consider something significantly
similar, something which could be regarded as the other side of this
empirical coin, really. It could itself be called "Empirical
Determinism", or more strictly speaking, I suppose "Empirical
Determinism & Incompatibilism", since it is the claim that a shrewd
analysis of ordinary facts about the world reveals that we cannot,
in fact, act in any way other than how we do act. It is worth
reiterating at this point that, if Ginet's H hypothesis were true,
then the conditions which determine our behaviour (contingently
necessitate), regarding which we have no say are what Ginet calls
"physiological-cum-environmental". This characterisation may itself
seem cumbersome and somewhat curious, but this is not really my
concern at the moment. I mention it again because the traditional
arguments in favour of empirical determinism/incompatibilism have
homed in on physiological and environmental factors as conditions of
action^i.e. the suggestion is that a proper appreciation of the
importance of physiological and environmental factors, an
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appreciation which can be gained without particularly sophisticated
or advanced techniques of enquiry, will reveal that we can never in
fact, do other than what we do. This really amounts to saying that
we can discover that Ginet's H hypothesis is, or something very like
it, is true, and that we can discover this with much less
investigative agony than Ginet thinks would be necessary to settle
things one way or the other. According to this thesis, someone like
Ginet really can't see the wood for the trees, since a fairly shrewd
insight into fairly ordinary facts evidences something with the same
upshot as H, suggests very strongly that physiological and
environmental factors leave us unable to act other than how we do,
in fact, act. Whilst I agree with the remarks made by Peter Van
Inwagen in the preface to his Essay on Free Will, that M.R. Ayers'
The Refutation of Determinism, is one of several books supposedly on
the topic of determinism which never actually properly addresses the
central issues put forward by the likes of Ginet, Honderich and
himelf, I think that Ayers does, however, have some sound comments
to make on empirical determinism/incompatibilism. Even then,
however, Ayers fails to identify and criticise what seem to me to be
some very common features of this attack on behalf of
determinism/incompatibilism. I don't think it possible to speak
with proper penetration about this approach without first talking
about what I want to call "explaining away" arguments. I believe
that empirical determinism/incompatibilism and "explaining away"
arguments are inextricably bound up.
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7. "EXPLAINING AWAY" AND EMPIRICAL DETERMINISM/INCOMPATIBILISM
I have already pre-empted this, to some measure, when I spoke
of Davidson's Psychological Anomalism, and the status of the
psychological with regard to Ginet's H hypothesis. I hope that, by
the end of this chapter, the connection between (and coherence of)
my remarks at that point, and my remarks now, will be entirely clear.
"Explaining away" arguments proceed, basically, as follows:
the thesis (whatever it may be) is put up for grabs and all apparent
counter-evidence is explained away in terms of the thesis itself,
leaving it very difficult to see what the thesis actually is, making
it look as though there can be no evidence against the "thesis".
The thesis is eventually revealed, therefore, to be something which
is not actually open to falsification at all, but which is, in fact,
an a priori assumption which will be used to interpret all data
presented. A great many issues which have received serious
philosophical treatment have tended to be a prey to this sort of
approach, and indeed it has often only been because this approach
has permeated the thing that there has appeared to be a serious
philosophical problem in the first place. Perhaps the most obvious
and celebrated is the question of egoism. This is the claim that
human beings always only act out of their own self-interest (and
there is, of course, an even stronger claim, entailing the weaker
one, that humans can only act out of their own self-interest). The
obvious steps are taken to counter-evidence the (prima facie
dubious) thesis: various acts of human kindness, sacrifice,
compassion, and altruism, are cited. To this it is replied that
these won't do; all of these, it is said, are simply cases of a
more sophisticated, enlightened self-interest. The objector is
forced, thus, to move on to more heroic, other-regarding actions,
which are, in turn, explained away as "really" cases of egoistic
behaviour, and so on, until even the most apparently obvious and
grand cases of altruistic conduct have been tried, and found
wanting. It is then clear that nothing, but nothing, can count
against this egoism thesis, that it is actually an a priori
assumption which will be used to interpret all data. The
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anti-egoist therefore, simply cannot win and reflection on why this
is, so reveals to us that it is something he shouldn't get
especially disturbed about. The objector can at this point, turn
the tables on the egoist and ask him where this a priori assumption
comes from, and of course, he will be very unlikely to be able to
tell us. The best he will surely be able to do is to cite cases of
egoistic behaviour, but then the thesis itself notwithstanding, the
objector can cite cases of other-regarding conduct, and the egoist
is back to square one. (An excellent discussion of egoism and the
unfalsifiable approach, occurs in John Hospers' Human Conduct.)
Other examples of this technique spring to mind fairly readily. The
area of political and ideological rhetoric is a notorious minefield
of unfalsifiable arguments. No one who gives any serious attention
to political debate can fail to be aware of both the left-wing
ideologue who explains away all apparent counter-evidence to this
claims, as examples of befuddled bourgeois conceptualising and his
right-wing counterpart, who explains away all apparent opposition,
as cases of mistaken proletarian conceptualising, born out of
resentment, envy, distaste of success, or whatever. Some varieties
of religious believer can hardly be forgotten either: there is the
believer who appears to throw up some tenet or other of his belief,
perhaps even God's existence itself, as a matter for debate, but
explains away all apparent weaknesses in his position in terms of
the belief itself. Indeed, there is also the believer who has the
bottom line of "it's a matter of faith",i.e. the believer who is
actually prepared to accept that there appear to be reasonable
grounds for doubt regarding his belief, but still thinks that one
can go on believing (whatever such a "belief" would actually be
like) and, in fact, that it is a measure of the rock-solid strength
of his belief that he can recognise the weakness of his evidence,
and yet believe nevertheless. Within theology and the philosophy of
religion itself, the problem of evil has also suffered at the hands
of "explaining away" participants. If rational appraisal does not
seem to afford a squaring of God's benevolence with God's
omnipotence, then various re-definitions of good and evil can be
attempted, or hitherto unsuspected shortcomings in humans' "way of
seeing things" can be provided, disanalogies set up between "our
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perception of good" and "God's (superior) apprehension of good",
until it becomes clear that, no matter the evidence, God cannot
lose. Psychoanalysis (some variants, at any rate) has also been
discredited by this feature: any opposition on the part of the
patient or critic to the details of the working of the Unconscious,
as documented by the analyst, are explained away as cases of
resistance to the (painful) evidence of the Unconscious. Like God,
in the previous example, the Unconscious cannot lose. Finally,
there exists a class of man or woman, who hold an unfalsifiable
position to the effect that the opposite sex are intrinsically
evil; no kind of conduct on the part of woman can save her or her
sex from this kind of man, and no kind of conduct on the part of a
man can save him or his sex from this kind of woman.
It should, by now, be clear enough what I'm talking about here,
and it shouldn't be altogether inimaginable where it gets a hold in
free will/determinism. In a section of the The Refutation of
Determinism, "On Not Being Able to Help It: Power and
Responsibility", Ayers considers the notion that the victim of
brain-washing who "could not help" being converted and "cannot help"
thinking the way he does, is no different from the rest of us. That
is, is not everyone influenced by background, education, and
pressures of society? For instance, few in Russia are
pro-capitalist, few in America are pro-communist. In the light of
my exposing of the phenomena of unfalsifiable arguments, we should
immediately be on our guard concerning the claim that we are all
victims of brain-washing. It appears to me, as it does to Ayers,
that the claim is a spurious one and, as I hope to make clear, can
only be sustained at the price of collapsing into a non-claim.
Before mentioning anything else, I hope it is obvious, by now, how
such an argument would proceed: there appear, at least, to be some
examples here and there (to keep the claim modest) of people who are
not altogether "brain-washed", and the propounder of the "universal
brain-washing" thesis would attempt to explain these away, as cases
of more insidious, undercover brain-washing, which leaves us all
(himself included) absolutely no different from (say) the fire and
brimstone religious believer. According to this, none of us ever
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achieves any genuine liberation from, or mastery over, received
ideas, ideologies, pressures, etc. Before concerning myself with
anything said specifically by Ayers, it is, I think, more than worth
noting another upshot of several of these unfalsifiable theses,
including this one. And that is that they often have the effect of
quite arbitrarily, needlessly, and pointlessly shifting the terms of
the issue, whilst leaving what is important and substantive
completely untouched. For instance, we could, if we wanted to
placate the especially stubborn philosophical egoist, say that we
are forced to accept his bleak thesis that all human actions are
motivated from self-interest, whilst still preserving the
distinction we regard as significant i.e. we could then say simply
that the significant distinction is between those actions which are
apparently motivated from self-interest, and those actions which are
apparently altruistic. We could grant the egoist that we are wrong
to talk of a straightforward distinction between self-interested and
altruistic behaviour, since we now know that all actions are really
self-interested, but we simply shift the parameters of the issue,
which now concerns a distinction between the "apparently selfish"
and the "apparently altruistic". In all our subsequent talk
concerning moral theory, praise and blame, culpability, etc., we
simply remember to slip in the word "apparently" before talking of
anything relating to selfishness and altruism, and the apparently
selfish and apparently altruistic have exactly the same import as
the selfish and altruistic respectively had before. So, for all the
endeavours of the egoist, nothing has changed. A claim having a
similar status, I think, is the one that has appeared in sceptical
epistemologies from time to time, namely that it is possible that
all life is a dream - this, I think, merely shifts the distinction
from dream/veridical to seeming dream/seemingly veridical. I myself
am not sure (very contentiously) that similar remarks don't apply to
Kripke's attempts at doing away with contingent identities, though I
don't wish to open the debate here. So, back to universal
brain-washing.
We could, I think, appease the propounder by saying that we
accept his claim, whilst it being the case that nothing substantive
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has actually altered. People's behaviour, and the data with which
we are presented daily, would not seem to be any obviously
different, in the light of the acceptance of this claim and, a la
the previous examples, we would learn to simply modify our talk, i.e.
instead of distinguishing between those who are brain-washed and
those who aren't, we would start to distinguish between those who
are apparently brain-washed and those who apparently are not. The
interesting questions would still be there, and the situation would
not seem to have altered significantly from the one prior to our
acceptance of the thesis of universal brain-washing,i.e. the
position where we granted at least some people some independence of
mind (let's call it) - the only difference is that we now slip in
"apparent" before "independence of mind". Or we may want to talk of
degrees of brain-washing: our most intellectually independent
subject is simply the one who has been brain-washed least. "But so
what?" one is tempted to reply "what does brain-washing then amount
to?" It now seems an appropriate time to cite the examples which
Ayers (quite reasonably, I think) regards as counter-evidencing the
claim that we are all victims of brain-washing. Ayers notes that
people can and do escape from the ways of thought and behaviour of
their youth, recognise for themselves in the once-admired teacher a
man of small prejudices, and diagnose and control in themselves
tendencies they despise in their grandfathers. We can easily
imagine the determinist coming back with the rejoinder that the
nature and extent of these "liberating" processes are themselves
determined by heredity, environmental factors, etc., i.e. the
brain-washing is simply identified a little bit further along the
line. And it should not be difficult to see the old spectre of
non-testability/unfalsifiability looming large here. It seems to me
to be a straightforward and indisputable fact that the kind of
things we have just seen Ayers cite do, in fact occur. The
determinist would be unlikely to dispute this, but would question
what his opponent is claiming for them. That is, the
anti-determinist (e.g. Ayers) is claiming that the occurence of the
processes in question demonstrate that we are not all, in fact,
victims of brain-washing, that we are not all creatures of heredity,
upbringing and environment, and the character that these have
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bestowed upon us, whilst the determinist is saying that they
demonstrate no such thing. It should be obvious by now that the
appropriate question to ask a determinist arguing like this is that
of precisely what, if anything, could count against his claim that
we are all helplessly imprisoned in an outlook we didn't even
create: if he cannot cite anything which could do this job, then it
becomes very difficult to see what his claim actually is. What
would he be meaning when saying that despite appearances, no one
actually achieves any real liberation from the sad brain-washing
which they have suffered? The ordinary evidence, taken at face
value, just doesn't seem to support this determinist claim, at all.
However, where I think Ayers is a bit slack here, where he
doesn't, I think, do full justice to this (ultimately unfalsifiable)
empirical determinism/incompatibilism, is that he doesn't seem to
recognise the extreme lengths to which this "explaining away"
technique in defence of the "universal brain-washing" thesis can be
deployed: we can go on and on, until we cite one's most critical,
rational and meticulous examination of received ideas (including, we
could say, a scrupulous examination of the critical processes
themselves), as evidence that one has gained some liberation from
even the most insidious, secretive psychological manipulation.
However, the "unbeatable" determinist may well reply that, even at
the greatest possible level of critical awareness, we are still,
whether or not we are aware, embracing (for instance) ideologies and
rhetoric, not essentially of our own making, and consequently, we
are never really anything other than brain-washed. Such ideologies
may only be those as widely shared and apparently innocuous as those
of physical objects, persons, private and public, myself and other,
subjective and objective, etc. So (it goes on), it is not only the
heavily indoctrinated Marxist, capitalist, Muslim or Christian or
whatever, who is in the grip of a conceptual apparatus (say) which
he is apparently unable to transcend, criticise, or detach himself
from, but indeed, we are all similarly imprisoned. Indeed (it
continues) philosophical discourse and technique, the practices of
critical analysis, are themselves only another form of rhetoric,
another "set of metaphors" (as is sometimes said), another
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ideology. That (it will be said) is the very best which we can do:
though we may avoid more primitive ideolgies, we may ultimately be
in the grip of the rhetoric of criticism, of asking for reasons,
evidence, etc. And (it may conclude) in devising this rhetoric, we
were in the grip of yet another one, and even the most fundamental
rhetoric we can reach does not appear to afford vindication from
anything outside itself. All of this should ring loud bells in the
ears of those acquainted with Post-Modern trends in philosophy,
according to which philosophy is effectively out of a job.
It should be no surprise by now, however, that I believe that
any appearance what has just gone may have of being especially
radical, or of having fundamental consequences vis a vis our
freedom, is an illusory one. To say that someone is (say)
imprisoned in a rhetoric of critical analysis, of not accepting
things without evidence, etc., is really to say nothing at all. So
far as one stays on this straightforward, empirical level, it would
seem that the greatest level of freedom which one can possibly have
regarding one's environment, upbringing, etc. surely consists (in
part, at least) of being in possession of, and applying to the
attitudes, values, etc. in question, the most precise and rigorous
critical techniques. If the determinist says that even this won't
do as regards rescuing us from the spectre of brain-washing, then it
becomes very difficult for us to see what could possibly do the job
- it begins to look as though this particular determinist has no
coherent notion of indeterminism. So, if it is claimed that, even
as I write, I am in the grip of a rhetoric,i.e. the rhetoric of
argument, debate, rational analysis, the rhetoric which comprises
the stage on which even debates about ideology, rhetoric, free
will/determinism and responsibility take place, then I hardly need
lose any sleep over submitting to this claim, where the issue of my
part in my actions is concerned. How would I possible be any more
free with regard to the ideas I have received than to be
"imprisoned" like this? It seems to me that a determinist going in
for this line of attack is doing little more than making the
(ultimately trivial, I think) Wittgensteinian point that we are,
each of us, born into a world which is already theory-laden, where
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even what appear to be our most fundamental perceptual judgements
entail, and are a part of, an entire conceptual framework, which is
not obviously without features of arbitrariness. It is what is
alleged to follow from this fairly uncontroversial claim that I do
not see. If we reach awareness of even this feature of our lives
and constantly keep alive in our minds the possibility of
alternative conceptual frameworks, then what can this determinist/
incompatibilist possibly be wanting from us if he says that even
this doesn't mean that we are not all victims of brain-washing? I
feel it worth stressing again at this point, that the problem of
free will is simply not to be settled in this fashion (if at all):
it is not a matter which can be resolved by looking at simple,
straightforward ordinary empirical data, or by recounting simple
empirical power-ascription techniques. There may well be reasons
(which may be discoverable at some point) for believing, a la
Ginet's 'H' hypothesis, or Honderich's ('One') determinism, that we
cannot give genuine content to the notion that we can act other than
how we do act, but the kind of ordinary, empirical determinist/
incompatibilist efforts are not among them. The truth or falsity of
determinism or compatibilism is simply not discoverable as
painlessly as the likes of Ayers, Lehrer, or the empirical
determinist/incompatibilist seem to think (otherwise, again, it
would surely not have had the history in philosophy which it has had
- I would be unlikely to be writing a thesis on it just now); it is
a matter which could only possibly be settled beyond the "veil of
appearances", so to speak. Indeed, I make no apology for harping
back to this point, to the significance of Van Inwagen's (M)
hypothesis. I hope that the poverty of the "explaining away"
attempt at establishing our impotence in the world is clear enough.
This garden-variety determinist position can, I think, be exposed
for what it is. However, it must be added that, should we have
failed to be aware of it before, the logical posibility of (M) or
something significantly like it being true, exposes also the very
serious limitations of the kinds of reply made by someone like Ayers
to the garden-variety determinist. What this kind of reply can do
adequately is knock down the empirical determinist/incompatibilist.
But then, as I hope I have made clear, one is punching at a man of
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straw in so doing. What this kind of reply cannot do however, is
counter-evidence those less simple-minded and more challenging
determinist thesis: (M) or anything significantly like it, such as
Ginet's H hypothesis, or Honderich's ('One') determinism. The fact,
for instance, that one does diagnose and control tendencies one
despises in one's grandfather or that one does realise that the
once-admired teacher is a man of small prejudices, does, I think,
straightforwardly refute the claim that one is necessarily doomed to
be imprisoned in the ways of thought and behaviour of one's youth.
However, what facts such as those do not counter-evidence is (M), or
any hypothesis significantly like it. All of the phenomena which
Ayers documents as supposedly counter-evidencing determinism may be
real enough (and I've already said that, largely, I think they are),
yet (M) or H, (for instance) may be true, with the fundamental
consequence that we are not responsible for our actions. This
empirical approach neither demonstrates that we can't do otherwise
(despite the empirical determinist/incompatibilist), nor that
(despite Lehrer and Ayers) we can do otherwise.
Indeed, we can now get to the bottom line. Much of what I have
said already about the ultimate poverty of this empirical
determinist/incompatibilist approach is itself no accident, is
really the result of something going on at ground-floor level. We
can get some inkling of this by noting what I feel is the final
irony of this particular empirical approach. That is that a genuine
analysis of the ordinary evidence firmly suggests neither the
conclusion that we can't act other than we do act, nor its opposite,
that we can do otherwise. That is, the ordinary evidence, it seems
to me, suggests that we have a real problem on our hands, which is
not going to go away or be settled easily. Our responses and
practices, in fact, seem to me to betray a frequent lack of
confidence on the questions of freedom and responsibility - we often
seem to be unsure how responsible we ought to hold someone for their
actions. We seem to often talk of degrees of freedom. People are,
no doubt, presented with ideology, rhetoric, etc. with vastly
varying levels of vigour, zeal and reinforcement. They also seem to
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be given vastly varying facility for criticising it, and liberating
themselves from it. It also seems sometimes that individuals have
varying capacity for liberation e.g. there is the occasional Russian
who is anti-communist, despite not having been presented with an
obviously different rhetoric to the vast majority who are not
anti-communist. So, in individual cases, we find ourselves asked to
ascertain (possibly among other things) how vigorously a person has
been presented with the given mind-set(s) relevant to doing a
particular action, having a particular attitude, etc., what facility
they can be reasonably thought to have had (or ought to have had)
for detaching themselves from the mind-set(s) in question, the
significance of particular contingencies of the individual
situation, etc. Establishing even what are the mind-set(s), etc.
which have been operative in the particular situation will not
itself always be easy. So, it seems to me that even the ordinary
evidence suggests that the whole business is problematic; like many
issues, there may well be extreme cases about which we feel in no
doubt, but a whole load of problematic ones in between. For
instance I, with a critical training, would have little excuse, it
seems, for entertaining attitudes which result from a dubious
rhetoric I have been given the facility to see through; I cannot
reasonably be excused, it seems, by putting forward such a rhetoric
as a reason for (say) a morally questionable act. On the other
hand, we may well excuse a person doing the same if the person has
clearly been allowed little opportunity to transcend the rhetoric in
question, and has had it presented to him in a very zealour manner.
But the enormous number in between present no obvious answer, and
each seem to demand a careful, precise appraisal. Far from the
ordinary evidence suggesting free will, it seems to me that the
daily kind of exercise I have just mentioned is another major source
of evidence that we are aware of the reality of the worry of
determinism. And it is when we attempt to account for this irony
that it becomes apparent what has really been going on, at bottom,
the whole time, and in terms of which so much else which has been
said with regard to this particular area, begins to make sense. I
talked earlier about the ground-floor reasons why the 'A' slots
within Ginet's 'H' hypothesis could not be occupied by psychological
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concepts. I explained this, really, as the outcome of Davidson's
thesis (or the thesis attributed by Kim to Davidson) of
Psychophysical Anomalism, according to which the psychological is
simply not the kind of thing to enter into lawlike relations with
the physical (supplemented by Psychological Anomalism, this amounts
to the all-embracing thesis that the psychological is just not the
kind of thing to feature in laws). I put this forward as the reason
why contingent necessitation between the psychological and behaviour
is not really possible, this in turn explaining why any set of
relations which appeared to counter-evidence this had to be *
revealed, on inspection, to turn on "explaining away" kind of
moves. Precisely the same kind of thing is going on here, in the
case of empirical determinism/incompatibilism. This is really the
reason for the final irony I have just documented and for much else
I have said in this part. What is going on, at bottom, is this:
the kind of factors put forward as evidence for our being unable to
act other than how we do act are not the kind of thing to enter into
lawlike relations with behaviour. That is really why this approach
is ultimately empty, and I hope that, after all I've said already
(not only with regard to empirical determinism/incompatibilism, but
also with regard to H, contingent necessitation, and Davidson), it
makes perfect sense that any supposed argument "evidencing"
empirical determinism/incompatibilism must collapse into an
"explained away" non-argument. I hope that it is entirely clear
that the recurring conjunction of "explaining away" laws and
vocabulary unsuited to lawlike relations is no accident. They are
bound up with one another. For instance, the claim, cited by Ayers,
which I mentioned a short while back, that we are all doomed to be
prisoners of heredity, upbringing, environment, etc., cannot be true
in any substantive sense: ordinary inspection seems to reveal its
falsity (as Ayers points out), and it can only appear to be true by
being explained away into a non-claim. The likes of social and
environmental factors (just like the psychological) just seem to be
ruled out, as regards entering into genuine lawlike relations with
behaviour. As with the psychological, there always appear to be too
many variables operative in any given case for lawlike relations to
be any sort of possibility. For instance (to go back to another
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example of Ayers'), some do recognise in the once-admired teacher a
man of small prejudices. Others don't. There cannot be the
slightest hope of accounting, in terms of lavs, for why some still
admire their teacher and others don't. As I've said, apart from all
else, there are a myriad of variables to be considered. It is now
banal, I hope, to say that, when we are talking about determinism,
we are talking about laws, and I hope it is now fairly clear why the
only kind of vocabulary suited to laws is the physical. I hope that
I have done enough by now to demonstrate that laws must, qua laws,
be physical. When we are talking about laws, we are talking about
particles, speeds, neuron firings, nerve cells, etc., we are not
talking about desires, hopes, wishes, fears, purposes, or heredity,
environment, social pressures, intelligence, indoctrination. And,
since determinism entails laws, when we are talking about
determinism, we are talking only about particles, speeds,
brain-states, never-cells, behaviour and the like. That is why care
is required with Ginet's locution of "physiological-cum-
environmental" laws. Despite the reference to environment, I hope
it is clear by now that we cannot be speaking of any social or
psychological factor here. Even "environmental" can only have
strictly physical import. Whilst this is not the place for a
discussion of the philosophy of the social sciences, this
realisation about the appropriate (and naturally, also
inappropriate) vocabulary for laws must surely have important
consequences for the range and scope of the social sciences. I
would imagine that a lot of the significant remarks made by Davidson
about psychology in "Psychology as Philosophy" would be paralleled
in other disciplines e.g sociology. I cannot really pursue this to
any serious extent here however. What is important is that what I
have called "empirical determinism/incompatibilism" must like
"psychological" determinism, fail right at the outset because its
vocabulary cannot support it. If determinism is true, this is
something (as I've already said) which can only be known through
knowing about particles, neuron firings, and the like. Of course,
at this point, it should hardly need repeating that it is hardly
agreed by everyone that the actuality (should it turn out to be the
case) of nerve cells, neurons, etc. behaving in a deterministic
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fashion, would entail that we can never act other than how we do
act, and it is now time for me to consider another compatibilist
tradition, an approach which has been accorded a degree of respect
which persistently surprises me (as I said), this being
conditionalism. Even Van Inwagen (who I am more often than not in
agreement with on issues in free will) seems to me, whilst making
numerous sound comments on it, to miss some fundamental
shortcomings. Indeed, for reasons which I hope I will soon make
clear, the whole issue of conditionalism seems to me to be, in fact,
little better than an irrelevance with regard to questions of free
will, determinism and compatibilism.
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8. CONDITIONALISM
It is difficult not to feel the gut, intuitive appeal of
conditionalisra. I talked away at the beginning of the preverbal and
precultural sources of a great many of the philosophical problems,
how this feature discredits specific tendencies within recent
philosophy, and how free will/determinism is but one example where
this aspect should be appreciable. And indeed, once one has "felt"
the free will problem as one of those kind of intuitive, half-formed
anxieties, it is, I think, a less than enormous leap to "feel", in
an equally kind of gut fashion, that conditionalism is the obvious
way of securing compatibility between free will and determinism.
We have seen attempts at useful articulation of the thesis of
determinism, in the shape of Ginet, Honderich and Van Inwagen, but
no matter what precise articulation is eventually accepted as a
successful conceptualisation of the problem, what is in no doubt is
that what primarily generates a worry about determinism and free
will (and what, it seems, any formalising of the problem must
recognise), is the fact (or supposed fact) of causation. (Or, at
any rate, as I've already suggested, the concern that the causation
which operates specifically in the case of human action may entail
determinism with regard to human action, leaving it difficult to see
how free will could be true and how in turn, ascriptions of
responsibility to persons could be warranted.) And what precisely
makes conditionalism seem like a knight in shining armour for free
will, is that, far from trying to argue away or marginalise the fact
of causation, the conditionalist welcomes it with open arms and
indeed, utilises it to supposedly reinforce our belief in our free
will. I have not yet stated the conditionalist thesis itself and,
before I do, I can, I think set the stage for it by posing what
seems to be, really, a rhetorical question: how could an action be
any more genuinely mine, my action, if it is caused by a choice,
wish, fear, hope, or whatever ("intentional state" may do, I
suppose) of mine? Despite the fact that it is, first and foremost,
a theory about meaning, it is this possibility which conditionalism
(if correct) seems to open up. My actions may indeed be as
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straightforwardly caused as anything else which happens in the
universe (so goes the conditionalist argument), but, unlike the
other effects in the universe, what causes them are choices, etc. of
mine. I decided to press the "coffee" button on the drinks machine,
which caused my pressing of the coffee button, but then, had I
decided instead to press the "tea" button, then my pressing of the
tea button would have been caused. All I needed to do was choose
differently, and a different effect would have issued. What could
be a more obvious or a more harmonious way of squaring determinism
with free will? That is, suppose (the argument goes) that the facts
about human action and causation really do entail determinism with
regard to human actions: what if the actions themselves are
determined _b^ the relevant choices, intentions, purposes and the
like? Freedom back, safe and sound. Everybody happy. (It may well
occur right away that such a suggestion is itself looking
inconsistent with what I've already concluded concerning the kind of
thing which could appear in deterministic laws i.e. that, due to
Psychophysical Anomalism and Psychological Anomalism, intentional
states cannot appear in laws of nature, cannot determine, even if
they can cause. This realisation will be seen to have a more than
passing significance by the end of this chapter.)
Despite the history of conditionalism within philosophy, the
motivation which is at the bottom of it is really as I've
described. And in fact, it is the exact nature of this motivation
which leaves it looking surprising to me, not only that
conditionalism has the formidable philosophical history which it
does have, but that no one, it seems to me, has ever made properly
explicit exactly why conditionalism is a hopeless compatibilist
project (I must include Van Inwagen here). Let me clarify.
As I hope will become entirely clear, conditionalism is,
really, a theory about meaning. This feature alone should, I think,
make us immediately suspicious. "If at any given time, there is
only one physically possible future, then how can any facts about
meaning secure free will for me?" Such a question, I think,
expresses an immediate and obvious worry, and one which I think
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continually haunts the conditionalist effort. The question also
points us towards the fundamental reason why conditionalism must
fail. That is, it seems too often generally assumed (by both
conditionalists and non-conditionalists alike) that the issue is an
entirely linguistic one, that if we can just arrange one or two
little things conveniently within the linguistic realm, we can then
leap across, as if by magic, into compatibilism/incompatibilism, and
win the game for compatibilism. However, it is precisely this kind
of assumption which seems to me to be mistaken. It seems quite
clear to me that it is a case of putting the cart before the horse
to think that the philosopher of free will who is desperate for a
compatibilist solution, just sits there doing nothing, waiting and
hoping that the conditionalists in the linguistic laboratories will
be able to cook up something for him. That is, the reasons why I
think conditionalism must fail are not any local, linguistic ones;
indeed the linguistic analysis only turns out as it does, only looks
as hopeless as it does, precisely because of much more fundamental
and pervasive features of the question of free will. It is no mere
linguistic accident, which the would-be compatibilist can only curse
his luck over, that Van Inwagen's attempt, for instance, at securing
a conditional analysis of 'could have' seems doomed (as we shall
see). On the contrary, Van Inwagen's attempts only themselves fail,
because the shallow hypothesis of conditionalism has no way of
coping with what (as I have already said) is so fundamental to free
will,i.e. conditions of choosing, willing, and the like. As I've
already indicated, Van Inwagen doesn't bring this out quite as
explicitly as he might; he may also leave one feeling that it is
some little linguistic irritation that prevents the conditionalist
coming to the rescue of the compatibilist. However, from what I
have just said, I hope that it will be clear when I look at some of
Van Inwagen's remarks on conditionalism, why this is not so. In
short, I hope it will become clear that the conditionalist
hypothesis writes itself off, at the very outset as any sort of
account of the 'could have' relevant to free will. I hope that, by
the end of this chapter, these suggestions will be wholly clear and
defensible.
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Conditionalism is accepted, in one form or other, by the great
majority of the present-day defenders of compatibilism. The
argument rests on a theory about the meaning of ascriptions of
ability. According to the theory, ascriptions of ability are really
disguised conditionals. For instance, according to one version of
conditionalism, what the proposition "Smith could have saved the
drowning child" really means is "If Smith had chosen to save the
drowning child, Smith would have saved the drowning child". (Van
Inwagen's example.) One point, of course, on which conditionalists
differ is that of the proper content for the antecedents of their
conditionals. Where one conditionalist will say, "If Smith had
chosen...", others will say "...had willed...", "...had decided...",
"...had set himself...", or "...had tried...". As Van Inwagen
notes, if an adequate conditional analysis of ascription of ability
is possible, it will assign of them conditional paraphrases of
rather more complicated forms than the form exemplified by the above
paraphrase of the "drowning child" example. For example, it could
hardly be true that (Van Inwagen's example) "Napoleon could have won
at Waterloo" really means "If Napoleon had chosen to win at
Waterloo, Napoleon would have won at Waterloo". It is therefore
expedient to concentrate on situations in which relatively simple
conditional analyses are adequate if any conditional analyses are
e.g. cases involving abilities to perform acts that don't involve
the execution of elaborate plans or demand special knowledge or
skill. However, even then, serious difficulties remain. Lehrer
has, in fact, drawn attention to this. Consider the proposition:
"Smith could have eaten one of the red candies". This is not
equivalent to "If Smith had chosen to eat one of the red candies
then Smith would have eaten one of the red candies". For suppose
that Smith is pathologically afraid of the sight of blood, and that
the candies are the colour of blood. Then it may well be that Smith
was unable to choose to eat one of the red candies. And, in that
case, he could not have eaten one of the red candies. Nevertheless,
we may suppose, if he had chosen to eat one of the candies, he would
have. As I've said, this kind of realisation is really, indeed,
what will be seen (I hope) to be at the bottom of my fundamental
dismissiveness towards conditionalism as an argument for
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corapatibilism i.e. the realisation, which is accepted by most
garden-variety determinists even, in some form or other, and which I
hope has emerged by now, that conditions of choice (and the like)
are of monumental relevance to the question of free will. The
question of free will loops back to take choice itself, and its
conditions, into its purview - it cannot stop at the discussion
merely of the path from choice to object. Of course, as Van Inwagen
notes, efforts can be made to rescue Lehrer's example. We could try
adding "...and Smith could have chosen to eat one of the red
candies". But, of course, what would the second 'could have' mean?
If it means the same as the first, and if the expanded conditional
proposition really is equivalent to the proposition that Smith could
have eaten one of the red candies, then the latter is equivalent to
the statement
If Smith had chosen to eat one of the red candies, then Smith
would have eaten one of the red candies, and if Smith had
chosen to choose to eat one of the red candies, then Smith
would have chosen to eat one of the red candies, and Smith
could have chosen to choose to eat one of the red candies.
This effort, however, contains the clause "if Smith had chosen to
choose to eat one of the red candies" as well as an unreduced "could
have", like its predecessor. But what is it to choose to choose
something? One can, of course, as Van Inwagen remarks, choose to
choose between two or more things: in choosing to drink wine, I may
in effect be choosing to choose between drinking claret and drinking
burgundy (Van Inwagen's example). But that is not to choose to
choose something; what would count as a case of choosing to choose
claret? It seems that the idea that the second 'could have' means
the same as the original, leads to incoherency. Van Inwagen floats
the possibility of the operation of another sense of "could have",
but as we shall see, such a hope also seems futile. He suggests
that we use 'COULD HAVE' to denote the required "new" sense of
'could have' and use 'could have' only in its power-or-ability
sense. The conditional analysis then becomes:
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x could have done y = if x had chosen to do y, x would have
done y, and x COULD HAVE chosen to do y.
There would seem to be a condition that must be met by any adequate
account of the meaning of 'COULD HAVE': 'x COULD HAVE chosen to do
y' must entail 'x could have chosen to do y'. If this condition
isn't met, then from the kind of example already considered, it
should be easy enough to see that a counter-example to this
definition can be produced. All we need do is simply pick one of
those logically possible cases in which someone COULD HAVE chosen to
do something, but could not have chosen to do it (and, of course,
construct the example in such a way that his choice would have been
effective). This will be a case in which our imaginary person could
not have performed a certain act, though, according to the proposed
definition, he could have. Consider again, Lehrer's example. If
'COULD HAVE' does not entail 'could have', then it may be the case,
according to the proposed definition, both that Smith could have
eaten one of the red candies, and that Smith could not have chosen
to eat one of the red candies. This, of course, in so far as we are
concerned with powers or abilities, is a nonsense. However, like
Van Inwagen, I do not myself know any way to define 'COULD HAVE'
that will meet this essential condition. And at any rate, as Van
Inwagen points out, this were possible, we would surely be able
to give 'COULD HAVE' a sense such that 'COULD HAVE' tout court
entails 'could have' tout court, and what then would be the
necessity for the conditional that is the first conjunct of the
definiens of the conditional analysis?
There is (I expect it would occur), an obvious kind of
manoeuvre (which Van Inwagen recognises and discusses) open to the
conditionalist. We can note that all attempted, conditional
analyses presented so far featured the agent's doing something
antecedent to his performing the action in question e.g. choosing.
What, however, if a conditional analysis were to be attempted which
did not include the agent's doing anything prior to the action? (In
fact, when I come to consider the notion of agent-causation, what I
will then be considering is the idea of an agent's causing
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something without first doing something else.) If we could do away
with acts of choice and the like, we may be able to avoid the
infinite regress we have seen generated (Ryle, of course, in The
Concept of Mind^, displays awareness of the worries of the infinite
regress.) Van Inwagen explores what may happen if a conditionalist
were to offer an analysis of 'could have' of this form:
x could have done y = if Rxy, then x would have done y, and A
where 'Rxy' represents some condition on x and y such that it is
possible that this condition hold without x's doing anything
antecedent to his doing y. 'A' may be any sort of qualification.
Such a format would allow us to stave off objections such as the
ones I have already cited e.g. consider "if x had wanted to do y
(more than anything else), then x would have done y." (Of course,
such an analysis would take on board problems which I cannot tackle
here, concerning the purported relationship between motivational
strength and action. Irving Thalberg has written an excellent essay
on this topic entitled "Questions About Motivational Strength"^.)
Wanting to perform an act (unlike choosing to perform an act) is
clearly not itself an act. Imagine "If he had wanted to eat a red
candy then he would have eaten one". According to this approach, it
would be no genuine objection to ask "But could he have wanted a red
candy?" This is because 'could haves' only get off the ground in
the first place with the existence of given wants. As Van Inwagen
notes, (because 'could haves' only enter the fray after the presence
of wants is given), to attempt this kind of objection, to ask a
'could have' about a want itself, would be to make a kind of
category mistake, would be to introduce some unspecified
'possible'. As we have seen, according to the 'choice' analysis "it
was not within his power to choose to eat a red candy" seems to
imply that it was not within his power to eat a red candy; however,
according to this new analysis, its not being possible that he
should have wanted to eat a red candy does not have this
implication, since (as I've said) 'could haves' only become an issue
once wants are given, it makes no sense to ask a 'could have'
question about a want itself. This feature is really, in fact, the
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downfall of the analysis in question. Van Inwagen suggests that we
look again at the "red candy" case. Smith doesn't want to eat a red
candy. The very sight of them, we may suppose makes him feel
uneasy. But let us suppose for the moment that he did want to eat
one of the candies. Presumably he could. But also, presumably, he
would not be afflicted with his neurosis which, in actuality,
renders him unable to eat one of the candies. So it would seem that
both the statements "If Smith had wanted to eat a red candy, he
would have" and "Smith could not have eaten a red candy" are true.
That is, assuming that a coherent, meaningful sense can be given to
the second statement in the face of the truth of the first one,
which, of course, it can be. So the attempted new analysis must
fail. We could, of course, attempt some qualification, some further
condition to be inserted in the space occupied by 'A' in the
abstract schema. Lehrer, for instance, makes a suggestion which
could be incorporated into the analysis:
x could have done y = if x had wanted to do y, x would have
done y and it is false that if x had wanted to do y, x would
have possessed some advantage with respect to doing y that x
did not actually possess.
As Van Inwagen says, this would not have the consequence that Smith
could have eaten a red candy. For, though it is true that Smith
would have eaten a red candy if he had wanted to, it is also true
that if he had wanted to eat a red candy, he would haye possessed an
advantage with respect to eating a red candy that he did not in fact
possess: freedom from his neurosis. However, this effort is also
pretty hopeless. Van Inwagen provides the example of his wanting to
fly to Washington: if he wanted to fly to Washington, he should
come to possess a certain advantage with respect to flying to
Washington: a reserved seat on a Washington bound flight; and this
advantage is one he does not actually possess. But this fact
obviously does not entail that he could not fly to Washington. In
order to cope with this difficulty, it is clear (that is, if there
is any way of coping with it) that we must involve ourselves in a
minefield which I think it unprofitable to tread any further into
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(and I hope the defensibility of stopping here will become clear).
Van Inwagen, around this point, adopts what I think is an
extremely useful and shrewd tactic. He supposes that we have found
(whatever it may be) the best possible conditional analysis of
ability, and he calls it simply the Analysis. The Analysis is right
if any conditional analysis is right, and wrong only if no
conditional analysis is right. If the Analysis is wrong, the
conditionalist may as well pack up and go home - he can do nothing
to help establish compatibilism. Van Inwagen notes that, so far as
supporting compatibilism is concerned, the Analysis does very little
for us, unless we have some reason to think it is correct. That is,
some or other sense of 'could have' may afford a conditional
analysis but, unless the 'could have' relevant to free will likewise
affords one (which would be the truth of the Analysis), then
conditionalism can do nothing for compatibilism. As I've said,
however, it is no accident that the Analysis is false. The main
thrust of my diagnosis is something which I have already given an
outline of, and which I will go into some detail about in a moment,
namely that (as should be quite clear by now) free will is
contingent upon, not only the leap from choice or wish to action,
but also the genesis of choice or wish itself. This realisation
finds expression through several contributors and indeed, from much
of what Van Inwagen says in the rest of his Essay on Free Will, the
respect he accords conditionalism as a compatibilist thesis
surprises me. Watson, for instance, in his essay "Free Agency"^,
distinguishes between freedom of action and freedom of will, the
former turning upon the leap from choice or wish to action, and the
latter concerning itself with the conditions of choices or wishes
themselves. It seems to me, that conditionalism can only
essentially concern itself with the former. There can be no doubt
by now however, that free will takes the latter into its purview
also. Anthony Kenny, in his essay "Freedom, Spontaneity and
Indifference"^, utilises the roughly equivalent Humean distinction
between liberty and spontaneity and liberty of indifference;
conditionalism, by its nature, can only take the former into its
purview, whilst the issue of free will extends into the latter.
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Similarly, whilst I will conclude that the efforts in question are
ultimately a pretty futile contribution to the free will/determinism
issue, it will be clear when I come to consider those efforts
shortly, that Harry G. Frankfurt is also more than aware of the
questions freedom can ask of choices and the like themselves.
(Whilst I don't have time to pursue it here, there are, of course,
parallel issues of a crucial nature in social and political
philosophy e.g. what kind of desires and choices should simply be
satisfied and what kind should we endeavour to change?) And as I
have also just documented, even the strictly empirical or
"explaining away" propounder of determinism/incompatibilism begins
his assault by focusing on conditions of choices and wants, and the
significance of this fact for what I am saying here is in no way
undermined either by the fact that the evidence does not support his
conclusions, or the fact that the kind of thing he puts forward as
evidence is not (due to Psychological Anomalism and Psychophysical
Anomalism), the kind of thing which could evidence determinism.
Waiving for the moment the rights and wrongs of empirical
determinism/incompatibilism, or those of the efforts of Frankfurt,
Watson or Kenny, the central point is by now, I hope, clear enough.
I can become much more specific about it.
I have already (in the preceding discussion of Lehrer's
compatibilism) mentioned Van Inwagen's fanciful (M) hypothesis. It
seems to me quite consistent for there to be some or other
conditional sense of 'could have', and (M) to be true. That is,
there could be a conditional analysis of some or other sense of
'could have', and yet no one be able to act other than how they do
act. Let's say that I decide to have an orange juice, but also that
had I chosen instead to have a lemonade, then I would have had a
lemonade. Let us also imagine a fairly simple conditional analysis,
i.e. let us say that
x could have had a lemonade = if x had chosen to have a
lemonade, and A, then x would have had a lemonade, where 'A' is
some unspecified set of conditions (indeed, it probably
wouldn't do any harm for what I want to say if we imagined A to
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be absent from the antecedent of the conditional; my suspicion
is really that the simpler the conditional is here, the better).
So according to this, if I had chosen to have a lemonade, and
A, then I would have had a lemonade. But since my decisions are
caused by a device implanted in my brain by Martians, a device which
caused me to opt for an orange juice on this occasion, I could not
have had a lemonade. In the only sense which matters, the situation
here is exactly the same as it would be if events in the past
conjoined with the laws of nature (neither of which are up to me)
were sufficient for my having an orange juice, and not a lemonade.
Specifically, I have access, in such a case, to only one possible
world, namely the actual one, in which I have an orange juice and
not a lemonade. Quite regardless of whether my choosing to have a
lemonade would go even some of the way to facilitating my having a
lemonade, the brute fact is that I have no access to a possible
world in which I choose to have a lemonade. That is, I am not free
to satisfy one of the conjuncts of the antecedent. This feature is
really the fundamental poverty of conditionalism in so far as it
announces itself as an argument for compatibilism i.e. the failure
to even address the question of access to possible worlds, of
whether I ever have access to a world in which I choose other than
how I do, in fact, choose. There may have been nothing stopping me
from having a lemonade if I had chosen to have one (I had freedom of
action, or liberty of spontaneity), but I could not have had a
lemonade (as a result of the Martian device, freedom of will, or
liberty of indifference, is lacking). Gonditionalism just does not
seem to be the kind of thesis which could square free will with
determinism. I may be accused of simply re-stating the kind of
thing which Van Inwagen said with regard to the "Smith and red
candy" example, of having us back at square one, but I would reply
that the conditional analysis (where it is used to support
compatibilism) takes us indeed, straight back to square one.
I hope I can make this even more clear by cashing it out where
I think it really matters. I have already said that, whilst there
are, obviously, important differences between hypothesis (M), and
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something like Ginet's H hypothesis or Honderich's ('One')
determinism, (as Van Inwagen recognises), the parallels are also
more than useful. And I now want to try to show that, even if
conditionalism has any currency as an account of any 'could have',
free will is no more safeguarded in the light of H or Honderich's
determinism being true, then it would be in the light of (M)'s being
true. If H is true, then everything I do is contingently
necessitated by physiological-cum-environmental laws. My taking
orange juice instead of lemonade, due to physiological-cum-
environmental law, could not have happened otherwise. It may be the
case that had I opted for lemonade, I would have had lemonade, but
what I will opt for is itself contingently necessitated. Indeed,
the laws which contingently necessitate my taking orange juice have
no place whatever for my choices or wants; all they care about are
what (literally) goes into my mouth. Whether they are true is
another thing again, but if they are true then (as the likes of Van
Inwagen's two Formal Arguments for Incompatibilism mentioned up till
now suggest) it seems very difficult to see how we can have any free
will, to see how we can do other than what we do.
To reinforce this point, it may be of more benefit to look at
Honderich, because Honderich seems to take slightly more seriously
(or deal rather more cautiously with) the psychological; choices,
wishes and the like which are so central to the Analysis. Ginet
seems to merely make it his business to explain why psychological
properties are not the kind of thing which can appear in laws,
without making much of an effort to explain the impression of
psychological efficacy, i.e. how it could square with H. Honderich,
on the other hand, does do something toward the latter end, in the
shape of his Correlation thesis. It may be wise to re-state the
Correlation thesis at this point:
Any particular description of consciousness D is true of an
individual if and only if his brain or part of it is in one
particular state or sequence of states S.
Remind ourselves of Honderich's other two premises, that states of
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the brain are effects, the effects of other physical states, and
that states of the brain are causes, both of other states of the
brain and also of certain movements of one's body (actions) and my
use of Honderich should not be too difficult to anticipate. Again,
consider some conditionalist analysis which (as before) includes my
choosing as one of the conjuncts of the antecedent. I took an
orange juice, but, had I chosen a lemonade, and 'A', I would have
had a lemonade. My choosing an orange juice and not a lemonade,
was, however, correlated with a brain state or sequence of brain
states, which was itself the effect of other physical states, which
weren't up to me. So I could not have chosen to have a lemondade;
my choice could not have been different from what it was, any more
than if (M) was true. When we focus on the genesis of choices or
wants in this way, their conditions, should their conditions be the
Martian device, "physiological-cum-environmental laws",
straightforward brain states, or indeed maybe even something else
altogether, we see the poverty and in fact (in my view) the ultimate
irrelevance of conditionalism to the cause of compatibilism.
Not only this, but I hope that it has emerged by now, how it
can be that conditionalism may give the appearance of establishing
compatibilism. That is because, as a theory about meaning, it looks
very plausible as regards freedom of action (or liberty of
spontaneity). To say that I have freedom of action with regard to
(say) having the lemonade which I did not choose is surely just to
say that, had I chosen the lemonade, nothing would have impeded my
path to it. Such a sense of 'could have' is undoubtedly a perfectly
genuine, meaningful one. Questions about freedom of action are
perfectly real questions. However the compatibilist illusion here
results from concluding that 'could haves' pertaining to freedom of
action are the only genuine 'could haves'. As I hope is clear by
now, this seems wholly untrue to me. The 'could have' pertaining to
freedom of will, liberty of indifference, access to possible worlds,
seems to me a perfectly real one also. Not only that, but the
latter seems to be the one which free will/determinism addresses,
and which conditionalism seems unable to provide a proper account
of. Whilst conditionalism may yet be correct as an account of the
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meaning of the 'could have' of freedom of action, there seems no
hope of its accounting for the 'could have' relevant to free
will/determinism.
It still seems at this stage clear to me that should H or
Honderich's determinism (or anything significantly like it) be true,
then we cannot do other than what we do, we do not have free will
(this seems to me as unambiguously the case as it would be if (M)
were true). I repeat that conditionalism doesn't seem to be the
kind of thing which could either counter-evidence (M), H or
Honderich's determinism, or protect anybody from what appears to be
the clear consequence of them all, namely that no one can do other
than what they do. Likewise, with the consideration Van Inwagen
makes of examining how the Analysis stands in relation to his First
Formal (incompatibilist) Argument, Van Inwagen comments:
The First Formal Argument is valid. Therefore, if the Analysis
is correct, at least one of the premises of the First Formal
Argument is false. (I assume this conditional is true. If it
isn't, of course, then free will and determinism are
incompatible even if the Analysis is correct.)
My own response to this shouldn't be difficult to anticipate. Van
Inwagen's conditional is true, but, due to, really, the most basic
features about free will, the Analysis is false.
Before ending this part, I think it worth pointing something
out. This concerns what we could conceivably add to a fairly
typical conditional analysis (e.g. 'I could have' = 'I would have,
if I had chosen'), which would make it look like a case for the
existence of free will. We can, I think, be given a hint towards
realising what this is by noting something which is, I think, itself
revealing about the status of conditionalism. This is that Ginet
and Honderich, in their respective offerings, just don't discuss
conditionalism. It doesn't rate a mention with them. They clearly
don't regard conditionalism as any possible way of securing our
ability to act otherwise, should the determinism they respectively
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speak of be true. Similarly, in "The Conceivability of Mechanism",
Malcolm doesn't mention it. Indeed, the comments of Malcolm in
particular, which I have cited, should hint strongly at what would
be needed to supplement conditionalism on behalf of free will.
Remember that the antecedent features choosing, wishing, or some
such intentional concept. So, I hope it isn't too difficult by now
to see that what is really needed to construct an argument for the
existence of free will, is an additional premise to the effect that
the intentional enjoys (as well as the irreducibility, which
Davidson speaks of) a particularly far-reaching, "untouchable" kind
of autonomy,i.e. that the intentional does not refer us back to some
more basic (to use Malcolm's expression) realm or vocabulary, which
could explain exhaustively, be it the neurophysiological
"physiological-cum-environmental" laws, or any kind of "laws of
nature". As Malcolm has so precisely pointed out, if (for
instance), basic neurophysiological laws are at the bottom of all
our choosings, wishings, etc., and can therefore account for
everything, entirely in the absence of invoking intentional
concepts, then there is a perfectly clear sense in which my
choosings and the like, don't really matter, in which they are
superfluous to an explanation of my action. In Malcolm's
aforementioned example, we could account entirely for the man's
climbing the ladder purely by recounting neurophysiological laws, we
needn't cite the desire to get his hat from the roof at all. His
desire to get his hat from the roof refers us back to a more basic
neurophysiological, which can exhaustively account for his climbing
the ladder. Why bother with secondary, ultimately superfluous,
concepts such as choosing, wishing, and the like, when we've got the
basic tools to account for everything? It is, I hope, clear that if
determinism is true, then conditionalism, through featuring
intentional concepts such as choosing, is going to refer us back to
something more basic, which is both not up to me, but accounts for
(in terms of laws of nature) and therefore relegates (in an
explanatory sense) my choosing, or whatever. If, say, Honderich's
determinism is true, then choosing and desiring and any action which
follows, can all be wholly accounted for by a more basic
neurophysiological, behaving in accordance with laws of nature.
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Assuming that Ginet is postulating a pretty similar sort of story,
the truth of H would mean that my choosings and the like and any
action which follows, can all be subsumed under more basic
physiological-cum-environmental laws. It should be obvious why
Honderich, Ginet and Malcolm, would regard conditionalism as
something of an irrelevance, and I hope that my surprise at the
respect afforded it by Van Inwagen is now looking reasonable. I
hope that it is also entirely clear why I think that, in order for
conditionalism to be involved at all in arguments in favour of free
will, the conditional must take the form:
x could have done y = Conditional statement, and Z
where Z is some condition to the effect that the intentional
cannot be subsumed under any more basic laws.
However, if it has remained rather hidden up till now, this
"new" conditionalism may have brought something else to light.
Right from the start of my look at conditionalism, it may have
seemed that especially in the light of what has gone before, there
was something slightly odd going on. Remember that conditionalism
advertises itself as an argument for compatibilism,i.e. it is given
that determinism is true, and the problem is to square this with our
free will. Enter the psychological, our choices, wishes and the
like as the free will/determinism hybrid. Therefore, it may seem
reasonable to call conditionalism a psychological determinism.
However, if what we have seen said by Davidson (or, at any rate,
Kim's re-stating of Davidson), Ginet and Van Inwagen is correct,
then there really can be no such thing as psychological
determinism. As we have seen Van Inwagen, in particular, make
admirably clear, when we talk about determinism, as opposed to mere
causation, we are talking about laws and, as Davidson, Kim and Ginet
all help clarify, the psychological is not the kind of thing which
can feature in laws, which can have nomological links with anything
else, be it other aspects of the psychological, or the physical
(Kim's Psychological Anomalism and Psychophysical Anomalism).
Davidson, in order to sustain a "psychological" determinism, is
forced to "descend" to the more basic physical for his laws, with
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the killing consequences for free will which I've already made
clear. Honderich's position seems slightly different; in his
Correlation thesis, he seems to have the (mistaken, I think) belief
that there can be psychophysical nomological links, but this is not
really what is important, however; what is important is that, like
Davidson or Ginet, he believes the basic, subsuming laws to be
discoverable at the physical level, with again killing consequences
for free will I hardly need spell out again, and which Honderich
fully accepts. So, it seems to me that there are two possibilities
for conditionalism:
(a) if we do not add in premise Z, and determinism is true, then
since (as we've seen), the only determinism it makes sense to
speak of has laws discoverable at the physical level, then
conditionalism provides no support for free will;
(b) we add in premise Z, in which case because of the
aforementioned Anomalism of the Mental, adds up in fact to a_
denial of determinism. Z, by nature, precludes subsumption of
the mental under more basic (physical) laws, but if determinism
is true, there must be laws. But the psychological is not the
kind of thing to feature in laws. Therefore, if Z is true,
determinism is false.
That is, conditionalism can only be a part of an argument for
free will if determinism is false. And this amounts to the claim,
of course, that despite its firmly entrenched position in
philosophical history as an argument for compatibilism, it can only
do anything at all for the cause of free will on pain of also
entailing incompatibilism. Conditionalism, at the end of the day,
does no more for the cause of compatibilism, than do the efforts of
Lehrer I considered a bit earlier. Another cheap trick.
As I've already said, the work of Harry G. Frankfurt in
"Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" can appear very
much like another contribution to compatibilism. Since Stevenson,
philosophers have been familiar with the term "Persuasive
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definition"; there is also such a thing, though, as an evasive
definition, and I will be wanting to claim that Frankfurt's attempt
at disparaging the significance of determinism vis a vis free will,
can only appear to succeed because his definition of free will is
ultimately, an evasive one. It is another cheap trick.
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1. In The Concept of Mind, Ch.III, P67
2. In Ernest Lepore & Brian McLaughlin, Actions & Events:
Perspectivbes of the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.
3 In Free Will, ed. Watson.
4. In Essays on Freedom of Action, ed. Honderich.
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9. FRANKFURT AND EVASIVE DEFINITION
There is no more than an innocuous appearance of paradox in the
proposition that it is determined, ineluctably and by forces
beyond their control, that certain people have free wills and
that others do not.
- "Freedom of the Will and the
Concept of a Person"
This claim occurs in the penultimate paragraph of Frankfurt's
essay, and has a clear compatibilist look about it. As I've already
suggested though, I think that the claim can only be sustained on
pain of a re-definition (evasive re-definition) of free will, and
one which is ultimately irrelevant to the substantive questions
within free will/determinism. Frankfurt himself admits that the
possession of this "free will" does not have the connection with
responsibility which free will is usually taken to have; one of the
major worries surrounding determinism of course (especially where it
is conjoined with incompatibilism) is that free will is generally
thought to be a condition of moral responsibility, but with
Frankfurt's conception of free will here, whilst free will may be
necessary for responsibility, it is (as he is aware) certainly not
sufficient. Indeed, an examination of what Frankfurt means by "free
will" will reveal, I think, that his position is not, in any
significant sense at all, a compatibilist one. Despite the
seemingly compatibilist paragraph above, his essay actually contains
no contribution at all to questions of determinism, libertarianism,
compatibilism and incompatibilism. The fact that the "paradox" he
speaks of above is only an innocuous appearance is actually of no
real significance, since "free will" is evasively defined, with the
consequence being that free will and determinism look as difficult
to square as ever before, and moral responsibility looking as out of
tune with determinism as before.
Frankfurt is, in a sense, I think, hijacking the notion of free
will, and I think that it is important to expose this. So what is
he actually talking about? From the same essay:
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Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or
that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain
desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be
different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they
are...No animal other than man...appears to have the capacity
for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the
formation of second-order desires.
To have a second-order desire is to want simply to have a certain
desire; however, to have a second-desire volition is to want, not
only to have a certain desire, but to want a certain desire to be
one's will,i.e. to want a certain desire to be the desire which
moves one to act. Frankfurt distinguishes the two by means of the
following example: a physician engaged in psychotherapy with
narcotics addicts believes that his ability to help his patients
would be enhanced if he understood better what it is like for them
to desire the drug to which they are addicted. Suppose that he is
led in this way to want to have a desire for the drug. However, it
is entirely possible that he does not want this desire to be
effective. He may not want it to move him all the way to action,
and indeed, he may prudently arrange to make it impossible for him
to satisfy the desire he would have if his desire to want the drug
should, in time, be satisfied. The physician, in this example, has
a second-order desire to take the drug, but his second-order
volition is not in tune with this. And now the punch-line - this is
what really seems to be important to Frankfurt: according to
Frankfurt, it is only because a person has volitions of the
second-order (unlike animals and 'wanton' humans, as he puts it)
that he is capable both of enjoying and of lacking freedom of the
will. The possibility of second-order volitions is (for Frankfurt)
a condition of the problem of freedom of the will:
When we ask whether a person's will is free we are not asking
whether he is in a position to translate his first-order
desires into actions. That is the question of whether he is
free to do as he pleases...Rather, it concerns his desires
themselves (emphasis mine). But what question about them is it?
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I think Frankfurt is completely correct here to suggest that the
notion of free will, despite an entire tradition within
compatibilism which I've devoted some attention to, loops back to
embrace desires themselves within its purview. However, the
question that Frankfurt thinks free will asks with regard to desires
is simply not the kind of question I think it asks e.g. is the
neurophysiological more basic than the (mentalistic concept of)
desire, as (say) Honderich's three determinist premises document
well? Can we give any sort of sense to the notion that the desires
could have been any different than they were at the time in question
(and if Ginet's 'H' hypothesis or Honderich's determinism is true,
it makes it very difficult to see how this can be done)? Frankfurt
has, I think, some curious things to say, on the questions free will
asks of desires and, rather than criticise specific, individual
suggestions one by one, I think, it more fruitful to cite a number
of extracts from Frankfurt's essay, thus establishing an overall
picture, which I can then go on to criticise:
It is in securing the conformity of his will to his
second-order volitions, that a person exercises freedom of the
will...a person may have, especially if his second-order
desires are in conflict, desires and volitions of a higher
order than the second. There is no theoretical limit to the
length of the series of desires of higher and higher orders;
nothing except common sense and, perhaps, a saving fatigue
prevents an individual from obsessively refusing to identify
himself with any of his desires until he forms a desire of the
next higher order...It is possible, however, to terminate such
a series of acts without cutting it off arbitrarily. When a
person identifies himself decisively with one of his
first-order desires, this commitment 'resounds' throughout the
potentially endless array of higher orders.
I am not happy with a lot going on here. For what it's worth (which
I think will ultimately turn out to be fairly little), the claim
that it is simply in securing the conformity of his will to his
second-order volitions, that a person exercises freedom of the will,
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appears to me, not only to be misguided, but odd in that Frankfurt
goes on to recognise the possibility of desires and volitions of a
higher order than the second. I am also not happy with the claim
that there is no theoretical limit to the length of the series of
desires of higher and higher orders, and that only common sense and
economy of energy ever allow soneone to actually act. I am also
doubtful of Frankfurt's suggested reason why the ending of the
series of critical acts is not arbitrary.
Even within the whole Frankfurt framework, of marginalising the
question of determinism with regard to free will (to which, of
course, I am unsympathetic), it should not, I think, be especially
difficult to see why it is entirely inadequate to say that one's
freedom of will be exercised merely by the conformity of one's will
to one's second-order volitions. This is because here is no reason
whatever why second-order volitions cannot themselves come under the
purview of freedom. I have already talked of brain-washing,
ideology, rhetoric, etc., and whilst I've made clear what I regard
as the ultimate significance within free will/determinism of an
empirical examination of these phenomena, if we are to bear with
Frankfurt and stick within his framework, it will, I think, very
frequently, be one's second-order volitions, more than one's
first-order desires or actions, which reveal the extent of these
kind of manipulative processes. Indeed, it seems to me that, as
Frankfurt has given them, the actual task of brain-washing and
psychological manipulation, precisely jl£ to create a particular
second-order volition, though it may also be necessary to create a
new first-order desire as well in some cases,i.e. the typical
"manipulator" attempts to convince his subject that it is one
particular desire, rather than another, which ought to move him to
act, and if he succeeds in this, then he has created a whole new
second-order volition and (as I've indicated) this creation of the
new second-order volition may actually entail the creation of a new
first-order desire as well which, of course, is the one he wants to
move the subject to act. Indeed, it seems to me that it tends to be
at the level of second-order volitions that we discover the
operation of the likes of values, principles, theories of conduct
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and of the good life etc., and the manner in which these have been
acquired can be every bit as good a reason for regarding the agent
as unfree to a significant extent, as can mere failure of his
actions to conform to them. The results of manipulation, ideology,
rhetoric, etc. can indeed reveal themselves straightforwardly in
one's first-order desires and be opposed by a second-order volition
which the agent has (critically) highly defensible reasons for
holding, but just as often, I suspect, first-order desires will or
will not be endorsed by a second-order volition which is, quite
transparently, a consequence of manipulation and rhetoric which has
never been subjected by the agent to any sort of critical
appraisal. Consider the case of the man who has enjoyed a weekend
drink for most of his life, and has never until now, pondered
especially on whether he ought to do so. Then, quite arbitrarily,
it seems he remembers someone having told him, at a very young age,
that alcohol is wicked and that consumption results in eternal
damnation for the drinker. For fear that this may be true, the
desire not to drink then becomes among his first-order desires, and
also becomes his second-order volition. Let us also suppose that,
within a week or two, he has succeeded entirely, i.e. he has brought
his actions into line with his second-order volitions, he has
stopped drinking. In such a case, the subject has satisfied the
condition propounded by Frankfurt for freedom of will, but even
within this empirical framework, we would surely be very reluctant
to say that such a subject is acting as freely as he could be. As
I've said, consciously held principles and the like often enter the
fray at this level, and our subject in this example could well turn
his anxieties into a statable principle (e.g. "Carnal indulgence for
its own sake is a bad thing"); here, the actions are not only in
line with a second-order volition, but actually in tune with
principles, which it may require some strength of character to
practise. I hope it is clear, however, that the issue surrounds the
principles, etc. themselves: in our example, the agent has not
subjected his anti-pleasure principle itself to the slightest
scrutiny. He has not questioned why he holds it in the first place,
or wondered whether there are good reasons for holding it. It is
simply a given for him; it may have been presented to him in
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particularly expedient conditions with a degree of zeal and
reinforcement which left him completely imprisoned within it,
entirely unable to transcend it and criticise it. Quite regardless
of whether such a detached appraisal would reveal the principle to
be sound or otherwise, the fact that it is a possibility at all,
which is not open to our agent, surely means we can say straight off
that our agent could be more free than he in fact is. And, as I've
suggested, I expect that a great many of the principles and values
which can be found at the bedrock of people's "second-order" lives
are taken on board in this uncriticised, untouched fashion e.g. love
of God, love of country, professional success, public esteem,
anti-hedonism, hedonism, pursuit of truth, various loyalties (I say
nothing, of course, about whether there actually are grounds for
defending any of these second-order motivations!).
From parts of Frankfurt's essay I have quoted, it seems that
Frankfurt is dimly aware of something like this problem. However,
both what seems to be his attempt at a diagnosis and his suggested
solution, strike me as completely misguided. I believe, in fact,
that in so far as one speaks within Frankfurt's parameters, both the
problem and the solution are not so much a case of desires of higher
and higher orders, but more a case of what is characterised by
Nagel, as standpoints of higher levels of objectivity. In fact,
this whole notion will become of crucial importance later, when I
look at Nagel's sharp response to Strawson. Let me expound.
Frankfurt suggests that there may be a conflict of one's
second-order desires, and that in such a case, a third-order desire
may have to come in to adjudicate. There are a number of things I
don't like about this suggestion, however. Generally, I am not
happy with the concept of desire being allowed to be so broad that
it extends from the most primitive (e.g. the wanton addict's desire
for the drug) to whatever Frankfurt supposes goes on at the
third-order level (and of course, possibly infinitely beyond,
according to Frankfurt). I would prefer (for reasons which should
shortly be made clear), to reserve and restrict the notion of a
desire for the fairly primitive levels of the supposed hierarchy -
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the wanting level and the wanting to want (perhaps) but really no
more. Apart from all else, I don't really see any reason to believe
that a person's motivational system could be as grand and complex as
this. Perhaps I am just a miserably primitive specimen of the race,
but on inspection, I cannot myself discover "within" me, a large and
complex hierarchy of desires, each level attempting to influence the
workings of the one immediately "below" and little plots and
sub-plots going on, here, there and everywhere, to overthrow the
dictates of the guy above (of course, since it possibly extends
infinitely upwards, I may only be able to gain access to an
infinitesimally small portion of it) - this kind of picture
postulated by Frankfurt seems to have dubious resemblances to some
traditional models of motivational processes as are criticised and
parodied (admittedly somewhat harshly at times), by the likes of
Ryle. The fundamental reason, however, why I am unhappy to talk of
"desires" of any order higher than the second, is really the nub of
the whole thing,i.e. the increasing levels of theoretical
sophistication, as one moves "outwards" (I prefer this to "higher")
from the arena of first-order desires, the greater levels of
objectivity. I will attempt to make this clearer.
Before talking of this specific issue, it is in order, I think,
to say a bit about objectivity, as characterised by Nagel. We each
of us view the world from "within", from the inside, we all occupy a
particular position in space and time, we all have highly specific
desires, wants, whims and hankerings which, from the inside, appear
to stand in no need of any justification. From this (Subjective)
standpoint, all that our desires seem to need is satisfaction; from
this standpoint, our desires, projects and purposes seem to be of
immediate and utmost importance. However, unlike the rest of the
animal kingdom, it seems, humans have the facility to transcend the
subjective standpoint and see it from the "outside", i.e. they can
see this subjectivity from a vantage point which encompasses and
explains it (Objective). From this standpoint, we are, each of us,
revealed to be no more significant than the next person, we are
inconsequential atoms of history, our own desires, projects and
purposes are of no great importance, and there is no particular
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reason why my desires should be satisfied in preference to those of
anyone else. And I don't think I can over-stress that it is only
our ability to adopt this objective standpoint towards ourselves
which allows there to be a free will problem at all: from the
inside, it appears that I am the source of a great many of my
actions but, once viewed from the outside, I become aware of myself
as contained in a natural world of cause and effect, and it is then
by no means so easy to see myself as the author of my actions. I
also want to stress that there are not simply two radically
different standpoints, the subjective, and the objective. Rather,
it is a question of degree, and may usefully be viewed as a series
of concentric circles: the first circle is the "least theoretical",
the world of pure appearances (such as I depicted above), which can
only be properly understood from the inside, the second is "more"
theoretical, encompassing, explaining, and criticising this world of
appearance, the third (in turn), encompasses, explains, and
criticises the second, etc.
However, I cannot stress strongly enough that (as I've already
talked of with regard to "explaining away" moves in empirical
determinism/incompatibilism) there a limit to how far humans are
constitutionally capable of carrying on this process, humans can
only reach out to a finite number of the concentric circles. (The
idealist will want to claim that there cannot be a circle beyond the
farthest one to which humans can constitutionally reach out,i.e.
what there is must be capable of being apprehended by humans, whilst
the realist will allow that there could be a circle beyond the
farthest away one to which we can reach, which encompasses, explains
and criticises the last one we can get to - indeed, for the realist,
there could be any number beyond that again.) Humans are
constitutionally limited in this respect: they can only go so far
out and the game is up for them. We eventually arrive at a circle
for which we can find no external justification, which must (as far
as we are concerned) stand on its own feet. As we move outwards, we
will arrive eventually at various critical procedures themselves,
for which there can be no explanation, which must simply reflect our
constitution, habits, practices and interests. Let me now attempt
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to apply all of this to Frankfurt's model.
It seem to me that the correct picture is actually this: we
find ourselves, at the most subjective standpoint, with a set of
first-order desires, which appear to us simply to be in need of
satisfaction e.g. we may want a drink, or a meal, or we may feel
like listening to some music, or whatever. An agent may or may not
reach the first circle outwards, the first standpoint of greater
objectivity, which attempts to encompass, explain and criticise what
appears to us from our most subjective vantage point. The wanton
drug addict fails to reach even this position. For someone who does
reach it, the desires which, from the most subjective standpoint,
appeared only to be in need of satisfaction, then appear as
something with an explanation from outside themselves, and an
evaluation which will often depend very much on what the agent,
rightly or wrongly, takes this explanation to be. An agent may or
may not get to the next position outward^.e. a position which
encompasses, explains and evaluates the standpoint of second-order
volitions: as I've already indicated, the agent in our "alcohol"
example completely fails to get there, since it simply doesn't occur
to him that what appears to him at the second-order level, the first
circle of objectivity, could itself undergo any scrutiny or
evaluation. It is given (for instance, that carnal indulgence for
its own sake is a bad thing). There obviously is another level,
however, when we get here, what has appeared at the second-order
level appears in need of evaluation and explanation: for instance,
how can I explain and evaluate my belief (say) that carnal
indulgence for its own sake is a bad thing? Should I get to this
position, I may discover that I did, in fact, have no decent reasons
at all for holding various principles and beliefs which had
previously appeared at the first level of objectivity, and guided my
second-order volitions. My second-order volitions may therefore
undergo change. However, I have already said that there is a limit
to how long this process can go on, how far "outward" humans can
go. I have already said that I am reluctant to talk of "desires"
beyond the second-order (for reasons which I hope are now looking
defensible) and indeed, it is becoming a bit difficult to envisage
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what would be involved, and what it would be like psychologically,
if we attempt to go to the level of objectivity beyond that which
criticises and evaluates second-order volitions. Some sort of
examination of these procedures of criticism and evaluation
themselves? Maybe. But then, it seems, it is all over. Nowhere to
run, nowhere to go. We cannot look for any more, in terms of
explanations and evaluation, at this point. This is the fundamental
reason why I can make little sense of Frankfurt's suggestion that we
can go forever, if we like, forming desires of progressively higher
orders. And, if we are to take our line on freedom from Frankfurt,
it would seem that the person who enjoys the greatest freedom of the
will is the person who can bring his actions into line with what he
wants to do, from the vantage point of the greatest possible level
of objectivity which humans can reach. And this does not have the
unmanageable consequences it may appear to have: we do not have to
take this giant leap outwards, every time we act, there will be
arenas of action, regarding which we needn't step outside the most
subjective of standpoints (e.g. "which kind of chocolate do I
want?"). However, the extent and delineation of even this arena
itself will have been determined from the vantage point of the
greatest possible objectivity which we can reach. This is also why
I am not happy with the idea put forward by Frankfurt of commitments
'resounding' through arrays of higher orders, when a desire gets
decisive endorsement at a certain level. Frankfurt is, in a sense,
I think, putting the cart before the horse here.
However, we still cannot avoid the sorry climax to all of
this. Despite all my huffing and puffing to fill in the blanks in
Frankfurt's effort, I think that it is really ultimately to little
avail. The person who reaches the n^-h circle of objectivity clearly
has a different kind of existence to the person who never leaves the
most narrow, subjective standpoint. However, if determinism is
true, then it is causally determined that our first subject reaches
the n1^ level of objectivity and the second one gets nowhere, and so
to say, (as Frankfurt would) that our first subject (assuming that
he is also unimpeded) lacks nothing in the way of freedom, is to
pointlessly shift the goalposts, to evasively define free will so
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that something which is actually fundamental,i.e. the question of
determinism, then looks only marginal. If determinism is true, then
it seems to me every bit as unwarranted to ascribe free will to our
first, ultra-objective subject than to our second ultra-subjective
one; in such a world, after all, it is not up to anyone how
objective their judgements are, or how much their actions are in
line with those judgements. I would then regard it no more
reasonable to hold the first subject responsible for his thoughts or
actions than the second one - how either of them actually gets into
the picture, in a way which makes in reasonable to attribute
responsibility to them, is not clear to me. I may be caused to have
even a very rich, fulfilling existence: however, if I am caused to
have it by forces outwith my control, then ascriptions of free will
to me strike me as nonsensical, as would the attendant
responsibility ascriptions. I repeat the point I made earlier
against Mackie, that the genesis of even the most 'objective',
fulfilled, empirical, contingent self cannot be marginalised with
regard to questions of freedom and responsibility.
Frankfurt indeed, admits the severing of the link between
responsibility and his "free will" - this is surely altogether very
odd since Frankfurt seems then to be saying that we may not even
hold responsible for his actions the person who lacks nothing in the
way of freedom. For all his conceptual juggling, it seems to me
that problems of determinism simply can't be stipulated or defined
away. Even at this level, the determinist threat is there, in as
full-blooded a fashion as ever before. We have not really moved, I
think, from square one. There still seems little reason to doubt
that, if determinism is true, then there is no free will, and
persons are not responsible for their actions. Perhaps Frankfurt
simply wanted to draw attention to things he thought essential to
the best of what life has to offer, and indeed, perhaps if someone
has "free will" in Frankfurt's sense (or, at any rate, in the sense
in which I attempted to rescue it), he may not feel especially
concerned about whether he has free will in the more problematic,
fundamental sense, whether determinism is true, whether he should
actually congratulate himself about having these life-enhancing
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conditions. Would anyone actually care, if in Frankfurt's sense,
they "lacked nothing in the way of freedom"? These, however, are
really separate issues; whether or not the absence of determinism
is essential to the Good Life is one thing, whether or not
determinism is true, and whether we are responsible for our actions,
is another thing again. As I've said, despite all the huffing and
puffing, this latter question is still there in all its grim reality.
As with conditionalism, there is nothing said by Frankfurt
which counter-evidences Van Inwagen's First Formal (incompatibilist)
Argument, nor anything which evidences free will, in the substantive
sense which matters. If Van Inwagen's (M) hypothesis is true, then
it is up to Martians that, for instance, Smith doesn't get "out"
beyond the "wanton" level, whilst Jones becomes profoundly
self-aware, so even Jones's profound self-awareness is in a very
serious sense, not up to him. If (M) is true (for instance), then
Smith has not got free will and Jones has not got free will; Smith
is not responsible for his actions, and Jones is not responsible for
his actions. Straight and simple. Indeed, whilst I just cast doubt
on whether the falsity of (M) and all significantly similar
hypotheses is actually essential to the Good Life, it would be very
difficult, I think, to imagine it having absolutely no impact
whatever on the outlook of an optimally "objective", fulfilled
person, if they discovered that there were good grounds for
entertaining (say), hypothesis (M). Not only, of course, would they
withdraw responsibility-ascriptions from themselves, but (depending
on temperament), they may or may not be affected by a measure of
unrest, and maybe even panic.
I don't think that this reflection is gratuitous. On the
contrary, I think it deeply revealing. Indeed, harping back to
comments made right at the outset, I think this point also reveals a
great deal about the primitive, preverbal worries at the bottom of
the ado which is the problem of free will. It reveals, I think,
that whilst we would find it futile to attempt saying precisely what
we mean by "the self", it is at least a condition of the concept
which we do have of it, that it does not sit comfortably alongside
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the prospect of the truth of (M), Ginet's 'H' hypothesis, or
anything significantly like those. That is, at the most primitive
level there appear to be a network of inextricably woven,
problematic and seemingly elusive notions, including those of the
self, action and responsibility, and this network would seem to
entirely collapse if (M), H or anything like it were true. There is
clearly a lot we do not know about those notions, but this much we
do seem to know. A recounting of those primitive intuitions makes
it clear, I think, just how little help or comfort can be provided
by what we have just seen Frankfurt do. Frankfurt seems to be
attempting to persuade us that certain issues don't really matter,
or ought not really to matter, but what is supposed not to matter is
what is, unavoidably, of the most profound importance. If (M), or
its like, were true, then whilst we may regard a preponderance of
satisfied pigs as a regrettable state of affairs, it would be
unwarranted to harbour feelings of distaste towards the satisfied
pigs themselves, whilst a dissatisfied Socrates, whilst he may
lament the state of affairs which leaves him dissatisfied, would be
unwarranted in scowling at himself for failing to be perfectly
rational, virtuous and happy. Even the smirk of a satisfied
Socrates would become somewhat nervous, I would imagine, if he
thought there were reasons for believing (M). Without wishing to
stray too far here, whilst a unified theory of the Good Life seems
hopelessly difficult, many would agree, I expect, that a component
of the Good Life is the belief that one is, in some measure, to be
genuinely praised and esteemed for certain kinds of achievement,
acquisition, etc. And this would seem impossible if (M) or the like
were true, quite regardless of anything offered by Frankfurt.
I talked a moment ago of concepts and conditions of action, the
self and responsibility. It is by focusing on the first of these,
the conditions of an act, that the next (final) and by far most
difficult and challenging argument in favour of compatibilism which
I will consider, gets off the ground. Later, I will consider a
challenge to assumptions about conditions of responsibility, a
challenge issued, in fact, by Frankfurt himself. The compatibilist
argument, which I will now document and examine will plunge us into
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several complex and difficult areas; some discussion of theory of
action, for instance, will be essential and the full significance of
issues touched on earlier, such as Van Inwagen's distinction between
mere causation and determinism, and the Libertarian's Dilemma, will
become clear, I hope. Van Inwagen has called the argument the Mind
argument, owing to the number of times it has occured in the journal
of that name, and I can see no reason to depart from this name.
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10. THE MIND ARGUMENT
It is a fairly commonplace realisation amongst contributors
that, whilst the truth of the thesis of determinism would at least
problematise any belief that we have in free will, the falsity of
the determinist thesis appears (prima facie, at least) to have
similarly unnerving consequences. If determinism is true, then
unless some form of compabilitism is correct, there seems no reason
to hold me responsible for my actions, to regard them as mine, in
any substantive sense. However, what if determinism is false? Can
there, in such a case, be any better reason for holding me
responsible for my actions, for regarding them as mine? It is not
at all obvious, straight off, that there is. I cited an
articulation of this worry near to the beginning, the articulation
provided by Dennett in "On Giving Libertarians What They Say They
Want". Dennett notes Hume's point that the dilemma posed for the
libertarian is that, whilst determinism doesn't seem to sit too
neatly alongside free will, if, on the other hand my actions are not
determined by anything, then they appear to just happen at random,
in which case there seems no reason either to hold me responsible
for them, to regard them as mine. And it may be remembered that the
task Dennett set himself was that if breaking down this dichotomy on
the libertarian's behalf, of demonstrating that "undetermined"
needn't mean "random", and consequently, that it may be possible to
discover some area of indeterminism which would, in fact, help give
credence to our notions of personal authorship and responsibility.
Whilst (as it may also be recalled) I said that I was, largely,
unimpressed by Dennett's specific efforts to this end, the worry
which motivated his enterprise in the first place, is, at bottom,
the same concern which generates the Mind argument in favour of
compatibilism. Recognising (as Dennett has done) the problem which
appears to be set for free will by indeterminism, the proponents of
the Mind argument actually assert that determinism is a condition of
an act. If we are to act at all (it goes), then determinism must be
true.
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The proper examination of this compatibilist position will
involve us in a hornet's nest of issues. For instance, I have
already touched on Van Inwagen's purported distinction between mere
causation and full-blown determinism, and this will become of some
importance, since it may well be that this compatibilist position is
actually motivated through fears about the absence of causation with
regard to actions, whilst this in turn can only be a worry about the
absence of determinism if causation entails determinism. What if we
could provide a solution to the 'causation' worry about actions
which wouldn't entail the truth of determinsm? Whether we would
then be any better off with regard to free will would depend on what
form the suggested solution takes. In the same way that Dennett
attempts (albeit fruitlessly, I believe) to deconstruct the supposed
synonymy of "uncaused" and "random" to provide a path for freedom
and reponsibility, Van Inwagen attempts to break down the supposed
synonymy of "undetermined" and "uncaused" in the hope of
demonstrating one of the confusions inherent in the Mind argument.
Another difficult notion which it will be necessary to consider in
connection with the Mind argument is that of agent-causation, an
idea which allegedly dates back to Aristotle^-, is given a well-known
modern defence by Roderick Chisholm^, and gains little praise from
Van Inwagen. Basically (for the time being), if agent-causation is
true, then we are presented straight off with causation without
determinism in relation to action, and therefore the refutation of
the Mind argument.
Before getting our teeth straight into the argument proper, it
is worth noting one other important feature of what I have said so
far, i.e. that (so far, at any rate) the Mind argument appears to be
only an argument that an act requires determinism - it says nothing
about free action. Action may well require determinism, but extra
arguments are then required to demonstrate that an act, so
conceived, is then a free act. That is, as far as this goes, the
proponent of the Mind argument may be entirely correct: if so, then
determinism is a condition of action. However, this would be
consistent with the absence of free actions from the world. All
actions could yet be determined and unfree. More is required,
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therefore, to say how an act, given that it is, qua act, determined,
can be free. How would we distinguish, within the class of acts,
between those which are free and those which aren't free? It cannot
be by the presence or absence of determinism since all acts are, by
hypothesis, determined. There would have to be some other criterion.
So the Mind argument, as I have portrayed it so far is not,
strictly, a compatibilist argument. It is only an argument that
action requires determinism, and more is needed to show that
determinism is compatible with free action, and hence turn it into a
compatibilist argument. For all we know at present, free will may
be both incompatible with determinism (as I have myself argued so
far) and incompatible with indeterminism, and hence impossible. I
will come to this extremely difficult problem.
If my incompatibilist claims so far are sound, then a free act
(if it is to be possible at all) must be an undetermined act.
However, it is when we begin to properly consider what an
undetermined act would really be like that we can begin to glimpse
what is the force behind the Mind contention (leaving aside the
question of the ultimate defensibility of it). This force is,
remember, in a sense an essentially negative one, taking root not so
much in a positive belief about the compatibility of free will and
determinism, but in a converse worry about the alleged compatibility
of free will and indeterminism, and indeed, according to one strand
(as I've said) in a worry about the alleged compatibility of action
and indeterminism. As I discussed in general terms away at the very
beginning, and have given specific content to on occasions up to
now, the legacy of Wittgenstein and the analytic tradition has
brought about a temptation to regard the apparently most intractable
of philosophical problems as cases, really, of much ado about
nothing, turning upon simple failures (for instance) to be receptive
to the nuances and "tricks" of our language. I hope that it is
clear by now how problems of free will and determinism have been
vulnerable objects of this approach, and I also hope, similarly,
that some of the stage has been set for my saying that, in his
articulation and setting out of problems within free
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will/determinism, Van Inwagen displays a quite ingenious facility
for exposing the limitations of this dismissive approach, and for
holding up the traditional problems of the domain to be the
perfectly real, substantive problems that they are. I say this now
because I feel that his presentation at least, of the specific issue
I am now about to discuss is again ingenious in its force and
clarity. I often think myself that the most efficacious way there
is of defending the authenticity of classical philosophical problems
is actually to present logically posssible, even if especially
fanciful and/or detailed and picturesque hypotheses, which appear,
prima facie, to display the problem in all its reality, and then
throw out the challenge as to why this would not be an articulation
of a genuine philosphical problem. For instance, despite
everything, despite, for instance, the efforts of Mind contributors
like O.K. Bouwsma^, I think that the most famous of these
hypotheses, namely Descartes' Evil Demon, incontrovertibly reveals
the problem of Scepticism to be an absolutely real one, and no
amount of Moore-like manoeuverings^ will make the problem dissolve
into an empty one. The answer, whatever it is, is of course, a
different matter altogther, but the point is that it is an answer to
an actual, full-blooded, genuine problem. In our time (though this
is not the place to talk about it), Thomas Nagel, in The View from
Nowhere, has come up with a brilliant fantasy-hypothesis, which
holds up the reality of the Realism/Idealism problem against its
discreditors^. And of course, getting back to the issue I am
specifically concerned with, Van Inwagen's Essay on Free Will, is
permeated by his being in the same kind of role as, performing the
same kind of function as, the likes of Descartes and Nagel in the
other cases I have mentioned. His aforementioned (M) hypothesis is
itself a superb example of this: it is a logically possible, though
extremely fanciful, hypothesis which, if true, leaves determinism
true and free will false. Straight and simple. The (M) hypothesis
(and we can hardly forget Van Inwagen's statement of determinism,
nor his First and Second incompatibilist arguments) is an
exceptionally useful device with regard to demonstrating that,
despite the smugness, the manoeuverings, or the writhings of the
likes of Strawson, Sellars, Austin, Davidson, Dennett, Mackie,
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Lehrer or Ayers, the problem of free will and determinism is a real
and difficult one which won't go away simply by our being thorough
Wittgensteinians (or convinced Kantians, for that matter). Or, at
any rate, it demonstrates that one supposed problem within free
will/determinism, namely the problem of compatibilism, is a
perfectly real problem (and, of course, in the view of Van Inwagen
and myself, that free will and determinism are incompatibile).
Similarly, as I've said, with this specific problem within free
will/determinism, the compatibility of indeterminism and free will,
or as the case may be, simply the compatibility of indeterminism and
action: any temptation that may exist to dismiss the supposed worry
as a non-problem, as some failure to grasp the workings of our
language properly or some equally primitive error will evaporate, I
think, on looking at the splendid, concrete hypothesis with which
Van Inwagen presents us. Like the cases of Scepticism,
Realism/Idealism, and the compatibility of free will and
determinism, the answer is, again, something else altogether,
something quite over and above the clear statement of the problem.
Indeed, I will ultimately have to voice some misgivings about Van
Inwagen's approach to solving the problem of the compatibility of
free will and indeterminism. However, what matters, for the moment,
is his superb explication of the problems in question, and I will
lean on these as I go along. Like the "evil demon", the (M)
hypothesis, etc., they are supremely felicitous, expressive
articulations of the preverbal, 'gut' worry which is that of the
compatibility of free will and indeterminism.
Van Inwagen separates the Mind argument into three strands,
which have a common beginning in a certain set of reflections on
what the nature of free action must be if the incompatibilist is
right. I pre-empted aspects of the Mind argument (as I noted a few
pages back) much earlier when I spoke of Dennett as, basically a
'language strata' theorist, and documented and criticised his
approach to the Libertarian's Dilemma, which really seems to be, at
bottom, Van Inwagen's "first strand" of the Mind argument. However,
let us look, for the moment, at Van Inwagen's excellent little
fantasy-illustration of this strand. Imagine a hardened thief who
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is in the act of lifting the lid off the poor-box in a little
country church. He sneers and curses when he sees what a small sum
it contains. Nevertheless, he reaches for the money. Suddenly,
there flashes into his mind a picture of the face of his dying
mother and he remembers the promise he made to her by her death-bed
always to be honest and upright. This isn't the first time that
this has happened in the same kind of situation, but he has always
disregarded it. But this time he does not disregard it. Instead,
he thinks the matter over carefully and decides not to take the
money. Acting on this decision, he leaves the church empty-handed.
We may suppose that this decision was undetermined. That is, we may
assume that there are possible worlds in which things were
absolutely identical in every respect with the way they were in the
actual world up to the moment at which our repentant thief made his
decision - worlds in which, moreover, the laws of nature (crucially)
are just what they are in the actual world - and in which he takes
the money. According to the proponent of this strand of the Mind
argument, this kind of example suggests that if we look carefully at
the idea of an undetermined act, we shall see that such an act could
not be a free act. This is because what this example (according to
the Mind theorist) seems to illustrate is this: if the
incompatibilist's account of free action is correct, then a free act
is an act that is undertermined by prior states of affairs. But an
act that is undetermined is a mere random or chance occurrence, and
a random or chance occurrence is hardly the kind of thing that could
be called a free act.
As I've already suggested, this charge of the collapse of our
actions into randomness in the face of the absence of determinism,
is the same one which Dennett makes an attempt at rebutting in "On
Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want". And, in a significant
sense, Van Inwagen's general thrust is the same as Dennett's. That
is, like Dennett, Van Inwagen is unimpressed by the claim that, if
an act is undetermined, then it must collapse into randomness.
(It's possibly worth pointing out that their general baggage is
slightly different: Dennett seems to run together determinism and
mere causation, opposing himself at times to the suggestion that an
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"uncaused" act must be a random one, whilst, as I've said, crucial
aspects of Van Inwagen's position will, as we will see, turn on the
alleged non-synonymy of "caused" and "determined". However, I do
think that what is important about their respective positions on
this point is the same, namely that it is not obvious that we are
faced with having to make a straight choice between determinism and
complete collapse into randomness.) As I devoted some time to
defending, I am largely unimpressed by Dennett's specific efforts at
utilising the possibility of a third option on behalf of free will;
Van Inwagen's efforts towards the same end are, as I've said, of a
different kind completely, focusing more on the fine-grained,
conceptual distinctions such as that between determinism and mere
causation. I will go on to attempt a serious appraisal of Van
Inwagen's specific efforts at finding and utilising a third option
on behalf of free will; perhaps they will carry more weight than I
think Dennett's do. In the meantime, Van Inwagen has what I think
are shrewed comments to make on the general premise that if our acts
are undetermined, then they are mere "random" or "chance" events.
The main problems are really of a conceptual nature, centering on
what is actually meant by "random" or "chance". As Van Inwagen
says, the words 'random' and 'chance' most naturally apply to
patterns or sequences of events. So it is not clear what they might
mean when applied to single events. These words might simply mean
'undetermined'; but, of course, in that case we should have no
argument but only an assertion that undetermined events are not the
sort of thing that can be called free acts. There is also a point
which can be usefully documented from developments in computers, in
order to rebut another familiar suggestion in this area. This is
the suggestion that if our acts were undetermined, they would issue
from us in a meaningless and incoherent jumble, as if we were
perpetually deciding what to do by consulting a table of random
numbers. However, we now know that (for instance) there are
computers that sometimes change state in ways that are not
determined by their earlier states and their input but their output
is not random in the way in which a table of random numbers is
random. The "first strand" is therefore looking decidedly dodgy;
on these grounds alone, there is no reason to believe that it is a
182
straight fight between the determined, and some disordered chaotic
morass. As I've said, Van Inwagen's attempt at exploiting the
prospect of some or other third alternative will, to a large extent,
depend upon his claim of the non-synonymy of 'caused' and
'determined', and will involve us in a difficult and complex set of
issues. In order to get to them, we will have to move on to what
Van Inwagen calls the "second strand" of the Mind argument,
somewhere where the invaluable graphic and illustrative talents of
Van Inwagen's which I have spoken of, will, I hope, be seen to
excellent effect.
Before moving right on to this however, it is, I think, worth
pausing on something for a moment. I have already said that,
although it tends to be thought of as a compatibilist argument, the
Mind argument is, strictly, an argument for the incompatibility of
free will and indeterminism. Van Inwagen is as aware of this
feature as I am, but nevertheless, he seems to omit the
consideration of what I think are highly significant questions with
regard to how the Mind argument fares as a contribution,
specifically, to the compatibilist cause, and questions which he
does indeed pose regarding other compatibilist arguments. For
instance, does the Mind argument falsify Van Inwagen's First Formal
(incompatibilist) argument? I would also myself reinforce this
general point by asking (of any argument supposed to be supportive
of compatibilism): if Ginet's 'H' hypothesis were true, would the
argument (e.g. the Mind argument) help us make any sense of the
notion of free will, of the possibility of our acting otherwise? It
could well be that some or other strand of the Mind argument is a
good case against the compatibility of free will and indeterminism
(and I will attempt to arrive at a conclusion on this), but unless
it can, for instance, come in the way of Van Inwagen's First Formal
Argument, then there seems no reason to regard it as a good positive
argument for compatibilism^i.e. for the compatibility of free will
and determinism. Applying this criteria (as has been done with
previous alleged compatibilist arguments), I do not see that the
"first strand" of the Mind argument does anything whatever to
discredit Van Inwagen's First Formal Argument, or to give sense to
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the notion of free will in the face of the truth of Ginet's 'H'
hypothesis. So, quite regardless of its consequences vis a vis the
compatibility of free will and indeterminism, I don't see that the
"first strand" could possibly be a positive argument in favour of
compatibilism, a genuinely compatibilist argument. Even if it did
go some of the way to showing that free will is impossible, it could
hardly follow from this that it showed the truth of compatibilism!
It is essenial, I think, that the same test is also applied to the
"second" and "third" strands, otherwise there seems little way of
knowing whether they are sound, positive arguments for
compatibilism, or whether, on the contrary, their success would
simply entail the impossibility of free will. Finally, in
conclusion to the preamble, I feel it essential to point out that,
whilst their precise import is different, the discussions of the
second and third strands of the Mind argument are by no means
entirely independent of one another; indeed, one specific issue
(which I have already alluded to on several occasions), namely that
of whether causes determine their effects, will be central to the
discussion of both strands. This will, I hope, become entirely
clear as I proceed.
The second strand of the Mind argument is basically this: if
an act, or what looks superficially like an act, is not determined
to occur by prior states of affairs, then it is not really an act at
all. Whatever else an act may be, it is a production of its agent.
But if an "act" (the argument goes on) is undetermined, it is not a
production of its putative agent and hence not really his act at
all. We can go back and work through what I've already said to be
philosophically invaluable working examples, and what I've said Van
Inwagen is so ingenious at providing. Let us go back to Van
Inwagen's thief who refrained - or so we should say if we went by
outward appearances - from robbing the poor-box. His refraining, or
the event that we should initially be inclined to call his
refraining, was ex hypothesi undetermined. Van Inwagen decides to
assume psycho-physical identity as an aid to his presentation, but I
think that mere psycho-physical correlation a la Honderich, would
suffice. We can, I think (as Honderich does in "One Determinism")
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remain neutral as to whether this psycho-physical correlation is in
fact, a relation of identity, or whether it is some other (weaker, I
suppose) relation. I don't see myself that the point would be made
any less forcefully and, in highly contentious areas such as this,
it is always very advisable, I think, to assume only what is
absolutely essential as regards the point at issue. The assumption
of psycho-physical correlation is, I think, a significantly lesser
liberty than an assumption of psycho-physical identity, and (as I've
said), I don't see anything being lost here through this particular
exercise in intellectual humility. So, let us suppose
psycho-physical correlation (or The Correlation Thesis).
Suppose that some event in your brain is correlated with one of
your acts. And suppose that this event was undetermined by earlier
events in your brain. Van Inwagen calls this undetermined event
"E". There would seem to be no reason to suppose that E or any
other undetermined event is essentially undetermined, and indeed
this reflection is the first in a chain of reflections which are
crucial to this aspect of the Mind argument, whose defensibility
will turn out to depend upon the credibility (or otherwise) of this
set of reflections. Van Inwagen provides this example: suppose
that a cup sitting untouched on a table suddenly breaks at t and
that this event - the cup's breaking at t - is undetermined by
earlier states of affairs. It would seem that it might have been
determined by earlier states of affairs: a hammer might have struck
the cup at just the proper moment that its breaking at t should have
been causally determined by this blow. (We can, I think, waive the
lurking problem concerning event-identity. It will do to note that
if an undetermined event happens, it is logically possible for a
descriptively identical determined event to have happened at the
same moment.) So we can suppose that an event just like E and
having the same consequences had happened, and that it was
determined. Now I will borrow from what is probably Van Inwagen's
most imaginative and useful illustration contained in his Essay on
Free Will, his Cartesian-style freakish demon. That is, we can
suppose that the action in question was determined by a freakish
demon. So, when all is said and done, we have the following
185
sequence of events: the freakish demon performs some supernatural
act such that it is causally impossible for this act to be performed
and E - or an event just like E - not to occur. Now let us suppose
pulling everything together, that E is correlated with (in the
example) an event we also call 'the thief's deliberations', under
which description we include the outcome of these deliberations,
this outcome then determines that the thief shall refrain from
robbing the poor-box and shall depart. In such a case, it would
seem that the thief would not really have acted at all, because he
would not have been the producer of the event in his brain that
initiated the bodily motions characteristic of a man leaving a
poor-box empty handed. As Van Inwagen says, this case would not be
significantly different from the case of someone whose brain has
been "wired" by a brain-physiologist and whose arm rises whenever
the physiologist presses a certain button. Indeed, although Van
Inwagen does not himself remark on this, it is not significantly
different from what would be the case if the (M) hypothesis were
true; in the latter case, it would be Martians who were the
producers of the event in the thief's brain which was efficacious,
and in the case now under consideration, the Martians are simply
replaced by a freakish demon. Now we may restore the "actual"
situation: we remove the demon and his works, leaving, it seems, an
uncaused event and its consequences. The crucial question is this:
does this somehow change the "demon" story to a story in which the
thief does act? And of course, it is very difficult to see how it
could. The significant fact about the "demon" story is that it
brings into prominence the fact that the determinants of the change
are not to be found within oneself. And if an event is
undetermined, then it seems just as true that the determinants of
that event are not to be found within oneself as it would be if
these determinants were to be found in the acts of a demon , for if
the determinants of one's act are not to be found, then, a fortiori,
they are not to be found within one. (Perhaps some small inkling is
now being felt of how it could make a substantial difference whether
one runs together causation and determinism, like Davidson and Hume,
or whether, like Van Inwagen or Searle, one thinks it unwarranted to
do this. At any rate, I hope the full significance of this will
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become clear fairly soon.) Indeed, in order to reinforce this
point, and to move some way towards discovering what form a possible
solution might take, Van Inwagen embellishes the freakish demon
story to (I think) splendid effect. There are some highly
significant moments in the embellishment, significant in that they
raise issues which it is essential that I confront.
Let us suppose that the demon exercise his influence over the
thief in this way: there is an invisible wire that passes through
the thief's skull and into his brain; at the other end of the wire
is a sort piano that is made of subtle matter and upon the keyboard
of which the demon plays; by what he plays he can "direct" via the
wire the motions of the atoms in the thief's brain and can thereby
direct the thief's inner life, including his deliberations. And
this is just what he has done in the imagined case: by striking the
keys in a certain order, he has guided the thief's brain through
just that sequence of states that correspond to the deliberations of
a man who refrains from stealing. Let us now, gradually modify
things, and move towards what might be key factors. First, spice it
with the supposition that the demon's actions at the keyboard are
undetermined by the demon's own inner states and by anything else.
It is important to be clear that this change in the case does not
weaken the argument for the earlier conclusion (that the thief did
not act). Now let us remove the demon and suppose that the "sort of
piano" we imagined the demon to be playing is a sort of player
piano: let us imagine that the keyboard is worked by a mechanism
internal to the piano; and let us suppose that this internal
mechanism is an indeterministic one. Nor does this change in the
case weaken the argument for the conclusion that the thief does not
act. Next stage: remove the piano and suppose that impulses simply
appear in the wire (which now protrudes from the thief's skull, its
far end unattached to anything) undetermined by prior states of
affairs. Nor, again, does this change weaken the argument for the
conclusion that the thief did not act. We are moving ever nearer to
the punch-line, which the more adept may be able to guess. Let's
imagine the wire becoming shorter and shorter till only the part
inside the thief's skull remains. Again, how could this change
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weaken the argument? If impulses undetermined by past states of
affairs appear in the wire and if these impulses determine the
putative acts of the thief - determine what movements are made by
his limbs and what thoughts pass through his mind - then these
putative acts are not real acts, are not among the things he does or
produces. We can keep going: let us suppose that the wire is
replaced by one of solid flesh, by a "wire", or wire-shaped thing,
made of brain cells. Does this change succeed in weakening the
argument? It would seem not: what difference does it make what the
wire is made of? The important thing is that the impulses of which
it is the carrier should be undetermined by past states of affairs.
I will now deliver the punch-line. We can and might as well go the
whole hog: let us suppose that the wire-shaped thing made of brain
cells is a natural part of the thief's brain. It is not obvious,
straight off, that even this modification should make a difference.
After all, whilst it is indeterminism with regard to actions we are
concerned with here, the determinism of the likes of Honderich or
Ginet features (unlike the (M) hypothesis) entirely natural,
non-freakish phenonema, yet this feature doesn't seem to make it any
easier to see how their truth could be squared with free will. Let
us look again, for instance, at Honderich's ('One') determinism:
States of the brain are...effects, the effects of other
physical states. Many states of the brain, secondly, are
correlates...States of the brain, thirdly, are causes, both of
other states of the brain and also of certain movements of
one's body. The latter are actions...It follows from these
three premises, about states of the brain as effects, as
correlates and as causes, that on every occasion when we act,
we can only act as in fact we do. It follows too that we are
not responsible for our actions, and, what is most fundamental,
that we do not possess selves of a certain character.
It seems clear from this, that where the issue of determinism and
our implications in our own actions is concerned, it matters not one
iota whether the determinants are Martians, as in the (M) hypothesis,
or whether they are straightforward, natural brain states as in
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Honderich's determinist hypothesis (and pretty much the same would
be, at bottom, true, I think, in the case of the truth of Ginet's
'H' hypothesis). This is because what really matters (as has
already been noted) is the relation between actions and past states
of affairs. And so why should it be any different in the case we
are now considering,i.e. the case in which my actions are
undetermined by past states of affairs? As with determinism, it
would seem that all that matters is this relation (or non-relation,
as the case may be) between action and past states of affairs. The
thief in Van Inwagen's example has a wire-shaped thing made of brain
cells within his brain, in which there arise impulses, undetermined
by past events, which determine his every action. But, as Van
Inwagen notes, if we now suppose that this thing is a natural part
of the thief, we are making a supposition not about its momentary
operations, but only about its origins. But facts about the origin
of a part of one's brain can be relevant to questions of free will,
it seems, only in so far as they are relevant to questions about the
momentary operations of the part.
So we are now at the point in Van Inwagen's illustration, of
imagining the thief's "acts" to be the result of undetermined
impulses originating in a certain section of his brain. The
freakish demon and his apparatus has gradually been turned into a
natural part of the thief's brain. And in the final story, as in
the original story, it still looks as though the thief does not
act. So it looks like the whole idea of a undetermined act is
incoherent and a fortiori, a free act (if it is to be a possible act
at all), cannot be an undetermined act. The possible means which
Van Inwagen floats of escaping this difficulty, and which I will try
to appraise, will involve us in the complex hornet's nest of
problems which I have been anticipating up to now.
Before getting involved in this, however, I feel inclined to
ask at this point, the required set of questions regarding this
strand of the Mind argument in so far as it purports to be a
positive argument for compatibilism. Does it falsify Van Inwagen's
First Formal (incompatibilist) argument? If (say) Ginet's H
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hypothesis were true, would the soundness of this second strand of
the Mind argument help us give genuine content to the idea that we
can act otherwise? If Van Inwagen's own (fantasy) (M) hypothesis
were true, would the success of the second strand of the Mind
argument preserve free will nevertheless? On all counts the answer
seems to me to be a flat "No". It does not seem to me that the
second strand of the Mind argument contributes one iota to the
positive cause of compatibilism, to squaring free will with
determinism. If it turns out to be sound, then it would seem to me
to demonstrate absolutely no more than that acts, qua acts, are
determined; it does nothing for the separate cause of showing how
(determined) acts could be free, of how we could act other than the
way we do, in fact, act. (As will be seen, parallel questions will
arise with the case of the Mind argument's third strand: it
purports to show that the idea of an undetermined free act is an
incoherent one, but is anything done in the process to help make
sense of the notion of a determined free act?) Van Inwagen himself
doesn't seem to be especially keen to hold it up to the light, but I
feel it of some importance to say now that it looks very much to me
that, if the second strand of the Mind argument can be sustained,
then free will just looks impossible. The game would be up. Acts
would have to be determined, but since determinism is incompatible
with free will, then free acts are impossible - we can never act
other than how we do act. That is how it looks to me. Of course,
perhaps this whole conclusion (the impossibility of free will) can
be averted; perhaps there are flaws in the second strand of the
Mind argument, just as there seemed to be in the first strand. It
is now time to document and appraise possible ways of dealing with
this problem, and it is useful for me to repeat at this point that
the second and third strands of the Mind argument and ways to coming
to terms with them, are not entirely independent (as will become
clear, I hope). Indeed, one general set of considerations are
central to any attempted solution to either. This should be no
surprise, of course, since we are dealing with strands of what is,
really, one general argument. Indeed, it should also on this
ground, be no surprise, that the form the solution (or the attempted
solution, at any rate) to the problem will take has already, really,
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been outlined in connection with the first strand of the argument.
What really is generally required for any sort of solution to the
Mind argument (at the very least) is the deconstruction of an
alleged dichotomy: the alleged dichotomy of determined and random,
meaningless. As I said, this was seen in connection with the first
strand (and as I also said, we saw Dennett's attempts, much earlier,
at confronting what is, at the bottom, the same supposed dichotomy),
and the second strand seems permeated with the same supposition on a
much more macroscopic scale. The second and third strands are
really a kind of "blowing-up" of the picture of the first strand,
and this has the advantage of allowing us to see more clearly, in
more fine detail, exactly what is going on and what may be wrong
with it. We must, in parallel, attempt to "flesh out", so to speak,
the general counter-argument that we do not, despite appearances,
have to choose between full-blown determinism or a complete collapse
into randomness. And the "blown-up" picture afforded in the shape
of Van Inwagen's imaginative fantasy - sliding into possible
reality, may well allow us to give some substance to the general
form of our counter-argument.
Van Inwagen suggests that it may not, after all, be an entirely
harmless step in the progression, to move from "wire-shaped thing"
to "natural wire-shaped thing", to suppose that the wire-shaped
thing is a natural part of the thief. It will be recalled that I
noted a few pages back that the shift from (say) Martian
manipulation to entirely natural (neurophysiological, really)
factors didn't seem to matter in the case of determinism. However,
the supposition that the equivalent shift within indeterminism is
equally innocuous is not only disputed by Van Inwagen, but indeed,
this particular moment is the point of impact at which (if you like)
the spirit of the solution to the Mind argument can, in the second
strand, become flesh. That is, what is not clear to Van Inwagen is
the claim that an apparent act of a human being that was the
consequence of an undetermined change in a natural part of a human
being could not be a real act, and it is through closing in on this
point that Van Inwagen is both allowed and required to give
substance to his disclaiming of the "determined/random" dichotomy.
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That is, as with all aspects of the Mind argument, qua Mind
argument, it is an absolute requirement to any solution that the
essential dichotomy is deconstructed, and it seems to Van Inwagen
that it is through moving the pointer to the apparently innocuous
step I have cited that it becomes clear how we could begin to do
this. Let me recap: what is required is that it is somehow made
possible to view human action as undetermined, yet not random.
Indeed, we want to discover if it is at all possible to view my
"actions" as genuinely mine. If my incompatibilist position put so
far is correct, then this isn't possible if determinism is true. So
we are looking for the possibility of "actions" being undetermined,
yet still occurring in some or other sort of way which grounds my
"actions" as really mine, as real acts (and ultimately, as real,
free acts).
One way of approaching this may be to enquire as to the
relation between determinism and causation; for instance, what if
we just could make some sort of sense of the notion of an "act"
which is undetermined, yet which is not random, but indeed is caused
in such a way as to ground the belief that it is a real act? This
is precisely the possibility which Van Inwagen wishes to explore.
His general disputing of the dichotomy which runs through the Mind
argument is given flesh in this case in his contention that we can
make sense of the idea of causation without determination and that,
where we are concerned with an undetermined change in a natural part
of a human being, then we may just have a case, not only of
causation without determination, but of a causation which grounds
the notion of genuine action. (As I've already indicated, this idea
will also be important within the third strand of the Mind argument,
the worry about undetermined free acts.) I have, in fact, already
alluded to Van Inwagen's (not especially widely accepted, it seems)
distinction between mere causation and full-blown determination:
away at the beginning, I cited Van Inwagen's distinction between the
thesis of determinism and the Principle of Universal Causation. It
will be remembered that determinism was defined by Van Inwagen as
the thesis that there is at any instant exactly one physically
possible future and that in order to deduce determinism from the
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Principle of Universal Causation we should need at least three
premises. It is worthwhile, I think, to re-state one of those
premises at this point since (as I said then), the truth alone of
one doctrine I will devote some time to soon, namely
agent-causation, would falsify it straight off, giving us a case of
causation with determination:
if an event (or fact, change, state of affairs, or what have
you) has a cause, then its cause is always itself an event (or
what have you) and never a substance or continuant, such as a
man.
'Agent-causation' is a possible means, one of two which are largely
recognised by Van Inwagen, by which our hope may be realised i.e.
undetermined causes which ground genuine action (and later, free
action). Both possibilities which Van Inwagen recognises, as I've
said, home in on the idea of undetermined changes in a natural part
of a human being. I am in agreement with Van Inwagen that the form
any general solution must take is that of finding a causation
without determination which is such that it grounds real action
(later, free action); I am also in agreement that the standard
Humean view of causation (which would preclude causation without
determination) seems misguided, that tenability can be given to the
idea of causation without determination, though (as I will make
clear), I am sceptical as to whether Van Inwagen's specific efforts
to this end are actually fruitful. Despite the seemingly widespread
appeal of the Humean view, considerations against it are put
forward, not only by Van Inwagen, but also by John Searle, in his
thorough book, Intentionality, and I will conclude that the comments
of Searle are much more persuasive than those of Van Inwagen.
Before going on, I say again that I will eventually have some unease
about what finally emerges from Van Inwagen vis a vis the Mind
argument, worries which I think may be good reason for taking a
serious look at the notion of agent-causation.
Before saying much about the Humean view of causation, I will
provide a relatively brief sketch of the notion of agent-causation.
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As I've indicated, the truth of agent-causation would entail the
falsity of the Humean view, and solve a great many problems in this
area. I will then move on to examine the Humean view itself, and
consider how its falsity might help ground (as well as
agent-causation) yet another model of human action, the one which
is, at bottom, the one which Van Inwagen leans towards. I will
eventually move full circle, coming back round to see whether
agent-causation, or something significantly similar to it, can bear
any fruit. It may well be that, when all is said and done, we will
have to be content in an area so complex and at times seemingly
intractable as this, with what is merely the least repugnant of all
the apparent alternatives.
The medieval philosophers believed that God was the cause of
all things other than himself. However, most of them, at least,
also believed that God was changeless. This raised a problem, since
the causes we observe in nature produce their effects only at the
expense of some change in themselves. Thus the Schoolmen postulated
a type of causation that does not involve a change in the cause and
called it immanent causation. In "Freedom and Action", Roderick
Chisholm revived this idea and applied it to the human agent,
Richard Taylor later coining the term "agent-causation" for the same
thing. According to Chisholm and Taylor, the agent himself is
sometimes (when he acts freely), the cause of his own acts or,
perhaps, the cause of the bodily or mental changes that manifest
them. This doesn't mean that a change in the agent causes these
acts or changes; rather the agent causes without himself changing
in any way. I hope it is very easy to now see that if the thesis of
agent-causation is true, then an act can be undetermined. Going
back to the case of Van Inwagen's thief, to say that it was not
determined that he should refrain from stealing is to say this:
there is a possible world that (a) is exactly like the actual world
in every detail up to the moment at which the thief refrained from
stealing, and (b) is governed by the same laws of nature as the
actual world, and (c) is such that, in it the thief robbed the
poor-box. (We will, of course, see exactly this kind of possibility
appear again in the model which Van Inwagen leans towards, and an
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attempted explanation of how it could be true.) If agent-causation
is true, then it seems that these conditions (of indeterminism) are
satisfied, i.e. that whilst the thief refrains from robbing the
poor-box, there is nevertheless a possible world that is exactly
like the actual world in every detail up to the moment at which the
thief refrained from stealing, is governed by the same laws of
nature as the actual world, and in which the thief robbed the
poor-box. The causally relevant difference between the two given
worlds is neither some or other set of events in the past nor some
or other set of laws of nature (since both are identical across the
two worlds), but what is caused by the agent at the crucial moment.
Therefore, if agent-causation is a coherent concept, the second
strand of the Mind argument fails to show that the notion of an
undetermined act is incoherent. I will leave this notion, now that
some idea of it has been given, for the time being, except to
reiterate, not only that if it is true, we have, straight off, a
refutation of the (standard) Humean view of causation, but also that
the falsity of this Humean view may well facilitate (as Van Inwagen
believes it does) some other non-deterministic view of human action
and another view which, for all we know at present, may be more
plausible than agent-causation. However, we must examine the Humean
view on its own merits; it would be a bad idea to wait for an
enquiry into agent-causation, and hold our breath on the Humean
view. For all we know at present, the Humean view could be false,
agent-causation false, and some other non-deterministic model of
human action correct. (And as I've indicated, Van Inwagen's
sympathies lie towards these respective truth-values.) I will now
look at the Humean view of causation, the view that causation and
determination are necessarily run together, entirely on its own
merits.
We have, of course, already seen what is probably the most
well-known (and it seems, generally accepted) feature of this Humean
view of causality, in the shape of Davidson's assumption of the
Nomological Character of Causality. It is slightly ironic that Van
Inwagen for one, expresses sympathy with Davidson's general theory
of action, yet spends some time disclaiming Davidson's Humean stance
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on causation (which, I suggested, forces him to espouse a
straightforward physical determinism, at bottom, and consequently
close the door on free will). It will be remembered also, I expect,
that when I discussed the 'language strata' theorists, of whom
Davidson is the most distinguished, I mentioned in passing the
contribution of John Searle to a family of questions which are now
highly relevant and requiring detailed examination, concerning
causation, intention and action. I have, in some sense, moved round
the circle, and have come to the point where some ideas merely
floated at that point have to be properly cashed out and discussed,
and where, as I've said, it is of importance to examine Davidson's
Humean assumptions on causality, as well as more general features of
his theory of action (which I did, in fact, express some sympathy
with earlier e.g. intentional states as causes of action).
Whilst Searle and Van Inwagen tend to approach things from
opposite directions, their efforts tend to complement one another.
Van Inwagen seems to make it a more primary matter to criticise the
general Humean ideas on causation, thus facilitating a
non-deterministic version of Davidson's theory of action (which he
leans towards), whilst Searle focuses more primarily on action
itself, and its relation with intention, a proper understanding of
which, he thinks, discredits straight off some Humean ideas on
causation, as well as grounding a theory of action which seems very
much like that favoured by Van Inwagen (and Davidson, of course). I
will, as I said, be expressing doubt about Van Inwagen's efforts at
discrediting the Humean picture (though I am, in fact, sympathetic
to the anit-Humean conclusion). Searle's efforts to this end are, I
think, much more compelling. And as I proceed, I will lean fairly
heavily on the contributions of both of them, part of which (at
least) are, I think, highly shrewd and penetrating.
Whilst Van Inwagen concerns himself, really, with only one
feature of this accepted view of causation, Searle documents and
sets about criticising three main features of it. The criticism of
all three features will be seen eventually, I hope, to be of
relevance, and indeed (as I've said) to be of some help for Van
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Inwagen's purposes. Searle cites the overworked philosophical
example, the paradigm case of causality: billiard ball A makes its
inevitable way across the green table, where it strikes billard ball
B, at which point B starts to move and A ceases to move. The event
of A's striking B caused the event of B's moving. The three main
features, given by Searle, which this little affair supposedly
instantiates, are:
(1) The causal nexus is not itself observable. One can observe
causal regularities; that is, one can observe certain sorts of
regular sequences of events in which events of a certain type
are followed by events of another type; but in addition to
regularities, one cannot observe a relation of causation
between events. In the way that I can literally see that the
cat is on the mat (Searle's example), or that one event
followed another event, I cannot literally see that one event
caused another event. In the billiard ball example I see
events which are in fact causally related, but I don't see any
causal relation in addition to regularity.
(2) Whenever there is a pair of events related as cause and effect,
that pair must instantiate some universal regularity
(Nomological Character of Causality). For every individual
case where an event causes another event there must be some
description of the first event and some description of the
second event such that there is a causal law correlating events
fitting the first description with those fitting the second.
As Searle notes, however, it is important to distinguish between the
metaphysical and linguistic versions of this "regularity" idea. In
the metaphysical version every particular causal relation is in fact
an instance of a universal regularity. In the linguistic version it
is part of the concept of causation that every singular causal
statement entails that there is a causal law correlating events of
the two types under some description or other. The linguistic claim
is stronger that the metaphysical claim in the sense that it entails
the metaphysical claim but is not entailed by it. (Indeed, it will
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be seen, as I go on, that Searle himself believes the linguistic
thesis to be false, and the metaphysical thesis most likely to be
true.) In the Davidsonian version it is also claimed that to know
that A caused B, one must know that there is a law. For instance,
Davidson writes
In any case, in order to know that a singular causal statement
is true it is not necessary to know the truth of a law; it is
necessary only to know that some law covering the events at
hand exists6
Anyone familiar with Davidson's offerings on this and related topics
will know that Davidson is also one of a host of philosophers (the
aforementioned David Pears is another) who suggest that the law need
not be stated in the same terms as the singular statement. I cited
this point in my specific discussion of Anamolous Monism, and its
consequences for free will.
(3) Causal regularities are distinct from logical regularities.
There are many regularities that are not even possible
candidates for being causal regularities because the phenomena
in question are logically related. Thus, for example
(Searle's) being a triangle is always associated with being
three-sided, but something's being a triangle would never cause
it to be three-sided since the correlation is by logical
necessity. The aspects under which one event causes another
event must be logically independent aspects. Again, this
metaphysical thesis has a linguistic correlate in the formal
mode. The causal law must state regularities under logically
independent descriptions, and therefore must state a contingent
truth.J|It will be specifically remembered, I hope, that in my
discussion of Davidson and the 'language strata' approach, I
touched on the apparent problem thrown up for a (Davidsonian)
causal theory of action by the seeming contingent nature of
causal relationships, and the seeming a priori relationship
between purposive states and actions. I floated a solution at
that point, in barest outline, and said that the contribution
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of Searle would help significantly to flesh it out. This will
be on the agenda fairly soon.
As I said, through Searle's attacking this entire picture of
causation, an alternative position to a deterministic view of human
action is made possible. However, as I've been repeating all along,
we could be well on the way to solving some problems if we could
even just dismantle the second feature of the standard picture of
causation, as cited by Searle. Before documenting reasons for being
sceptical of it, however, it is worth taking note of how Van Inwagen
cites the same premise:
Many, perhaps most, philosophers believe that causes determine
their effects. They believe, that is, that given the cause...a
relation that takes events or states of affairs or some such,
and not persons (i.e. not 'agent-'causation), as it terms, the
effect must follow. They believe that if A is the cause of B,
then, if A had happened and had not been followed by B, this
could only have been because the laws of nature were different.^
As I've indicated, neither Van Inwagen nor Searle believe that there
is very much to commend this premise, and I think that Searle at any
rate adduces some compelling considerations against it. As I've
also indicated, some of Searle's considerations, not only undermine
the general premise, but actually flow from an independently
supportable non-deterministic (though causal) account of action.
Let me first cite the more general example of Van Inwagen's, an
example designed to generally counter-evidence the (Humean) premise
that causes determine their effects. As I've indicated, whilst I
think there are good grounds for doubting this Humean picture, I'm
ultimately sceptical as to whether this Van Inwagen example provides
any such grounds.
Suppose someone throws a stone at a window, and that the stone
strikes the glass and the glass shatters in just the way we should
expect glass to shatter when struck by a cast stone. Suppose
further that God reveals to us that the glass did not have to
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shatter under these conditions, that there are possible worlds
having exactly the same laws of nature as the actual world and
having histories indentical with that of the actual world in every
detail up to the instant at which the stone came into contact with
the glass, but in which the stone rebounded from the intact glass.
It follows from what we imagine God to have told us that determinism
is false. But (Van Inwagen poses) does it also follow that the
stone did not break the glass, or that the glass did not break
because it was struck by the stone? Van Inwagen says that the only
reason we could have for saying this is that we accept a corollary
of the standard theory of causation: that instances of causation
simply are instances of universal exceptionless laws, that the
concept of the instantiation of an exceptionless law and the concept
of causation are one and the same concept. With his hitherto
well-documented flair for fantasy-examples, Van Inwagen extends this
case. Suppose that we are watching a slow-motion film taken by a
camera trained on the point at which the stone came into contact
with the pane of glass. We observe the following: the stone moves
through the air towards the point of impact; the stone touches the
glass; the glass bends ever so slightly; cracks appear in the
glass, radiating outward from the point of impact; shorter cracks
appear, joining these radial cracks, thus producing detached shards
of glass; the stone moves through the space formerly occupied by
the unbroken pane, pushing,or apparently pushing, shards of glass
out of its way; the stone continues along its path, trailing a
rough cone of spinning shards. It seems trite to say (as Van
Inwagen does) that watching this slow-motion film several times
should make it very hard to believe that the stone did not break the
glass. Van Inwagen then asks us to harp back, for the moment, to
the revelation we earlier imagined God having delivered:
Could this revelation really lead us to say that, despite
appearances, the stone didn't cause the glass to break? That
it is a logical consequence of this revelation? Wouldn't it be
more reasonable to say this: that, while the stone did cause
the window to break, it was not determined that it should;
that it in fact caused the window to break, though, even if all
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conditions had been precisely the same, it might not have?®
As I indicated, I do myself feel a problem with this attempt on Van
Inwagen's part at refuting the Humean assumption, and I think that
what worries me is that it looks question-begging. We are asked to
imagine that we have compelling grounds for believing that the glass
broke because it was struck by the stone; Van Inwagen's fantasy
slow-motion film would seem to provide such grounds. Fair enough.
However, we are also asked to imagine God revealing to us that the
glass did not have to shatter under these conditions, that there are
possible worlds having exactly the same laws of nature as the actual
world and having histories identical with that of the actual world
in every detail up to the instant at which the stone came into
contact with the glass, but in which the stone rebounded from the
intact glass. This is precisely what seems question-begging to me,
i.e. it is assumed here precisely what Van Inwagen has to
demonstrate, namely that there _is_ a possible world having exactly
the same laws of nature as the actual world and having histories
identical with that of the actual world in every detail up to the
instant at which the stone came into contact with the glass, but in
which the stone rebounded from the intact glass. If there is^ such a
world then, of course, determinism is false, the (Humean) assumption
that causes determine their effects is false, and (what really
matters here) the door is opened to undetermined causes and possibly
to undetermined causes (e.g. in a natural part of a human being)
which will ground genuine action, and maybe even genuine free
action. But we can hardly just assume that there is such a world;
for all we know at present, there might not be - it might be the
case that the Humean position is correct, that causes dja determine
their effects, that in all possible worlds having exactly the same
laws of nature as the actual world and having histories identical
with that of the actual world in every detail up to the instant at
which the stone came into contact with the glass, the glass shatters
when struck by the stone. As I've said, it is incumbent upon Van
Inwagen to demonstrate that this is not the case. Instead, it is
assumed that it is not the case. Perhaps the idea of God, and his
revealing things to us, confused Van Inwagen somewhat. This is not
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the place for a discussion of the logical limits of God's
omnipotence, but I feel bound to make a few points.
Whilst it would, I expect, be uncontroversial to say that God
may reveal possible worlds to us which may otherwise remain hidden
from view, there are surely a set of significant questions, which
Van Inwagen overlooks, concerning God's power of creation of
possible worlds, and how this stands in relation to his supposed
revelations. Let me clarify. I have already noted the distinction
Searle makes between the linguistic "regularity" thesis about
causation and the metaphysical "regularity" thesis. Similarly, not
only is it generally thought to be essential to distinguish between
logical (or 'analytic') and factual (or 'synthetic') possibilities,
but this distinction has also had considerable import within
enquiries about God's omnipotence. And I think that, even if one
handles these distinctions with the most meticulous care, it still
seems very difficult to see how Van Inwagen's particular efforts
here make the falsity of determinism look feasible. Remember that
this example will secure Van Inwagen's objective if and only if it
demonstrates the falsity of both the linguistic and the metaphysical
regularity theses about causation. The falsification of the
linguistic thesis alone won't do, since this is consistent with the
truth of the metaphysical thesis, which simply jLs_ the truth of the
claim that causes do, in fact, determine their effects. Let us look
first at the linguistic thesis. This is the claim that the whole
concept of causation without determination is incoherent. Van
Inwagen's suggested falsifying of this seems to take the form: "God
reveals to us that causation without determination is a coherent
concept, therefore causation without determination is a coherent
concept". This strikes me however, as completely untenable. This
is because God has no more facility than you or I to make what is
incoherent coherent. As has been well-documented, He cannot make a
square circle and, generally, if He is going to reveal to us what is
coherent, it must b<2 coherent in the first place. God can only
reveal to us that causation without determination is a coherent
concept, if causation without determination already i^s a coherent
concept. He just could not, for instance, reveal that the concept
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of a square circle is a coherent one, because, before God even
thinks about speaking, the concept of a square circle is
incoherent. So, God's word appears to offer no assistance whatever,
with the task of dismantling the linguistic regularity thesis about
causation. What about the metaphysical thesis then? Let us assume
for the moment (as I, in fact, believe is the case) that the
linguistic thesis _i£3 false and that, therefore, it is a possibility
that the metaphysical thesis is false. Again, I do not see that the
invocation of the word of God helps the indeterminist cause at all.
We can even assume that God has pretty much a free hand here, i.e.
we can assume that He has all logical possibilities laid out in
front of Him (of which causation without determination is one), and
he simply picks whichever one He fancies. Again however, He can
only go on to reveal that determinism if false if He, first of all,
makes determinism false. A "revelation" on God's part that
determinism is false, can only be a genuine revelation, can only be
true, if determinism is already false (whether made so by Him or by
some other means entirely). This is precisely what Van Inwagen and
ourselves are hoping to discover, but I can only assume that the
reason Van Inwagen introduces the revelations of God into things is
because he is misled into thinking that God can "reveal" anything
whatever, that God's word is a guarantee of truth. If God does, in
fact, "reveal" only what is true, then He will only reveal to us
that determinism is false if determinism is false. This, I repeat,
is what is at issue. We may even allow, on the contrary, that God
enjoys a little joke every now and then, and may just be "revealing"
a falsehood to us. We would therefore have to be wary; perhaps,
despite what God says, it may just be the case that the glass did
have to shatter under the conditions in question. Again, we would
have to investigate this, to try to establish whether God is telling
the truth or not. I hope that I have made it clear why this effort
by Van Inwagen strikes me as question-begging, and why the "word" of
God doesn't really help us. And indeed, whilst I will repeat that
(as I will expand on soon) I am sympathetic to Van Inwagen's
contention that causation doesn't entail determination, not only
does this example fail, in my view, to support it, but I fear that
it is much worse than this, even. Indeed, it seems to me that Van
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Inwagen's formulation here, not only leaves a whole load of
questions uncomfortably hanging, but in fact makes the Humean
assumption in question look reasonable. Not only that, but
(crucially, I think) one of the problems I find with this example,
will turn out, really, to be the same kind of problem which
generates the ultimate misgiving I will have about the conclusions
of Van Inwagen with regard to free action.
What worries me, at bottom, is this: suppose that there is (as
Van Inwagen seems fairly sure there is) a possible world having
exactly the same laws of nature as the actual world and having
histories identical with that of the actual world in every detail up
to the instant (in Van Inwagen's example) at which the stone came
into contact with the glass, but in which the stone rebounded from
the intact glass. How would we account for the happenings in this
(possible) world? What would, or could we say, happened, took
place, in such a world at the point where the stone did not, in
fact, shatter the glass, but rebounded instead? In the actual
world, it seems very much like the history of the world, conjoined
with the laws of nature, provide a complete explanation of what
happened, make it reasonable to entertain nothing other than the
shattering of the glass, from the moment the stone makes impact with
it. However, according to Van Inwagen, it is doubtful whether this
is strictly true, since there is probably a possible world, with
identical history and laws of nature, where the stone rebounds from
the glass. As I've suggested though, what actually happens in such
a world? Do the laws of nature suddenly take a back seat, "decide"
to have a break from operations? The point is that, it seemed very
much as though we had a complete explanation for things as they
happened in the actual world; there seemed, as far as we were
aware, to be no explanatory "gap" whatever. As I said, the history
of the world conjoined with the laws of nature seemed to close the
door on the possibility of any happening other than the shattering
of the glass, once the stone made contact. However, Van Inwagen's
suggestion seems to be that this was mistaken all along, that there
was indeed an explanatory gap, that the history of the world plus
the laws of nature still allowed the possibility that the stone
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would rebound from the intact glass. And of course (it goes on),
whatever it was that filled this gap in the actual world, there are
possible worlds in which it may be filled differently, and the stone
consequently rebound from the intact glass. This, however, is the
notion which I find it very difficult to make any sense of. I ask
again: what kind of things are going on in the "gap"? Magic? What
is the source of our "illusion" that the history of the world plus
the laws of nature provide a comprehensive explanation of the
stone's shattering the glass? And why don't they? Van Inwagen
seems to me to provide nothing by way of answer to these questions
and (whilst I am ultimately sympathetic to the anti-Humean position)
I must therefore conclude that his attempt here to discredit the
supposed synonymy of causation and determination is a failure.
Indeed, I feel it worth saying at this point that one of the reasons
I will be left dissatisfied with Van Inwagen's enterprise, is a
similar gap in explanation (i.e. in the case of free action) between
intentional state and action. In the light of what we have just
seen Van Inwagen say, the intolerable "gap" (to which I will come)
is little of a surprise. This, I hope, will be borne out as I
proceed.
It is, I think, worthwhile to pause here to re-establish
exactly where we are, and what we've been trying to do. Despite the
nature of the territory I have just been going over, it is essential
to bear in mind that what we are really concerned with here is
action, and ultimately, the question of free action. What we are
presently examining is the possibility of a non-deterministic theory
of human action/i.e. which will ground real action (and ultimately,
which will ground free acts). One means to opening up this
possibility was to see if we could dismantle the Humean assumption
that causation entails determination, and then go on to see if we
could find a set of undetermined causes which could ground real
action (e.g. these could be undetermined causes in a natural part of
a human being). One attempt at dismantling this Humean premise, the
one suggested by Van Inwagen which we have just documented, looked
to be a failure. However, this does not mean, of course, that no
attempt at this task can succeed. Indeed, all that really matters
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here is that this Huraean premise is seen to be wanting when applied
to cases of human actionsi.e. if it can be demonstrated that human
action admits of undetermined causes, then that it is all that will
matter in this regard; we needn't worry whether it is true outside
of cases of human action, and it is perhaps significant that the
(doomed) example of Van Inwagen's which I have just cited does not
concern a case of human action. As I've indicated already, it is
through focusing specifically on human action itself that John
Searle attempts to show that the Humean premise is not universally
true, that in the case of human action at least, (in its linguistic
version) it seems to fail. As I've also indicated, in so doing he
also provides a theory of action which is, in ways, similar to the
(Davidsonian) one Van Inwagen favours, and also clarifies modal
questions concerning the relationship between intention and action.
All of these issues tie together in what is in parts a highly
penetrating offering of Searle's, but before setting down his
efforts properly, I think it a good idea to re-sketch a brief
outline of the significant points of impact of Davidson's theory of
action.
The cental idea is very simple: an act is caused by the very
factors its agent would adduce if asked to give his reason for
performing it, to wit, by the agent's desire that a certain state of
affairs should be realised and his belief that an act of that type
was the best - or, at least, an unsurpassed - means to realising
that state of affairs. Suppose, for example, that a certain man has
raised his hand; and suppose that when he is asked why he raised
his hand, he says that he did this because he wanted to vote for the
measure before the meeting and believed that the way to vote for
this measure was to raise his hand. If what he says about the
reasons for his act is correct, then, according to Davidson, the
cause of his act is his desire to vote coupled with his belief that
he could realise his desire by raising his hand. Davidson,
remember, holds what I've said is a straightforwardly deterministic
version of this theory which I've so far argued to be incompatible
with the idea of free action (despite Davidson's aforementioned
dismissiveness towards incompatibilism). Van Inwagen, as I said, is
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sympathetic to an indeterministic version of it but, as I've just
been arguing, I am unimpressed with his efforts at completing the
necessary step to this end, of refuting the Humean premise, which is
accepted by Davidson. When I was discussing Davidson specifically,
near to the beginning, I expressed sympathy myself with Davidson's
theory of action (as it is outlined here) and in Intentionality,
Searle argues, not only that this kind of theory is true but,
because of the nature of intentionality, it actually has to be
true. As I've said, he also provides clarity on the nature of the
relationship between intention and action. As I've also suggested,
I think he fills in some of the gaps in Van Inwagen's effort, though
perhaps not all of them. Let us look at Searle's efforts in
"Intentional Causation".9
I laid out, a bit earlier, Searle's recounting of the three
features of the orthodox view of causation, one of which was the
assumption I have just been talking about regarding causation and
determinism. As I've already said, it is certain sorts of very
ordinary causal explanations having to do with human mental states,
experiences and actions in particular, which Searle wants to say do
not sit very comfortably with the orthodox account of causation. To
take an example of Searle's, suppose I am thirsty and I take a drink
of water. If someone asks me why I took a drink of water, I know
the answer without any further observation: I was thirsty.
Furthermore, in this sort of case it seems that I know the truth of
the counterfactual without any further observations or any appeal to
general laws. I know that if I hadn't been thirsty right there and
then I would not have taken that very drink of water. Now when I
claim to know the truth of a causal explanation and a causal
counterfactual of this sort, is it because I know that there is a
universal law correlating 'events' of the first type, my being
'thirsty', with events of the second type, my drinking water under
some description or other? And when I said that my being thirsty
caused me to drink the water, was it part of what I meant that there
is a universal law? Am I committed to the existence of a law in
virtue of the very meaning of the words I uttered? Part of the
difficulty, as Searle notes, in giving affirmative answers to these
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questions is that I am much more confident of the truth of my
original causal statement and the corresponding causal
counterfactual than I am about the existence of any universal
regularities that would cover the case. Searle suggests that maybe
there are physical laws at the neurophysiological or even molecular
level that would describe the case (and, of course, this is
precisely what Davidson's view of the matter is), but I certainly do
not know for a fact there are such laws, much less what they might
be, and I do not in making my original causal claim commit myself to
the view that there are such laws. (Although I think Searle is
correct about this, part of his analysis of this example helps
generate the ultimate worry I will express about the efforts of both
Searle and Van Inwagen. I will be returning eventually to this.)
The claim that there are causal laws corresponding to the events in
question is not a logical consequence of the singular causal
statement. It is logically consistent to insist on the truth of the
singular causal explanation and yet deny a belief in corresponding
causal laws. As Searle says, I know, for example, what made me take
the drink of water: I was thirsty, but when I say that I am not
committed to the existence of any causal law, even if in fact I
believe there are such laws. (It should be clear that this amounts
to a denial of the linguistic thesis, but not of the metaphysical;
the idea of undetermined causes of action and therefore the
non-deterministic version of Davidson's theory which Van Inwagen
favours demands, of course, that the metaphysical thesis also be
false. As I will reiterate as I go on, Searle in fact, believes
that the metaphysical thesis is likely to be true. This would, of
course, have bad consequences for free will. Nevertheless, Searle's
work on intentional causation does give compelling reason to believe
that some version, deterministic or non-deterministic, of Davidson's
theory is true, as I will document soon.) Searle points out that
the Humean premise, in its linguistic version, makes an
extraordinary^ strong and unsupported claim, namely that any
statement, such as
My thirst caused by drinking entails a statement of the form
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There is some law L such that there is some description p> of my
thirst and some description\p>of my drinking, and L asserts a
universal correlation of events of type ft and events of typev/^ .
And, of course, this supposition is hardly intuitively plausible.
The linguistic thesis seems simply false; I think that Searle
provides compelling reasons here for not accepting it. This closes
the door, it seems, on at least one possible set of reasons for
accepting the metaphysical thesis, since, of course (as has been
said already) the linguistic thesis entails the metaphysical
thesis. However, the metaphysical thesis may yet be true and (as
I've also just said) this is really what ultimately matters for free
action; even the truth of the Davidsonian theory of action which
I've outlined (which Van Inwagen, Searle and myself all favour) does
nothing, for free will, if both incompatibilism is true (as I
believe it is) and the metaphysical thesis about causation is true
(as Davidson and Searle both seem to believe). To say that the
metaphysical thesis about causation is true is to say that
determinism is true, that causes in fact determine their effects. I
have already looked at Van Inwagen's attempt at refuting this
thesis, in the shape of his "stone breaking glass" example, and
found it wanting. The metaphysical thesis may yet be true (on
non-linguistic grounds), and we must hold judgement on it for the
moment. As I've said, I think it more than useful, for the moment,
to look at Searle's comments on why a Davidsonian account of action
(deterministic or otherwise) must be true. We must beware of losing
sight of the main issues here; the possibility under consideration,
remember, is that of finding a set of causes of human "action" which
satisfy two conditions:
(i) they are undetermined,
(ii) they are such as to ground a belief that "actions" in
question are real actions (and later, real free actions).
As I've said, the question of (i) depends on the truth or otherwise
of the metaphysical thesis about causation, something on which we
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must wait, (ii) on the other hand, turns upon the cause satisfying
certain other kinds of conditions e.g. (as Van Inwagen has noted) it
could be that the occurrence of the causes in question in a natural
part of a human being would mean the satisfaction of (ii), and this
in turn would be supported by the truth of the Davidsonian theory of
action. The reason why, therefore, we are ultimately interested in
adducing reasons for accepting the Davidsonian theory, is that it
would seem to help establish the truth of (ii), leaving us then to
concern ourselves only with (i). Let us look now then at Searle's
valuable insights, insights which I think make it clear that some
version of Davidson's theory must be true.
We can best begin this, I think, by considering the issue (and
Searle's remarks on it) which I have mentioned at several junctures,
and which is entailed by the third premise (which I set down) of
Searle's statement of the orthodox view of causation. This concerns
the question of the 'logical' or 'contingent' nature of the
relationship between intentional states and action. Searle presents
a very persuasive case that there is a logical relation of a sort
(much weaker than the entailment relation between statements)
between cause and effect in the case of action. That is, the cause
itself quite independently of any description, is logically related
to the effect itself, quite independently of any description. How
is this possible? This is because, in the case of action, the cause
is a presentation or representation of the effect e.g. thirst,
regardless of how described, contains a desire to drink, and that
desire has, as conditions of satisfaction, that one drinks; an
intention in action to raise one's arm, regardless of how described,
has as part of its conditions of satisfaction, that one's arm go
up. The reason that there is a logical or internal relation between
the description of the cause and the description of the effect in
the cases mentioned is that in every case there is a logical or
internal relation between the cause and effect themselves, since in
both cases there is an Intentional content that is causally related
to its conditions of satisfaction. (There may, throughout the
Searle exposition, be a small measure of Searle's baggage, which I
can think can generally be assumed.) The specification of cause and
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effect under those causally relevant aspects involving
Intentionality will give us logically related descriptions of cause
and effect precisely because the cause and effect themselves are
logically related - not logically related by entailment, but rather
by Intentional content and conditions of satisfaction. Indeed, as
Searle specifies, there is an identifiable formal structure of the
phenomenon of Intentional causation in the case of action: there is
a self-referential Intentional state or event, and the form of the
self-reference is that it is part of the content of the Intentional
state or event that its conditions of satisfaction (in the sense of
requirement) require that it cause the rest of its conditions of
satisfaction (in the sense of thing required) e.g. if I raise my
arm, then my intention in action has as its conditions of
satisfaction that that very intention must cause my arm to go up.
That is, in the case of action, at least one term is an Intentional
state or event and that state or event causes its conditions of
satisfaction. More precisely, when an Intentional state x causes an
action y then
(1) y is (or is part of) the conditions of satisfaction of x,
and
(2) the Intentional content of x is a causally relevant aspect
under which it causes y.
Indeed, where any causal theory of action is concerned, it is
important to note that, in spite of orthodox ideas about causation,
we directly experience causation in many cases when we make
something happen. When, for instance (to take Searle's example
again) I raise my arm, part of the content of my experience is that
this experience is what makes my arm go up. In such a case, we
directly experience the causal relation, the relation of one thing
making something else happen. As Searle notes, I don't need a
covering law to tell me that when I raised my arm I caused my arm to
go up, because when I raised my arm, I directly experienced the
causing: I did not observe two events, the experience of acting and
the movement of the arm, rather part of the Intentional content of
the experience of acting was that that very experience was making my
211
arm go up.
Despite the standard theory, Searle is indeed correct to say
that every experience of acting is precisely an experience of
causation. Whenever we act on the world, we have self-referential
intentional states, and the relationship of causation is part of the
content (not the object) of these experiences. Searle suggests, in
fact, that what has been happening is that the Humeans' have been
looking in the wrong place. That is, they sought causation (force,
power, efficacy, etc.) as the object of perceptual experience and
failed to find it, whilst Searle is suggesting that it was there all
along as part of the content of both perceptual experiences and
experiences of acting (whilst it needn't concern us here, Searle
makes out an analogous and similarly penetrating case concerning
perception). Again, when I raise my arm I don't see causation or
raise causation, I just raise my arm. The movement is not part of
the content of the experience, rather it is the object of the
relevant experience. But causation is part of the content of the
experience of that object. Searle's point is that it is not in the
observation of actions that we become aware of causation, it is in
the performance of actions, for part of the Intentional content of
the experience of acting when I perform intentional actions is that
this experience causes the bodily movement. Part of the actual
phenomena of the action is the experience of causation. The
experience itself does the causing and, where successful, it causes
what it is directed at. The causal nexus is internal to the
experience and not its object.
As I've been saying, I think that the foregoing considerations
adduced by Searle are penetrating and persuasive, and reveal why a
theory of action along the lines of that forwarded by Davidson and
favoured by Van Inwagen must, at bottom, be true. Searle is aware
that there are some possible objections to his account, but he goes
on to demonstrate also, I think, that these can be satisfactorily
negotiated, and I don't feel it essential to say much more.
So, where exactly does all of this get us to, and (just as
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important), where doesn't it get us to? As I've said, Searle's
offerings seem to make clear why a (Davidsonian) causal analysis of
action cannot but be correct. However, where does this get us
regarding the crucial questions of determinism, indeterminism,
action, and free action? We can bring to mind also at this point
that it seems to have been clearly established, that so far as the
concept of causation is concerned, a non-deterministic account
(despite Davidson's own position) of Davidson's theory of action is
perfectly feasible (the linguistic "regularity" thesis about
causation is false). This would mean that, if we adopt the stance
Van Inwagen seems to do, of having an "action" being caused by an
intentional state sufficient for its being a genuine action (waiving
the question of free action for the moment), then an undetermined
act would undoubtedly seem to be a conceptual possibility.
Conceptually, an "action" may be caused by the intentional state of
its doer (making it a real action), and may yet be undetermined.
Fair enough. On the conceptual level, an undetermined act is a
possibility. So if the second strand of the Mind argument is only
that the concept of an undetermined act is incoherent, then it seems
to fail. However, I hope it is clear by now why this, of itself,
doesn't have a great deal of import. What is still unresolved is
the crucial question of whether the metaphysical regularity thesis
about causation is true; we have established that the idea of an
undetermined act is coherent, but even if a Davidsonian account of
action is correct, whether there are in fact any undetermined acts
will turn upon whether the metaphysical regularity thesis is true:
if it is true (as Davidson thinks it is, this indeed being entailed
by his endorsement of the linguistic thesis), then there are, in
fact, no undetermined acts; if it is false, then there are, in
fact, undetermined acts. And, of course, it should be obvious from
now I have been arguing to far that this brings in its train
monumental consequences for the idea of free action, in my view,
i.e. if undetermined acts are, in fact, impossible, then free will
is impossible, since determinism would then be true and (I have been
arguing) incompatibilism is true. If undetermined acts, are in
fact, possible, then the problem for free will becomes that which
the third strand of the Mind argument pinpoints/i.e. how an
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undetermined act can be a free act.
Indeed, it seems to me that this is what is really the root
problem with the Van Inwagen "breaking glass" example - he confuses
the linguistic regularity thesis with the metaphysical regularity
thesis. If it were merely his business to reveal to us that God
could reveal to us, given our concept of causation, that determinism
is false (i.e. could say "determinism is false" without
incoherence), then he undoubtedly succeeeds. God could indeed tell
us without incoherence that determinism is false. Such a suggestion
is no over-investment in God's omnipotence, is not like saying that
God could create a square circle. However, Van Inwagen both wants
and needs to be claiming more than this^i.e. he needs, for his own
purposes, to be saying that determinism is, in fact, false, that an
undetermined act is not only a conceptual possibility but is also a
metaphysical possibility, is compatible with the history of the
world and the laws of nature taken together. And, as I've
reiterated, conceptual possibility is hardly any guarantee of
metaphysical possibility; Van Inwagen seems to speak as though
something which doesn't follow does follow/i.e. it doesn't follow
from the fact that God can say without incoherence that determinism
is false that God utters a truth when He says "Determinism is
false". In order for the latter to be the case, we need something
more than conceptual feasibility: we need determinisn to, in fact,
be false. And whilst it may be up to God whether determinism is
false, (as I've said) the metaphysical fact or otherwise of the
falsity of determinism is something independent of God's (coherent)
statement of the falsity of determinism. God would first have to
create a world where determinism is false, before He could state
truly that determinism is false; though regardless of whether or
not determinism is, in fact, false, God could indeed sit all day
long in heaven and shout down perfectly coherently "Determinism is
false!" As I also said, whilst I am persuaded that the concept of
the falsity of determinism in a universe of cause and effect is a
coherent one, in so far as Van Inwagen's "stone breaking glass"
example is an attempt at demonstrating that determinism is, in fact
false, I think it fails. More is needed, I believe.
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As I said, the truth of the metaphysical thesis amount to the
truth of determinism, and (in my view) the absence of free will. If
the Davidsonian theory of action is sound (as I believe there are
compelling reasons for holding), then the falsity of the
metaphysical thesis means that there are undetermined acts, leaving
then the question of if and how we can say that such acts are free.
What of the metaphysical thesis? Davidson obviously holds it and,
as I said, Searle thinks it likely to be true. From "Intentional
Causation":
...these causal claims [singluar causal claims made with
respect to four examples of intentional causation cited by
Searle] do not commit me to the existence of any relevant
causal laws. I might additionally, and as a matter of fact _I
do indeed, believe that there probably are causal laws
corresponding to these four types of events but that is not
what I meant...10
Two of these examples, of course, of intentional causation, are the
two I have already mentioned, my thirst causing my drinking and my
intention to raise my arm causing the raising of my arm (the other
two concern perception). We can see that Searle thinks it likely,
that there are, as a matter of fact laws at some level or other,
relating cause and effect (k la Davidson). Therefore, according to
Searle, determinism is, in fact, true (though not entailed by these
singular causal claims); or probably true, at any rate. If my
incompatibilist claims so far are sound, then this would entail that
I cannot act other than how I do act. I could not, when I took the
drink, have done otherwise, nor when I raised my arm, could I have
refrained from raising my arm. This is what makes Searle's
assurance that "it's up to me", whether or not I take a drink of
water when I'm thirsty, puzzling: if there are laws at some or
other bedrock level, which determine whether I take a drink of
water, then in what substantive sense is it "up to me" whether I
take a drink of water? It certainly would not be up to me in the
sense which matters for free will. When dealing specifically with
Davidson as a language strata theorist, I argued that Davidson's
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position was incompatible with the existence of free will; what
makes it so, I believe is the causal theory of action conjoined with
the metaphysical regularity thesis about causation. And Searle
subscribes, largely, to both of these, and therefore leaves us no
better off with regard to free will. As I've said, Van Inwagen
believes the metaphysical thesis to be false (despite his weak
effort, in my view, at demonstrating it); as I also said, he leans
in favour of the (Davidsonian) causal analysis of action.
Let me say at this point that as I already indicated when
speaking of Van Inwagen's illustrative example, I am myself
sceptical as to whether the metaphysical regularity thesis is false
with regard to cases not involving human action; as I said then,
the "gap" in the Van Inwagen kind of example has to be accounted for
if the metaphysical thesis (with regard to non-action cases, at
least) is to be false. I'm not entirely sure what could fill it.
Let us assume for the moment, however, that it is false where cases
of human action (despite Davidson and Searle) are concernedti.e. not
only have we real acts (because, as I said, we have "acts" which are
caused by the subject's desires, beliefs, etc.), but we have
undetermined acts. This is what the causal analysis of action along
with the falsity of the metaphysical regularity thesis about
causation would give us: actual undetermined acts, and not the mere
conceptual feasibility of it (as the falsity of the linguistic
thesis alone conjoined with the causal analysis of action would give
us). We have actual, full-blown, real, undetermined acts. This
would mean that the second strand of the Mind argument would have
been negotiated. Welcome the third strand now, however. How could
we say that an act, such as I have just described it, is a free
act? It shouldn't be difficult to anticipate by now the precise
import of something I said before, namely that the explanatory "gap"
within Van Inwagen's "stone breaking glass" example (as he
documented it) would be echoed and unsatisfactorily negotiated in
the parallel attempt at setting down conditions of undetermined,
free action. Van Inwagen, remember, isn't especially hospitable to
the idea of agent-causation, and so (in parallel with his "shattered
glass" example) he rests content, it seems, with saying that, whilst
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we may not really know how this is the case, an intentional state
which, on one occasion, caused a particular act may on another
occasion (in another possible world) not have caused the same act
even when this particular intentional state was the only thing which
was causally relevant. This idea, with no further explanation,
strikes me as curious indeed. The addition of extra causally
relevant factors, on the "other occasion" would, of course, make all
the difference, but they aren't there. Again, we have this gap:
the world has a given history, and a given set of laws of nature,
and I have a particular intentional state, this being the only thing
which is causally relevant to what I do. Yet, somehow or other,
just at this point, and not before it, causation may suddenly come
up against a brick wall. There is (the story goes) something about
this point which provides the option of causation "not working".
Whether it does, in fact, work or not is (according to Van Inwagen)
a complete mystery. For instance, on one occasion my thirst may
cause me to take a drink of water; however, on another occasion,
with an identical set of laws of nature and my thirst again being
the only causally relevant factor, I might not take a drink of
water. What actually happens at this crucial point, be it a
millionth of a second or whatever, where causation either "works" or
it doesn't? How might it not work? Van Inwagen states this odd
position by saying that he must reject the following proposition:
If an agent's act was caused but not determined by his prior
inner state, and if nothing besides that inner state was
causally relevant to the agent's act, then that agent had no
choice about whether that inner state was followed by that
act.10
He admits to finding it "puzzling" that this proposition should be
false. I, however, find it much worse than that. I, really, find
it intolerable. Not only that, but in light of much of what I have
said already, something even more fundamental may, perhaps, be
apparent concerning Van Inwagen's effort. That is, if this is
really the best Van Inwagen has to offer, then he seems to locate
freedom between the intention and the action intended, and not (as I
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think it reasonble to do) at a step prior to the intention or act of
will. I have made this point already at several junctures, that the
significant questions for free will must include at least questions
about the conditions of intention, choice, desire, belief, act of
will, etc., and not merely questions about the path from intention
(or whatever) to action. So, even if we could make sense of the
supposed falsity of the proposition just stated, it's not clear that
it would be of very much help for free will.
Van Inwagen claims that he finds all the alternatives
inconveivable. However, perhaps he has not done justice to all
possible alternatives. This is where some kind of agent-causation
may be on hand to help. What if we added in to the causally
relevant factors, the agent himself? On one occasion when I'm
thirsty, I take a drink of water; on another such occasion I
don't. It seems (prima facie) that, on both occasions, the only
causally relevant factor was my thirst (coupled, strictly I suppose,
with the belief that to take a drink of water would satisfy my
thirst). But perhaps I am a causally relevant factor. Perhaps,
when faced with thirst and a glass of water in front of me, I either
cause my arm to reach out and take the glass up to my mouth, or I
don't. Perhaps of causal relevance are not only intentional states,
but myself also the bearer of these intentional states. Such an
idea could perhaps fill in the gap which I find unacceptable in Van
Inwagen's indeterministic, causal effort. Agent-causation may seem,
prima facie, somewhat mysterious, but it can hardly be any more so
than what we have just seen Van Inwagen suggest. Van Inwagen seems
to speak as though agent-causation and his (Davidsonian) causal
analysis are mutually exclusive, but I do not see that they are. On
the contrary, (as I've just said), perhaps the addition of the agent
himself to the existing stock of causally relevant factors may
provide (as I suggested) the least repugnant analysis. It will be
useful, I think, in helping us towards a positive theory, to look at
some work by Hugh McCann, his article "Volition and Basic Action"^!.
Before doing this, I expect it will be no surprise that I don't
take the third strand of the Mind argument to be any better a
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positive compatibilist argument than the first, or second strand.
It does nothing by way of counter-evidencing Van Inwagen's First
Formal Argument. It can, at best, be an argument for the
incompatibility of indeterminism and free action. And what I am
presently trying to discover is a way to avoid just this conclusion.
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11. TOWARDS A POSITIVE THEORY?
It is worthwhile, I think, before looking closely at McCann, to
both state the parameters of McCann's exercise and remind ourselves
exactly where we are and what we are trying to establish. I have, I
hope, presented sound arguments for incompatibilism; if determinism
is true, then there is no free will. The problem now being
confronted is how there can be free will if determinism is true; so
far, the notion that we ever act freely whilst determinism is false
seems almost as intractable as the notion that we ever act freely
whilst determinism is true (i.e. as intractable as I have argued the
latter to be). I have just said that, whilst favouring Davidson's
causal analysis of action and Searle's penetrating suggestions in
this area, I find Van Inwagen's final position on how free will is
compatible with indeterminism unacceptable. Remember that I did
say, however, that I am in sympathy with the overall spirit of Van
Inwagen's project. That is, I believe that he is correct to assume
that any possible solution there is, is grounded upon the
realisation that causation without determination is a coherent
possibility (although, as I said, the falsity of determinism
requires the actuality of a set of undetermined causes, the falsity
of both the linguistic and metaphysical 'regularity' theses about
causation). Van Inwagen, as we saw, has (like some others)
suggested that the notion of an undetermined cause occurring in a
natural part of a human being, could well bear fruit and, despite
Van Inwagen's scepticism about agent-causation (or 'immanent
causation', as it is sometimes called), a notion going back to
Aquinas^- and having modern-day back-up from Chisholm^ and Taylor^, I
am presently attempting to discover if this idea can be exploited in
order to help the spirit of Van Inwagen's enterprise become flesh.
Near to the end of "Volition and Basic Action", McCann expresses
recognition of the philosophical context which, through the crucial
notion of the essay, he places himself in:
If terminology is needed to distinguish those actions which
have results from those which do not, I would suggest the words
'transient' and 'immanent' respectively, which were used
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in traditional philosophy to mark a distinction at least very
close to this one.
So, this crucial notion McCann is exploring is that of actions which
do not have results (volitions), which (as he acknowledges), is very
like the old idea (which I've already said a bit about) of 'immanent
causation'. Before discovering what consequences this idea could
possibly have for the hope of free actions being compatible with
indeterminism, it will be necessary to explain it in some measure,
and I will do this in a moment. But I will make one or two
preliminary remarks first.
McCann is not arguing specifically that volitions actually take
place, but is providing a theoretical account of the advantages of
postulating volition. And perhaps one of these advantages will be a
plausible-looking account of how undetermined free action is
possible through a change in a natural part of a human being; or,
at any rate (to invoke a highly useful distinction), if we can turn
what looks like a philosophical perplexity into a problem, then
progress will have been achieved. I hope it is clear that nothing
offered in this area by Aquinas, Chisholm, Taylor or McCann, can
have the slightest import for free will if determinism is true/i.e.
we are assuming here that determinism is false. In fact, near to
the end of this chapter, I will cite what I think is an important
passage from the concluding section of "Volition and Basic Action",
where I think McCann places his efforts very usefully within the
entire context of the problem of free will. Indeed, I will be
wanting to urge, over the course of both this and the next chapter
("Is Determinism Likely to be True?") that the significance McCann
affords thought in his analysis, may well be more fruitful than
McCann himself is prepared to assert, as regards the whole question
of whether determinism is likely to be true.
The important concepts in McCann's enterprise are causally
basic (or just 'basic') actions and volitions. Volitions are
causally basic actions. This requires expansion. A great many of
our actions may be said to consist in bringing about a change.
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Raising my arm is bringing it about that my arm goes up, and moving
a finger is bringing about the finger's motion. In some cases the
change brought about is external to the agent; killing Smith is
bringing it about that Smith dies. When an action is one of
bringing about a certain change, that change may be called the
result of the action in question. Hence the result of raising my
arm is that my arm goes up; that of killing Smith is that Smith
dies (these examples are McCann's). Results are events which are
necessary for those actions whose results they are. But they are
never sufficient for those actions. An event appropriate to serve
as the result of an action A might occur without A occuring at all.
If Smith dies someone may have killed him but no one need have. An
upward motion of my arm does not guarantee that I have raised it
(there is also the 'deviant causal chains' possibility, the
importance of which is clearly brought out by the points we have
just seen Searle make regarding the precise causal relationship
between intention and action). This lack of sufficiency is what
made Wittgenstein's question about arm-raising possible. McCann
calls the general problem of answering such questions the
action-result problem: it is the problem of providing an account of
how it is when events and processes qualify as results of human
actions, they do so qualify. As I have just said, we saw Searle go
some of the way to providing an answer, but it may be that there is
yet more to be said. Indeed, Searle is himself inhospitable to the
concept of agent-causation (hardly surprising in view of his
leanings in favour of the metaphysical 'regularity' thesis about
causation), and one objective here is to examine whether the idea
may be due a more favourable reception.
The initial step is to see why the idea of a causally basic
action is even necessary. As McCann says, besides results, actions
can also have consequences. Like results, consequences are changes
one brings about in performing an act. But unlike results, they are
not essentially tied to the action. Rather, they are caused by it.
Thus the action of moving one's finger might have it as a
consequence that a gun fires. Since the connection between an
action and its result is intrinsic, the result of an action A cannot
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also be a consequence of A. Frequently, though, the result of A
counts as a consequence of an action B of the same agent, which is
in some sense "other" than A. McCann notes that this fact, when it
occurs, generally provides a solution to the action-result problem
for A. For instance, we can go back to McCann's example of killing,
where the agent brings about results external to himself. Killing
Smith (action 'A') might involve bringing it about that a bullet
enters his body (result of B). The entry of the bullet could not be
a result of the killing, but it is the result of an act of shooting
Smith (action B). If Smith dies as a consequence (result of A),
then the result of the act of killing Smith is caused by the act of
shooting him. We would say in such a case that the agent killed
Smith b^_ shooting him. Note, however, that shooting Smith does not
cause the agent's action of killing him: it causes only the result
of that act. We can now move a step towards the idea of a causally
basic action. The pattern of action at issue is that in which an
action B causes the result of an action A of the same agent, but not
A itself. In such cases, we can say that A is a causally nonbasic
action, and that B is causally more basic than A. It should be
clear that the causal pattern is especially useful for dealing with
the action-result problem, since it allows us to explain how the
result of the less basic action A came to occur at all, and explain
it in terms of action on the part of the agent. Thus if killing
Smith involves a causally more basic act of shooting him, we can
appeal to the shooting to explain Smith's death. If we ask the
Wittgensteinian question "when I kill Smith, what is left over if I
subtract the fact that Smith dies?", the answer is "my shooting
Smith". The explanation amounts to a description of how the agent
brought Smith's death about, and bringing about this result _is_ the
action of killing Smith. Thus when an action A involves a causally
more basic action, the fact that it does provides a solution to the
action-result problem for A. The result of A qualifies as a result
because it is brought about by performing the causally more basic
action B.
So far, so good. But it should hardly be difficult to imagine
where the problem is going to arise. Suppose B also has a result,
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as shooting Smith has its result in the bullet entering his body.
We are then obliged to ask how this event qualifies as a result.
And if answering it involves pointing to an action that is causally
still more basic, in this case firing a gun, then we are clearly on
a path that must have an end. For if every action encountered in
this type of analysis involves both a result and a causally more
basic action, one would have to bring about an infinite series of
further changes in order to bring about any change or set of changes
at all. As McCann says, people cannot do this, but they perform
actions with results all the time. Hence the analysis of such
actions in terms of the causal pattern must eventually terminate in
an action that does not involve such a sequence. Such actions are
causally basic, and it looks as though if such an action has a
result, that result does not occur as a consequence of a causally
more basic action. But of course, can causally basic action have a
result at all? Many recent philosophers have believed that the
causally basic action in the case of killing Smith is one of moving
a finger, a consequence of which is that the trigger of the gun is
depressed. If so, we can use the causal pattern to analyse what the
agent does down to this level. But this can't evade the
action-result problem, for bodily actions like moving a finger
always have results: that of moving a finger is that the finger
moves. That of raising an arm is that the arm goes up. And if the
appeal to causally more basic actions is ruled out, we must solve
the action-result problem in these cases by different means. This
is where the idea of volitions could be very useful. McCann makes
what seems to me to be the highly persuasive suggestion that the
causally basic actions are volitions, which are themselves a species
of thought. Before going on to look at what McCann adduces in
favour of this suggestion, let me repeat that, even if McCann's
promptings are as persuasive as I think, there may well persist very
dark areas with regard to how free will is possible. I have already
said that we may eventually have to rest content, for the time
being, with what is merely the least repugnant analysis, and also
that if we reach a point where we have a clearer grasp of what form
any acceptable solution would take, then something will have been
achieved. Van Inwagen, remember, admits to a final puzzlement
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(which I have said I find intolerable), and it may be that we can
improve on that.
McCann is, like myself, aware that it is possible to question
the strategy of treating thinking as an action, and I will later
cite some suggestions of McCann in favour of this ^proach. Let us
assume it for the present, however. The action-result problem does
not seem to arise about thoughts. Unlike acts of moving a finger or
flexing a muscle, thoughts do not seem to have results. McCann
provides the example of the mental act of thinking of the number 1.
Here there seems to be no event I bring about which is logically
required for the act's occurrence, yet not sufficient for it, as the
notion of my finger is in the case where I move it. Nor can my act
of thinking of 1 be considered its own result. Results cannot be
sufficient for the occurrence of the actions whose results they are,
but thinking of 1 is sufficient for thinking of 1. It seems, then,
that to think of the number 1 is not to bring about any result at
all. And (if McCann is correct) the same would seem to apply to all
thinking. If acts of thinking do not have results there can be no
action-result problem about thinking. If there is no result to be
distinguished from an action, there can be no question as to what
makes it a result. If all this is sound, it follows that all acts
of thinking must be causally basic (as I've already indicated, the
whole notion of thinking as a causally basic activity will assume
substantial importance as I come round to consider the whole
question of whether determinism is likely to be true). The worth of
this notion is that it makes acts of thinking especially suitable
for providing a solution to the problem of the threatened regress,
which arises if all actions that do have results are analysed in
terms of the causal pattern. In what I think is a revealing, and
indeed, rather ingenious example, McCann asks us to suppose that he
is attached to a highly advanced electroencephalograph, which
displays a characteristic pattern whenever he thinks of a one-digit
number. An examiner asks him to produce the pattern, which he does
by thinking of the number 1. Here the act of producing the pattern
is causally nonbasic, since the occurrence of the pattern is caused
by mental action. That action, however, is necessarily causally
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basic. We could then say how the occurrence of the pattern
qualifies as the result of the action of producing it, without
analysing the producing of it in terras of any act about which the
action-result problem arises. As I've already indicated, McCann's
ultimate claim is that, since volition is thought, volition must be
causally basic if it occurs at all. Supposing, therefore, that in
the usual case where an action that has a result is performed, the
causally basic action is one of volition, the action-result problem
would be solved. If, for the moment, we waive the problem of
whether determinism is true, there would seem to be a major
advantage afforded by this proposed theory of volition. When a
bodily change is brought about by performing a mental act, that act
seems to serve as the means by which voluntary control over the
change is exerted (I repeat ray present waiving of the problem of
determinism). It would thus constitute the exercise of agency
through which the bodily change and its consequences come to qualify
as results of actions. McCann suggests that in the case of
volition, the mode or manner of the thought can best be described as
the willing of the content. And it is this modality which makes it
practical thought, rather than speculative, assertive, desiderative,
or wishful. That is, volition is_ execution: to will the occurrence
of a change is to enter upon the act of bringing it about. I hope
that it is beginning to look plausible that McCann's suggestions
supplement the efforts of Van Inwagen, Davidson and Searle, which I
have already documented. It will be remembered, I expect, that I
voiced disquiet with the "gap" in Van Inwagen's proposed analysis;
I said that I found it intolerable that an agent may perform a
particular act on one occasion, and on another occasion have the
opportunity to refrain from performing the same act, when the set of
causally relevant factors is identical (i.e. a la Davidson, some set
of desires and beliefs). I am here floating a possible means of
filling in the gap left in Van Inwagen's offering, and it is very
worthwhile, I think, to quote outright at this point, an extract
from McCann's essay, an extract which makes explicit that McCann is,
like myself, aware of the role volition can play towards closing the
(to me, intolerable) gap in the analysis of Van Inwagen:
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This account neatly fills the gap between the mere having of
reasons and intentions, and the occurrence of changes that are
results of actions. If it is correct, the connection between
the two i£ through the agent's executive thought. This
provides a role for intention and reason, as guides to
conscious action...the account does not as far as it goes, do
any violence to the agent's voluntary control in action over
the changes that occur in his body. For it would be through
the action of willing that the control is exercised...Actions
with results would be fully intentional on this account,
provided the result was willed, and was caused in the
anticipated way.
I hope that some clarity has now been given with regard to my
original suggestion that, as well as intentional states, it may well
be fruitful to see whether the agent himself can reasonably be
regarded as a causally relevant factor. I think that McCann has
shown that volition, as a causally basic action, gives some sort of
content to this notion. On one occasion, I take a drink of water
when thirsty. On another occasion, in identical conditions, I don't
take a drink of water. If McCann's analysis is sound, what is
present on the former occasion, and absent on the latter, is a
volition i.e. my willing that I take a drink of water. This, since
it causally basic, is something that I do without having to do
something else. McCann also, I think, provides a persuasive defence
of his claim that volition is, indeed, genuine action, with the
single exception that it lacks a result. Suppose a person engages
in the act of willing that his arm rise. McCann is right, I think,
to say that, besides constituting a conscious act he can know he
performs, it seems perfectly natural to say this act is done by the
agent in order to raise his arm. McCann's most persuasive
consideration is, I think, the case of paralysis. That is, suppose
the arm does not go up, as it surely wouldn't in this case. As
McCann says, it hardly follows that the agent has failed to act
intentionally, and here only the volitional act would be performed.
McCann also notes that it is indeed hard to see how volition could
fail to be intentional. Going back to McCann's shrewd example cited
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already, it is just like thinking of the number 1, where this is
done to produce a wave pattern. And similar examples can be used to
show that a great deal, at least, of our thinking is intentional.
Whilst I feel it essential not to beg any questions at this point
regarding what is, after all, the central issues I am addressing in
this thesis, namely questions of free will, determinism and moral
responsibility, it is true that (as McCann notes) ordinary moral
discourse is replete with cases wherein people are held responsible
for thoughts, and a person would be held responsible for whether he
engaged in willing if, for example, the act was meant to constitute
a text for paralysis. Whilst I think that McCann is sometimes
guilty, in "Volition and Basic Action", of doing the kind of thing I
have just warned agains^i.e. running together volition, intention
and responsibility, thus begging the question in favour of free
will, he is, I think, right to say that the kind of considerations
just adduced certainly support the contention that volition is
action (I will of course, come to consider the import of all this
X w
for free actions, soon). Whether/yfree action is, of course, another
matter and ordinary moral discourse, in holding people responsible
for thoughts, seems to beg the question here. Assuming that moral
responsibility does indeed require free will (I will conclude by
considering and rejecting some opposition to this claim), then we
can only be morally responsible for our thoughts if we have them
freely ^i.e. if we could do other than have them. However, for the
moment, if McCann's suggestions are generally sound, then volition
has all the features of the normal intentional action of raising
one's arm or moving a finger, except that it lacks a result.
As I've already indicated, neither McCann nor myself believe
the offerings of "Volition and Basic Action" to be any kind of last
word, not, at any rate, where questions of free will, determinism,
compatibilism, incompatibilism and responsibility are concerned. It
is essential, of course, not to lose sight of the fact that it is
these issues which I am concerned with, and any concern I have given
to the theory of action will only be of any help in so far as it
helps us with regard to issues within free will and determinism. So
the question which must now be addressed is this: assuming that
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McCann's theoretical defence of the notion of volition is plausible
(as I believe it to be), exactly where does it get us vis a vis the
issues with which I am concerned? There is a perfectly simple sense
in which I believe the answer to be "nowhere at all". That is,
despite what I've just noted as seemingly question-begging,
tendencies on the part of McCann, McCann's offerings do absolutely
nothing so far as I can see to evidence any of free will,
determinism, compatibilism or incompatibilism. Remember that the
reason I am looking at him at all is to explore a possible way of
making the compatibility of free will and indeterminism
theoretically plausible; yet, nothing he has said (even if it is
all defensible) itself entails the falsity of determinism (and
therefore, of course, according to my incompatibilist claims the
possibility of free will). That is, it seems to me that volitions
may take place and be, in the sense which he suggests, causally
basic, and yet determinism be true, and hence free will false.
There is no incompatibility, in so far as I can see, between
McCann's suggestions, and (say) Van Inwagen's (fantasy) (M)
hypothesis, or Ginet's H hypothesis. Volitions may be causally
basic actions of mine, they may be actions of mine which lack a
result, actions which I perform without doing anything else first,
yet they may themselves be determined by Martians, by
physiological-cum-environmental laws, or in some sense by the past
taken together with the laws of nature. I may be thirsty, and may
or may not take a drink of water; whether I do, in fact, take one
may indeed turn on whether I will to do so. Yet this last factor,
whether I do, in fact, will to take a drink of water, may itself be
determined by Martians, physiological-cum-environmental laws, or in
some way or other the past taken together with the laws of nature.
That is, my willing may, strictly, be as much outwith my control as
are the past and the laws of nature. It may be causally basic in
that I don't to anything else in order to do it, but if (M) is true,
then a Martian does something in order that I do it, and so the
volition is in no way a free action of mine. Similarly, with the
truth of any determinist hypothesis. In the important passage which
I alluded to earlier, McCann both expresses awareness of this
feature, and provides what I think is probably a crucial
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contextualising of his theory, with regard to the problem of free
will:
But the great problems about action remain. They are, of
course, the free will problem and the related problems of the
nature of agency (of which the action-result problem is only a
relatively insignificant part), and whether desires and beliefs
cause action. I see no decisive solution to any of them in
what I have said here, largely because volition has primarily
to do with the execution of intention, whereas the free will
problem is mainly concerned with its formation. But both the
formation and execution of intention are functions of mental
agency...so perhaps what has been said here will help lead us
in a more fruitful direction than some that have been followed
recently. For the most important thing about the free will
problem is that it is a problem about the will.
As I hope to clarify and defend through the remainder of this
chapter and part of the next one, McCann's remark that "both the
formation and execution of intention are functions of mental agency"
could be crucial, both in helping discover whether determinism is
likely to be true, and (optimistically) in helping ground a positive
theory of undetermined, free action. On the question of the former,
I hope it has been borne out to some measure by my preceding
comments that, thoughts are causally basic actions, then we seem,
in a sense, to be back at square one in asking "are thoughts
determined?". I will be returning to this in the next chapter.
On the question of the latter, what if determinism is false?
How could McCann's offerings help us see how free action is
possible? As I've said, I think that McCann's model by no means
removes all mystery from this area. However, I think it does help
us to at least see precisely where the problem of free will could be
located if determinism is false, and provides us with a plausible
theoretical framework within which any solution (should it ever be
found) would sit. Or to put it again as I did earlier, it helps us
make the move from perplexity to problem. Remember that I expressed
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dissatisfaction with the "gap" in the account favoured by Van
Inwagen. I am now saying that McCann gives us some reason to
believe that this gap could be filled by another causally relevant
factor,i.e. the agent. And since the formation of intention is also
a function of mental agency (as McCann pointed out), it also seems
not implausible to regard the agent as a causally relevant factor in
the formation of intention.
Van Inwagen suggested (remember) that it wasn't clear that an
undetermined change in a natural part of a human being couldn't be
the cause of a free action, and I am now suggesting that there may
be some plausibility to the notion that the agent himself (assuming
determinism to be false, of course) could be the cause of such a
change (or, at least, one causally relevant factor). Let us go back
again to an example of McCann's. I produce the pattern on the
electroencephalograph by thinking of the number 1. The mental
action is causally basic; I, it seems, cause the mental action
without doing anything else first (or at least, I certainly seem to
be one causally relevant factor), which in turn causes a
brain-change, resulting in the pattern displayed. If_ determinism is
false, and this model correct, then it would seem to be the case
that (as Van Inwagen favours) an undetermined change can occur in a
natural part of a human being in such a way that free action may be
grounded, and that ^ am a causally relevant factor in bringing about
this change (this feature itself grounding the idea that the action
is free and helping fill the intolerable gap in Van Inwagen's
suggested Davidsonian analysis , the gap which makes free action
look no less odd than if determinism were true).
I say again that I feel no temptation to invest too much in
this notion. I repeat that it seems to provide no more than a
theoretical framework which gives the idea of undetermined, free
action some substance. I am perfectly well aware that it does
itself throw up very difficult, and for the time being possibly even
intractable questions. I admit that there is still something
mysterious-looking about my simply causing something without doing
something else first. Indeed, I readily concede that the whole
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picture seems to throw up a whole set of worries normally associated
with Descartes' project. The idea of my causing myself to think of
the number 1, for instance, and this in turn causing a physical
modification,i.e. a brain-change, seems a paradigm case for
anti-Cartesian objections. It seems that we must, straight off, be
assuming the existence of a self with certain causal powers, and
itself standing in an enclosed, protected, yet causally powerful
relationship with its thoughts (a set of which are its volitions).
I humbly accept that such problems seem enormous. I cannot say that
I am confident about what the self is; I cannot say that I know how
such a self could have the required relationship with its volitions
and how the latter could have the causal efficacy which is
required. I am not confident either about how such a self would
ground action, free or otherwise. I cannot say that I know how
thought could have the autonomy, primacy, basicness and causal
efficacy which the model requires. However, it seems to me that the
squaring of free action with indeterminism requires something like
the combining of Davidson's causal analysis and the idea of
agent-causation, such as I have documented. At least, it would
leave us knowing precisely what the problems are; it seems to me
then, that any squaring of free will with indeterminism must
inevitably lead us into the most basic Mind-Body territory. If one
thinks that the kind of problems which I have left hanging, and to
which I know no answer, are an intolerable burden, then if one also
accepts my incompatibilist claims, one will prefer to entertain that
free will is impossible. Of course, it may yet be that determinism
is true and (assuming incompatibilism) free will false, in which
case the intractable-looking problems I have just cited will hardly
matter here. This is something I will now address,i.e. whether
determinism is likely to be true.
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Notes
1. In St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, 54,2.
2. In "Freedom and Action" (Freedom and Determinism, ed. Lehrer).
3. In Action and Purpose.
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12. IS DETERMINISM LIKELY TO BE TRUE?
As I will elucidate, I think that there are reasons for
believing determinism to be false, and hence free will a
possibility. However, before providing these reasons, I think it
essential for me to say something about a whole tradition of thought
in this area, a position (or set of positions) according to which
there is either a particular kind of reason (which I will document)
for believing that determinism is false, or that the issues of
determinism and compatibilism are at bottom, irrelevant with respect
to the question of moral responsibility. Although there are, as
I've indicated, a few variants of this position, I think it
reasonable to group them together, largely because of the common
debt they owe to Kant. The arguments are all, I think, essentially
Kantian in character. Proponents have included Wilfrid Sellars^,
Daniel Dennett^ and, most famously, P.F. Strawson^. Indeed, Donald
Davidson's views on several related issues are essentially the same
in spirit, and (as I will also elucidate) Van Inwagen makes a
similar move at one juncture.
What these contributions also have in common is that they
provide what seem to me a set of defective arguments, a set of
defective reasons for believing that determinism is false, or that
its truth or falsity could be of no relevance regarding issues of
free will and responsibility. In truth, it is perhaps very valuable
to isolate Van Inwagen from the others I have mentioned here, since
it is really only he who believes that determinism looks false, on
the kind of grounds under consideration. For the time being, let me
say that I do not think Van Inwagen's claims on this point are
sound, and I will return to them properly. The others however, are
really the class of philosopher who believe that the question of
determinism simply could not be of relevance to the questions of
free will, moral responsibility, and the reactive attitudes which
seem to depend on them (I hesitate to call this position
compatibilist, since it seems, indeed, to be itself grounded on the
claim that the whole idea of a compatibilist problem is illusory;
Van Inwagen is different, in this regard). According to this, it is
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not possible for the reactive attitudes to be philosophically
undermined in general by any belief about the universe or human
action, including the belief in determinism. This extract from near
to the end of Strawson's essay, expresses the essence of this view:
Inside the general structure or web of human attitudes and
feelings of which I have been speaking, there is endless room
for modification, redirection, criticism and justification.
But questions of justification are internal to it. The
existence of the general framework of attitudes itself is
something we are given with the fact of human society. As a
whole, it neither calls for, nor permits, an external
'rational' justification.
As Thomas Nagel acknowledges^, Strawson's claims here run parallel
with those he makes about knowledge. According to this,
justification and criticism make sense only within the system:
justification of the system from outside is unnecessary, and
therefore criticism from outside is impossible. I have already
mentioned in connection with Harry G. Frankfurt, the transition from
the subjective standpoint to its objective counterpart, and I
believe that Nagel is right to say that Strawson's position is
incorrect because there is no way of preventing the slide from
internal to external criticism once we are capable of an external
view. As Nagel says, it needs nothing more than the ordinary idea
of responsibility. The problem of free will, like the problem of
scepticism, does not arise because of a philosophically imposed
demand for external justification of the entire system of ordinary
judgements and attitudes. It arises because there is a continuity
between familiar "internal" criticism of the reactive attitudes on
the basis of specific facts, and philosophical criticisms on the
basis of supposed general facts. When we consider the possibility
that all human actions may be determined by events in the past and
the laws of nature taken together (or for that matter, by Martians),
it threatens to defuse our reactive attitudes as effectively as does
the information that a particular action was caused by the effects
of a drug - despite all the differences between the two
236
suppositions. No new standards have come into play here, since all we
are doing is generalising familiar standards of criticism. We cease
to resent what someone has done if we cease to see the alternatives
as alternatives for him, something which would be the case if both
determinism and incompatibilism were true. Nagel himself usefully
fills out the epistemological parallel here. That is, the extremely
general possibilities of error that the sceptic imagines, undermine
confidence in all our beliefs in just the way that a more mundane
particular possibility of error undermines confidence in a
particular belief. The possibility of complete erosion by sceptical
possibilities is built into our ordinary beliefs from the start: it
is not created by the philosophical imposition of new standards of
justification or certainty. On the contrary, new justifications
seem to be required only in response to the threat of erosion from
ordinary criticisms, sufficiently generalised. In the case of
action, some of the externally imposed limitations and constraints
are evident to us. If we discover others, not as obvious, then our
reactive attitudes towards the affected action tend to be defused,
for it seems no longer attributable in the required way to the
person who must be the target of those attitudes. And, as Nagel
says, the philosophical challenges to free will are nothing but
radical extensions of this encroachment. If our actions are, in
fact, determined by the past conjoined with the laws of nature, then
our reactive attitudes would be entirely defused, incoherent. The
push to objectivity opens up this possibility and, as Nagel says,
the push to objectivity is a part of the framework of human life.
And it could only be stopped from leading to sceptical results in
areas of knowledge, action or anything else, if the external view of
human life could be shown to be illegitimate - so that our questions
had to stop before we got there.
Indeed, not only am I in agreement with Nagel's remarks here,
but I have been persistently nonplussed at both the frequency with
which Strawson's and related positions have been expressed, and the
respect which they have generated. In fact, it strikes me as so
clearly incorrect that it requires more a diagnosis than a
refutation. What is lying at the bottom of it, I think, is
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something fairly primitive, and perhaps not fully articulable.
However, a glimmer of light can be shed on what it actually is,
through these lines from Wordsworth:
Ye dreamers, then
Forgers of daring tales! we bless you then,
Imposters, drivellers, dotards, as the ape
Philosophy will call you...^
The idea in question seems to be that philosophical analysis, the
drive to objectivity, is some kind of rival which has to be beaten
off, in certain areas at least. I said at the beginning of this
section that there were variants of this position, and in the cases
I have seen, I have sometimes found it difficult to know precisely
what position is being propounded, and indeed I have sometimes
thought that the same essay slides between different positions (I
include Sellars and Strawson here). That is, it sometimes appears
(as Nagel describes Strawson), that what is being said is that the
questions themselves which appear perfectly real to Nagel and
myself, are empty. Other times it appears that what is being said
is that questions of determinism and free will are real, but only
within certain contexts, when we have a certain set of
("scientific") interests motivating us; they are inappropriate from
the viewpoint of human action and moral responsibility. Sellars'
position, in particular, often seems to be this one, and my
suspicion is that it is this one which Davidson really entertains as
well; it seems to be a case of our having two largely unrelated
possible standpoints on our behaviour^i.e. (loosely) the
scientific/objective and the intentional. We adopt whichever one we
fancy according to our motivation; the neurophysiologist who is
interested in prediction (say) will adopt the former and from this
standpoint, notions of free will and responsibility seem empty, but
when we want to entertain reactive attitudes, we can switch channel
quite calmly to the latter, and away we go, with free will,
responsibility, praise, blame and all the rest of it. Yet another
variant is one which acknowledges the reality of the problem, that
determinism is a genuine thesis, that its truth would leave us (when
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we are doing philosophy, at any rate) puzzled about the source of
our reactive attitudes, but that we ought simply to make a gallant
stand against the enquiring impulse on behalf of other aspects of
our make-up. This seems to me a particularly desperate manoeuvre,
and I think it is exemplified here in this footnote to Strawson's
"Freedom and Resentment":
...Quite apart from the issue of determinism might it not be
said that we should be nearer to being purely rational
creatures in proportion as our relation to others was in fact
dominated by the objective attitude? I think this might be
said: only it would have to be added once more, that if such a
choice were possible, it would not necessarily be rational to
choose to be more purely rational than we are.
As I hope I've made clear by now, I believe that every strand of
this general position is defective. The kind of criticisms made by
Nagel really cut across every one of them. Nor (as I indicated) am
I impressed by Van Inwagen's suggestion that the very best possible
reason for believing, not only in the falsity of determinism, but in
the truth of the free will thesis, is the undoubted reality of moral
responsibility. If it is agreed (as it is by Van Inwagen) that
moral responsibility requires free will, then it seems to me
intolerable that one should accept the reality of moral
responsibility in the absence of independent evidence in favour of
free will. We must have reason to believe that we have free will
before we can entertain any thoughts of moral responsibility; it
seems to me fatuous to argue the other way. Free will (as the
considerable labours of Van Inwagen himself bear out) is far too
difficult a thesis to be made parasitic upon the kind of persuasive
points in favour of moral responsibility, which are adduced by Van
Inwagen. The kind of Strawsonian points Van Inwagen documents are
not only familiar enough, but generally true, I would expect. He is
right to say that people believe in the reality of moral
responsibility, that they behave as though moral responsibility were
a given. He is clearly right to say that few people will react to
an act of gratuitous injury deliberately done them by a human being
239
in the way that they would react if that same injury were caused by
a bolt of lightning or a bough broken by the wind. When some person
injures us - at least if we believe he knew what he was doing and
that he could have helped doing it - we react in certain
characteristically human ways: we blame, we remonstrate, we hate,
we reflect on the futility of hate, we plan revenge, etc. As I say,
this is all uncontroversial enough, but it does not seem to me to be
genuine evidence that we have free will, and that we are, in fact,
morally responsible. These familiarities do not of themselves
counter-evidence the thesis that all our actions are determined by
events in the past and the laws of nature taken together; they do
not counter-evidence (for instance) Ginet's H hypothesis or, indeed,
Van Inwagen's fantasy (M) hypothesis. Whether the kind of facts Van
Inwagen cites about our behaviour and attitudes are rationally
justified is itself contingent upon whether we have free will, and
this itself must be dealt with on its own independent merits. As we
have already seen Van Inwagen himself warn, the world may appear to
be exactly the same, regardless of the actual truth of the
respective determinist and free will theses. Van Inwagen here seems
to forget his own directive; Nagel's riposte applies as much, I
think, to what Van Inwagen says here, as it does to the comments of
Strawson and Sellars. As I've already said at various junctures,
the questions of free will and moral responsibility can only gain a
very limited input from ordinary appearances; this is really
another way of making Nagel's point that the slide from internal to
external criticism cannot be avoided. This realisation is really of
monumental significance. In order to gain evidence either way about
determinism, and hence about the possibility of free will (and
therefore, moral responsibility) we cannot, despite what we have
just seen Van Inwagen say, fudge the following question: is there
any reason to believe that human actions are uniquely determined by
the past and the laws of nature taken together? No matter how much
philosophers may try to evade it (as so many tend to), there is no
way of escaping the relevance of hard data on this issue.
But, as Van Inwagen himself documents, the evidence gives us
little reason to believe that determinism is true. It is almost a
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banality, for instance, that the standard interpretation of quantum
mechanics is indeterministic. And there is, as Van Inwagen also
notes, little to commend the objection that quantum-mechanical
indeterminacy applies only to unobservable submicroscopic events and
not to the observable events of everyday life. Quantum mechanics is
a physical theory, and is thus as legitimately applied to the
behaviour of a glacier, an elephant, or (most importantly, of
course), a human being as to the behaviour of a neutrino or a
positron. Also, of course, the domain of the submicroscopic and the
domain of the observable are not causally isolated from each other.
Individual submicroscopic events can "trigger" observable events.
Van Inwagen provides the example of the Geiger counter. The passage
of a single alpha particle or electron or burst of high energy
electromagnetic radiation through a tube of gas can sufficiently
ionise the gas in the immediate vicinity of the path of the intruder
to produce an effect that - after suitable amplification, which a
Geiger counter is designed to provide - registers an audible click.
Generally, what is of real importance is that actual matter, matter
that obeys the rules of quantum mechanics is intrinsically incapable
of carrying within itself the perfectly deterministic dispositions
to future behavour that strict determinism requires. And, whilst
neither Van Inwagen nor myself understand the issues to any serious
extent, twentieth-century physics has not supported any attempt at
embedding quantum mechanics within a more general deterministic
theory. Most importantly, of course, no evidence has been collected
to support the belief that human beings are determined. To
reiterate, then, there would seem to be two ways in which scientific
evidence could convince us we are determined; first, we might
believe this, as Laplace did, on the basis of our most general
physical theories (which apply to all physical systems and hence to
us); secondly, we might believe this on the basis of the empirical
study of man. But our most general physical theories are no longer
deterministic. And the empirical study of man has a long way to go
before it will be in a position to tell us anything about whether we
are or are not determined.
These points are all, I think, very important, but what I think
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is a very persuasive and generally neglected point against
determinism being true, is also the one which I think provides
reason to believe that we have free will. Remember that the falsity
of determinism is itself no guarantee of free will; as I devoted
some time to, making free will compatible with indeterminism is also
a very difficult task. What I want to say here does not, of course,
entail either the falsity of determinism or the truth of free will,
but it does, I think, make both seem likely. I said earlier that I
think there is some merit in McCann's idea of volition as thought,
the latter being a class of actions which lack a result, and whilst
(as I said) nothing offered by McCann is incompatible with
determinism, what I want to say here is germane in that it is
thought, or certain features of it, which both make determinism seem
unlikely, and ground the likelihood of free will.
Let me deal first with determinism. This may seem to some
somewhat weak, and indeed some may not even take it seriously as an
argument at all, but it seems simply unlikely to me that all of the
thoughts which humans are constitutionally capable of having are
uniquely determined by the past and the laws of nature taken
together. That there are, in principle, laws of nature accounting
for every thought (given the past) which everyone has ever had seems
to me to be a very difficult thesis to believe. At any rate, its
truth would seem to me to demand, at the very least, an extension of
the concept "law of nature", which is (at the moment, anyway)
difficult to entertain. That is, the idea that laws of nature could
be the kind of thing which, conjoined with facts about the past,
would account for every thought I have ever had (and, given the
causal role of thought, every action I have ever performed), just
seems something there is little reason to believe. Even the most
sophisticated and detailed laws of nature which we entertain seem to
fall far short of this possibility. There are certain things I do
not want to deny, namely that laws of nature are, in principle,
always discoverable, and (probably more importantly) that a very
large part of the intentional lives of all human beings is
relatively simple, straightforward, primitive. I appeciate, on the
latter issue, that we are by no means all of us, all of the time,
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trying to find ways of solving Zeno's Paradoxes, wondering how
judgements of taste are possible or indeed, whether there is reason
to believe that either free will or determinism is true. Perhaps
the idea of determinism with regard to the more primitive features
of the mental lives of human beings is not so unlikely, but this
itself does not seem to me to alter the fact that it seems unlikely
to be true with regard to the most sophisticated operations of which
humans are intellectually capable. For instance, I have had, here,
some very precise and detailed things, as opposed to some different
set of very precise and detailed things, to say on the issues of
free will, determinism, compatibilism, incompatibilism, action and
responsibility. I find it very difficult to entertain the idea that
the past and the laws of nature taken together could account for why
I have said one set of very precise and detailed things as opposed,
indeed, to an enormous set (in principle) of different, equally
detailed and precise things. Is it really plausible to suppose that
the past and the laws of nature taken together uniquely determine
that (for instance), I support incompatibilism, think that the
history of compatibilism is a catalogue of cheap tricks, think that
some of Van Inwagen's attempts at disparaging the metaphysical
'regularity' thesis about causation are weak, or (for that matter)
that Witte«-genstein changed his view on the Picture Theory of
Meaning or that Nagel thinks realism about the external world is
likely to be true? I repeat my awareness that these features are
all, strictly, compatible with determinism. They just make it
unlikely, I think. And, as I've already indicated, this has back-up
from neurophysiology, the present state of which does not evidence
that the brain is a strictly deterministic system. These kind of
considerations make it no accident, I think, that we have not yet
discovered even one of the "physiological-cum-environmental" laws
which Ginet postulates, and which would exhaustively account for the
actions of (in Ginet's example) the man giving the paper. Of
course, if Ginet's H hypothesis is true, these laws would account
for all human action. My suspicion is that there are no such laws,
none waiting to be discovered, even by the most sophisticated
technique. Again, it seems very unlikely to me that the fact that
the man in Ginet's example says one very precise, detailed set of
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things to his audience, as opposed to any number of other sets can
be accounted for by the past and the laws of nature taken together.
I see no reason to believe that the Intentional can be entirely
subsumed under laws of nature, despite the obviously intimate links
between the intentional and the brain. Of course, it could be the
case. But I think it unlikely. Despite (I repeat) the obviously
intimate links between mental operations and the brain's workings,
there seems to me to be some reason to believe, with regard to some
domain at least, in a primacy of the mental, a basicness of the
mental,i.e. mental operations which need not refer us back to a more
basic neurophysiological, and which cannot be explained by reference
to the past and the laws of nature taken together. Although I am
well aware of the difficulties with this notion, it is also, at
bottom, as I've already indicated, the source of my belief that free
will is likely to be true. I have already said that I believe there
to be merit in McCann's defence of volition, that volition is
thought and is causally basic. It is this idea, taken together with
what I have just said regarding the primacy of at least some
thought, which grounds my belief that it is likely we have free
will. That is, two premises, (i) volition as thought, and (ii)
primacy of (at least some) thought. This may seem a very weak
defence of free will, and I am aware, obviously, of major
difficulties. I have already stated these, really, when I spoke
specifically about McCann himself, and, of course, the problems seem
to have a recognisably Cartesian flavour about them. How thought
could be primary in the sense in which I speak of, how I could just
cause a change in my brain or body without doing something else
first, are questions to which I cannot say I know the answer. Nor
does anyone, I would think. What is clear is that, if there is
anything to be said at all for my suggestions, the Free Will Problem
must inevitably lead on to problems of the Self and, of course,
Mind-Body. Both of these issues, of course, demand a separate piece
of work. I have little to say on either, except to float a
suggestion of Nagel's on the Mind/Body problem, to which I think
there is merit:
Can one thing have two distinct essential properties that are
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not necessarily connected with each other? This seems possible
if the two properties are different aspects of a single
essence. For example, a tiger is essentially both a mammal and
a carnivore, but those two properties are not always linked.
They are linked in the case of the tiger because both are parts
of the essential nature of the species - a particular type of
mammal that can live only on certain kinds of food, and has
other essential charactertistics as well...presumably something
similar would have to be true if mental processes had physical
properties. They couldn't be just slapped together. Both must
be essential components of a more fundamental essence.6
What such a fundamental essense could possibly be, I have little
idea. And, as I've said, I do not think that we can properly grasp
how free will is possible until we know at least something about
this fundamental essence. That is the point where things are left,
I think. The perplexities have at least been transformed into
problems. As I've said and tried to defend, I think it most
reasonable to believe
(i) incompatibilism is true,
(ii) determinism is false,
(iii) free will is true.
There are still, as I've acknowledged, deep problems. The problem
of free will won't go away.
As should be clear, I have also been assuming all along that
moral responsibility requires free will, that one is only
responsible if one could have done otherwise. According to this, of
course, the truth of determinism (assuming incompatibilism) would
kill off moral responsibility entirely. I do myself share this
belief, but it has recently met with some opposition. According to
a paper by Harry G. Frankfurt^, one can be morally responsible even
if one could not have done otherwise. I disagree with Frankfurt on
this, and will conclude with a brief examination of his comments.
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Notes
1. In "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man".
2. In "Mechanism and Responsibility".
3. In "Freedom and Resentment".
4. In The View From Nowhere, Ch. VII (4).
5. In The Prelude. Book V, (521-526).
6. In The View From Nowhere, Ch. Ill, (5).
7. In "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities", The Journal
of Philosophy, 1969.
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13. COULD MORAL RESPONSIBILITY NOT REQUIRE FREE WILL?
Why is it supposed that movements cannot be actions? One main
reason can be brought out by noticing that the same movement in
one sense of those words, may occur in both the knee-jerk
reflex, and in the action of moving one's lower leg...All that
needs to be said about this is that there is a perfectly clear
sense in which the same movement does not occur in the two
cases...They are not identical, or instances of the same
movement-type, in that, one does not derive from intention, and
one does.l
It is this kind of realisation made by Honderich, an observation
about event-identity, and the role which intention (or its absence)
may play in this, which, at bottom, provides a rebut to the
suggestions of Frankfurt, which I am about to document. Indeed, I
think that the general form of the rebut is remarkably simple, and
that Van Inwagen's defence of the belief that moral responsibility
requires free will is somewhat laboured. I will therefore myself
devote only a little time to this discussion, since I think it
doesn't really require much more.
A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he
could have done otherwise.
Frankfurt calls this the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP),
and attempts to construct counter-examples to it. I will cite Van
Inwagen's own Frankfurt-style example. Suppose there is a man
called Gunnar who has decided to shoot his colleague, Ridley.
Suppose a third man, Cosser, very much desires that Gunnar shoot
Ridley. Cosser is delighted with Gunnar's present intention to
shoot Ridley, but he realises that people sometimes change their
minds. So he devises a plan: if Gunnar should change his mind
about shooting Ridley, Cosser will cause Gunnar to shoot Ridley.
Van Inwagen asks us to suppose that Cosser is able directly to
manipulate Gunnar's nervous system, and is thus able, in the fullest
and strongest sense of the word, to cause Gunnar to act according to
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his wishes. We suppose, moreover, that there is nothing Gunnar can
do about Cosser's intentions or about the power Cosser has over his
acts. It would seem therefore, that Gunnar has no choice about
whether he shoots Ridley. If he does not change his mind he will
shoot Ridley. If he does change his mind, he will shoot Ridley.
Every possible future that is open to him is a future in which he
shoots Ridley. Van Inwagen recognises that these futures are of two
sorts: those in which he shoots Ridley without having been caused
to do so by Cosser and those in which he shoots Ridley only because
Cosser caused him to. And perhaps he has a choice about which of
these sorts the actual future will belong to. But he has n£ choice
about whether the actual future will belong to one of these two
sorts, and hence no choice about whether he shoots Ridley. Yet we
would hold Gunnar responsible if he shoots Ridley without having
been caused to do by Cosser. Yet he could not have done other than
shoot Ridley. Does this falsify PAP?
I hope that the Honderich extract has provided a clue to my
reply to this notion. Strictly speaking, it is not the mere
shooting of Ridley which Gunnar may be held responsible for;
despite the fact that Gunnar will shoot Ridley anyway, the
centrality of intention, or its absence, is crucial to the
individuation of the event. That is, Gunnar's shooting Ridley as a
result of being caused to do so by Cosser is a different event from
his shooting Ridley as a result of his own intention to do so. In
the former case, Gunnar clearly could not have done otherwise: he
could not do other than shoot Ridley as the effect of Cosser's
causing, and consequently (by PAP), Gunnar is not held responsible
for shooting Ridley. In the latter case however, Gunnar could do
other than shoot Ridley as a result of his intention to shoot Ridley
(assuming free will, of course), and it is this precise event,
individuated by the presence of intention as much as the former one
is individuated by the absence of intention, for which Gunnar is
held responsible. The reason why the question of intention is so
important to the individuation of the events is precisely that it
tends to be assumed (rightly or wrongly) that behaviour which is
caused by my intentions is behaviour with regard to which I am free,
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behaviour which I could refrain from adopting and behaviour,
therefore, for which I am to be held responsible. This would not be
so in the case of behaviour which is caused by Cosser's manipulating
me. If free will is false, of course, then it is not true that I
could act other than how I do in the case of behaviour which is
caused by my intentions, but I repeat that intention is only
regarded as a criterion of moral responsibility (and hence a
criterion of event-individuation in the case at issue here) because
of the assumption that we are free with regard to what our
intentions are. If I am not, in fact, free with regard to what my
intentions are, then I would think there no reason to hold me
responsible for behaviour which is caused by my intentions. Despite
the fact that Gunnar shoots Ridley in both cases, the event for
which he is held responsible is a different event from that for
which he is not so held: "shooting Ridley as the effect of the
intention to shoot Ridley" is something Gunnar was (perhaps) able to
refrain from doing, and is consequently responsible for it, whilst
"shooting Ridley as the effect of Cosser's causing" is something
Gunnar is unable to refrain from doing, and something, consequently,
for which he is not responsible. This is paralleled in the
Honderich example at the beginning: although in some sense of the
words, the movement is the same, a knee-jerk reflex is a different
event from the moving of one's lower leg. The latter case, as
Honderich says, is something which is the effect of intention, and
is consequently something for which I may (at any rate) be
responsible, whilst the knee-jerk is not an effect of intention, is
clearly a case where I could not have done otherwise, and
consequently a case where I am not responsible. I think that this
kind of move therefore, does nothing to counter-evidence PAP. I see
no reason whatever to believe PAP false. And indeed, the comments
of Searle which I cited earlier, should leave us in no doubt as to
the centrality of intention in action-individuation. (Whilst I am
confident of the truth of PAP, I may have seemed to suggest a more
watertight connection between responsibility and intention than
there probably is. For an excellent discussion of some confusions
in this area, see Peter A. French's essay "Fishing the Red Herrings
Out of the Sea of Moral Responsibility"^). I believe PAP to be true
249
and since I believe it likely that we have free will, I think it




In Honderich, "One Determinism".
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